How is the tension between conflict and deliberation resolved in shareholder engagement? We address this question by studying shareholder engagement as a deliberative process with three stages: establishing dialogue, solution development, and solution implementation. We theorize that two interactionist mechanisms, deliberative interaction and the voicing of disagreement, play different roles at different stages of the process. We test our hypotheses with a proprietary database of 169 environmental, social, and governance engagements with US public companies over 2007–12. We find that while (...) deliberative interaction does not help advance the engagement process, it positively moderates the effect of disagreement in the solution development stage. By contrast, in the solution implementation stage, deliberative interaction amplifies the negative effect of disagreement, thus hindering progress in the engagement. Our article contributes to shareholder engagement, deliberation theory, and interactionist organization theory by establishing that engagement effectiveness is an interactional achievement shaped by both deliberation and disagreement. (shrink)

This study examines whether private information exchange between institutional investors and public companies in engagement dialogs on sustainability issues improves the publicly disclosed measurements of the target company’s financial and non-financial performance and transparency. It uses a unique dataset containing 326 private reports related to environmental, social, and anti-corruption recommendations to address material incidents among publicly traded MSCI World Index portfolio companies of Nordic institutional investors. The results indicate that target companies appear to have similar values with matched companies on (...) sustainability performance and transparency ratings in the 3 years following the initiation of private reporting. Unexpected sustainability incidents are subsequently reflected in the next year’s fall in the market value of target companies relative to MSCI World Index. This paper provides empirical evidence for the legitimacy-based provision of private sustainability information used in a larger disclosure system of public companies. (shrink)

In this study, we explore the relationship between perceived CEO greed and workplace safety. Drawing on insights from the social psychology literature, we theorize that CEOs are cognizant that their perceived greed has implications for how observers respond to failures in workplace safety. Our theorizing points to a somewhat counterintuitive positive relationship between perceived CEO greed and workplace safety. Consistent with our theorizing, we find that the relationship is attenuated when the CEO is insulated from how observers respond to firm (...) conduct and is amplified when the CEO’s characteristics have a larger impact on how observers respond to adverse firm-level events. We contribute to business ethics research on executive greed, on the relationship between CEO traits and (ir)responsible corporate conduct, and on the antecedents of workplace safety. (shrink)

Climate change is an ethical and moral challenge of a global scale due to its potentially catastrophic implications for human welfare. Understanding forces that drive corporate adaptation to climate change is an important research topic in business ethics. In this paper, we propose that shareholder climate-related proposals could be a catalyst for corporate innovations in technologies mitigating climate change. Our results, based on the analysis of US firms, indicate that corporations respond positively to these proposals by producing more climate-related patents (...) and citations. We also uncover potential casual channels of influence. Further, we find that corporate governance moderates the documented effects. These proposals lead to a more efficient and valuable innovation output, but lower firm performance in the short term. The real effect that shareholder proposals have on innovation gains clarity in the context of climate change, contributing to the discussion of investor “voice.”. (shrink)

It is widely recognized that workplace sexual harassment has significant negative psychological and personal consequences, and employees facing harassment suffer reductions in productivity. Our contribution is to propose a novel measure of workplace sexual harassment risk and provide a fuller estimation of the firm value impact of sexual harassment. In contrast to recent studies that focus on short-run market reactions to media announcements of harassment scandals, we use employee job reviews to identify low-profile harassment incidents that better reflect the pervasive, (...) toxic environment pertaining to sexual harassment than do newsworthy scandals, and we measure the longer-term effect on firm value starting from the date when harassment risk affects employee morale. We identify firm harassment risk by analyzing employee job reviews and estimate the sexual harassment score (SH) through textual analysis of online job reviews. Our sample of high-SH firms, or firms with unusually high-SH scores, exhibits significant reductions in future stock performance and profitability. For example, firms with a top 2% SH score earn a value-weighted risk-adjusted stock return of − 17% in the 1-year period after high-SH classification, and this damage is concentrated in firms with higher investor attention. Furthermore, high-SH firms experience a decline in operating profitability and an increase in labor costs during a 5-year period around high-SH classification. Our evidence suggests that sexual harassment can cause greater damages to firm value than previously documented. (shrink)

In our study, we examine the association between hedge fund activism and a target firm’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities and whether activists can promote socially responsible investments while upholding shareholders’ interests. Using different matched samples, we find a strong positive association between the target firm’s CSR in the year before it is targeted by activists and its probability of being targeted by a hedge fund. Classifying hedge fund activists into socially and non-socially responsible funds based on their objectives, we (...) find that both give similar level of consideration to a firm’s CSR activities when initiating campaigns. Similar to DesJardine and Durand (DesJardine and Durand, Strategic Management Journal 41:1054–1082, 2020), we demonstrate that hedge funds have, on average, a negative impact on target firms’ CSR in the years following the initial investments. Complementary to DesJardine and Durand (DesJardine and Durand, Strategic Management Journal 41:1054–1082, 2020), we compare the two types of hedge funds and find an asymmetric effect of the hedge funds’ campaigns. Socially responsible hedge fund campaigns are associated with a large _increase_ in their target’s CSR, whereas non-socially responsible hedge funds _decrease_ this measure in their target. Finally, we find that target firms exhibit a long-term improvement in future stock returns and profitability. These findings provide evidence that certain types of activists, such as socially responsible funds, promote both _stakeholder_ and _shareholders’_ long-term interests. (shrink)