RESUMO O artigo trata da apropriação fenomenológica das epístolas aos Tessalonicenses levada a termo por Martin Heidegger em sua prelação do semestre de inverno de 1920-1921 intitulada “Introdução à Fenomenologia da Religião”, quando era assistente de Edmund Husserl na Universidade de Freiburg. A preleção foi publicada pela primeira vez no quadro da Edição Integral das obras de Heidegger em 1995. No artigo considerarei especialmente a noção de temporalidade escatológica a partir da análise do fenômeno cristão da παρoυσíα fora do contexto (...) do sercrente e de sua consequente fundamentação teológica. Portanto, a proposta do presente estudo sobre o jovem Heidegger consistirá, em primeiro lugar, no “status quaestionis” da pesquisa sobre a referida preleção acadêmica e sua relação com o Denkweg de Heidegger. Em segundo lugar, destacarei a peculiaridade da leitura das epístolas de Paulo no contexto de uma abordagem fenomenológica a partir do conceito de “pré-compreensão” no sentido de que há um sentido a ser procurado em um fenômeno sem ainda determiná-lo teoricamente. Esta categoria metodológica indica um horizonte para o qual é preciso avançar realizando uma metamorfose do si. Em terceiro lugar, examinarei o §26 da segunda parte da mesma preleção acadêmica que versa sobre a “expectativa da parusia” no Cristianismo das Origens para explicitar especialmente as conexões entre historicidade e modalidade da vida autenticamente vivida, bem como a estrutura da temporalidade vivida pelo Cristianismo das origens: “a experiência fática da vida é histórica. A religiosidade cristã vive a temporalidade como tal”. ABSTRACT The article deals with the phenomenological appropriation of the epistles to the Thessalonians carried out by Martin Heidegger in his lecture of the winter semester of 1920-1921 entitled "Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion", when he was assistant to Edmund Husserl at the University of Freiburg. The lecture was first published in the context of the Integral Edition of Heidegger's works in 1995. In the article, I will especially consider the notion of eschatological temporality from the analysis of the Christian phenomenon of the παρoυσíα outside the context of the believer and its consequent theological foundation. Therefore, the proposal of the present study on the young Heidegger will consist, in first place, in the "status quaestionis" of the research on the said academic lecture and its relation with the Denkweg of Heidegger. In second place, I will highlight the peculiarity of the reading of Paul's epistles in the context of a phenomenological approach from the concept of "pre-comprehension" in the sense that there is a meaning to be sought in a phenomenon without yet determining it theoretically. This methodological category indicates a horizon for which one must advance by performing a metamorphosis of the self. In third place, I shall examine § 26 of the second part of the same academic lecture dealing with the "expectation of the parusia" in Christianity of Origins in order to explicate especially the connections between historicity and modality of an authentically lived life, as well as the structure of temporality experienced by Christianity of the origins: "the factual experience of life is historical. Christian religiosity lives temporality as such". (shrink)

The question of whether Heidegger’s phenomenological contribution to the philosophy of being originates from his pre-philosophical attitude to theology or rather, it is the methodological question of phenomenology which influenced his thinking, is one of the most essential questions in Heidegger-research. Though, this has already been elaborated on in a broader sense, the publication of the Black Notes has opened new dimensions for discussion. It is not the aim of this paper to represent Heidegger’s concept of the history of being (...) in the light of the new debates, but rather to confirm the thesis, that, in spite of the ‘turn’; in Heidegger’s thinking, his phenomenological hermeneutics was inspired, above all, by his reflection on Christianity. Moreover, the paper will question whether the linearity of Heidegger’s thinking about the historical being remains on the horizon of the religious phenomenon, as it is thematized in his early papers and lectures. While Heidegger’s early phenomenological approaches to religion and theology have been sufficiently elaborated on by several authors, and the phenomenological–hermeneutical relevance has been proven in his thinking, the linkage between the early philosophical approaches to the problem of religiosity and of historical being arising newly in Heidegger’s thinking from the 1930s is missing. The present paper will not just refer to the thesis that Heidegger’s theological background contributed to his questioning of being, and that it was influenced in different ways, but makes an attempt to reveal the internal dynamics of Heidegger’s early thinking prior to the publication of Being and Time and the time of composing the Contributions to Philosophy of those of Heidegger’s lectures which remain in the parallel analysis of religiosity and historicity. (shrink)

In his 1927 lecture ‘Phenomenology and Theology’, Heidegger claims that philosophy is the formally indicative ontological co-direction [Mitleitung] of basic theological concepts. For this claim, he...

Spengler’s work is typically represented as speculative philosophy of history. However, I argue that there is good reason to consider much of his thought as preoccupied with existential and phenomenological questions about the nature and ends of human existence, rather than with history per se. In this paper I consider Spengler’s work in comparison with Heidegger’s history of Being and analysis of technological modernity. I argue that Spengler’s considerable proximity to much of Heidegger’s thought compels us to reconsider the nature (...) and scope of Spengler’s philosophical project. (shrink)

The 'Metaphysics of Dasein ' is the name which Heidegger gave to a new philosophical project developed immediately after the partial publication of his masterwork Being and Time. As Heidegger was later to recall, an 'overturning' took place at that moment, more precisely right in the middle of the 1929 treatise On the Essence of Ground. Between the fundamental-ontological formulation of the question of being and its metaphysical rephrasing, Heidegger discovered that a 'metaphysical freedom' stood at the root of Dasein (...) 's relation to his world and, thus, at the basis of his whole ontological questioning. This article will show how the very structure of the 1929 essay clearly illustrates the path Heidegger followed between Being and Time and the new philosophical beginning of the mid 1930s. It will conclude with a few critical remarks concerning Heidegger 's attempt to free his thinking from traditional philosophy and to overcome metaphysics. (shrink)

El secreto de Ser y tiempo y de su constante presencia cultural y filosófica radica en su extraordinaria riqueza interpretativa a la hora de diagnosticar la conciencia moral y ética de nuestra época. Este texto no desarrolla una teoría filosófica entre otras, sino que afronta el reto de pensar a fondo uno de los problemas centrales de la historia de la filosofía: la cuestión del ser humano y su particular relación con el ser en general. Desde este punto de vista, (...) el presente trabajo explora la posibilidad de leer esta obra fundamental de Heidegger como una ética del cuidado de sí, esto es, como un libro que promueve un cultivo de sí y de los otros. (shrink)

This article aims at answering the following problem: since for Heidegger the historicity of Being presupposes the withdrawal of the transcendental source of such a historicity, then does Heidegger’s perspective lead to a form of relativism of the kind of an epochal historicism? If on the contrary one judges that for Heidegger there is after all, beyond the ordered unfolding of epochs in the history of Being, an ultimate transcendental or at least trans-epochal dimension, does Heidegger’s thinking lead back to (...) an ahistorical Absolute beyond historicity? In order to answer these questions, I propose to divide Heidegger’s philosophy in three stages, rather than the two stages that have usually been retained by commentators ever since the works of Richardson, in conformity with Heidegger’s own indications regarding the Turning (Kehre) of his philosophy. Indeed, Heidegger in the 1930’s develops the notion of machination (Machenschaft) and thus gives historicity a hegemonic function in Being’s essential occurrence (Wesung), itself understood as the intensification of the program of machination starting in the Greek inceptual thinking and developing itself until today’s planetary technological era. However, after 1945 Heidegger does not think anymore that the truth of Being is entirely determined by historicity and that Being essentially abandons Dasein to machination and to its gradual historical unfolding, because there is now according to him, beyond the epochs that are destined to Dasein, a trans-epochal giving (and perhaps generous) origin of presence that constitutes the supreme cause for thinking (Sache des Denkens). (shrink)

The modern notion of the subject as constant self-presence that conditions the truthful appearance of phenomena is brought under sustained critical scrutiny by Heidegger. More than critical scrutiny, Heidegger offered a positive sketch of what is other than the subject, Dasein. Understanding the human being as openness for the circulation and preservation of the meaning of what-is as such is posed as the negation of the self-contained closure and interiority that subjectivity is. Levinas sees materialism and the loss of interiority (...) and freedom in Heidegger’s project, inclining more towards an ethics of things rather than persons. However, Levinas’s criticisms themselves are not free of the modern predilection for the human, albeit in a fresh and rich way. Conversely, it can be argued that that being which is open to the world of things and people still has a profound interior dimension because it is in each case mine. The Heideggerian notion of human agency and freedom may be appropriated as a possible response to technological nihilism and modern subjectivism. (shrink)