(2013). Distributed intentionality: A model of intentional behavior in humans. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 267-290. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.641743.

Contrary to the target article's claims, social cognition research shows considerable learning (about other people) that is relatively automatic. Some of this learning is propositional (spontaneous trait inferences) and some is associative (spontaneous trait transference). Other dichotomies are also important. However conceived, human conditioning is not synonymous with human learning.

ABSTRACTLearning procedures such as mere exposure, evaluative conditioning, and approach/avoidance training have been used to establish evaluative responses as measured by the Implicit Association...

Although ads with subtle racist imagery can reinforce negative stereotypes, advertisers can eliminate this problem. After a brief overview of predominantly U.S.-based research on the racial mix of models/actors in ads, a theoretical framework for unmasking subtle racial bias is provided and dimensional qualitative research is introduced as a method for identifying and rectifying such ad imagery. Results of a DQR-based study of 622 U.K. television ads with at least one Black actor indicate subtle racially biased imagery now supersedes overt (...) forms, and the most popular ad appeals often mask negative stereotypes. Implications for public policy and advertisers, as well as recommendations for future research, are discussed. (shrink)

Moral judgements are based on automatic processes. Moral judgements are based on reason. In this paper, I argue that both of these claims are true, and show how they can be reconciled. Neither the automaticity of moral judgement nor the post hoc nature of conscious moral reasoning pose a threat to rationalist models of moral cognition. The relation moral reasoning bears to our moral judgements is not primarily mediated by episodes of conscious reasoning, but by the acquisition, formation and maintenance (...) ? in short: education ? of our moral intuitions. (shrink)

With a few yet increasing number of exceptions, the cognitive sciences enthusiastically endorsed the idea that there are basic facial expressions of emotions that are created by specific configurations of facial muscles. We review evidence that suggests an inherent role for context in emotion perception. Context does not merely change emotion perception at the edges; it leads to radical categorical changes. The reviewed findings suggest that configurations of facial muscles are inherently ambiguous, and they call for a different approach towards (...) the understanding of facial expressions of emotions. Prices of sticking with the modal view, and advantages of an expanded view, are succinctly reviewed. (shrink)

Lawrence Kohlberg slayed the two dragons of twentieth-century psychology—behaviorism and psychoanalysis. His victory was a part of the larger cognitive revolution that shaped the world in which all of us study psychology and education today. But the cognitive revolution itself was modified by later waves of change, particularly an ‘affective revolution’ that began in the 1980s and an ‘automaticity revolution’ in the 1990s. In this essay I trace the history of moral psychology within the broader intellectual trends of psychology and (...) I explain why I came to believe that moral psychology had to change with the times. I explain the origins of my own social intuitionist model and of moral foundations theory. I offer three principles that I think should characterize moral psychology in the twenty-first century: (1) Intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second, (2) There’s more to morality than harm and fairness and (3) Morality binds and blinds. (shrink)

Intuitive judgments elicited by verbal case-descriptions play key roles in philosophical problem-setting and argument. Experimental philosophy's ‘sources project’ seeks to develop psychological explanations of philosophically relevant intuitions which help us assess our warrant for accepting them. This article develops a psycholinguistic explanation of intuitions prompted by philosophical case-descriptions. For proof of concept, we target intuitions underlying a classic paradox about perception, trace them to stereotype-driven inferences automatically executed in verb comprehension, and employ a forced-choice plausibility-ranking task to elicit the relevant (...) stereotypical associations of perception- and appearance-verbs. We obtain a debunking explanation that resolves the philosophical paradox. (shrink)

By stipulating the existence of a system 1 and a system 2, dual-process theories raise questions about how these systems function. De Neys identifies several such questions for which no plausible answers have ever been offered. What makes the nature of systems 1 and 2 so difficult to ascertain? The answer is simple: The systems do not exist.

Causal reasoning is one of our most central cognitive competencies, enabling us to adapt to our world. Causal knowledge allows us to predict future events, or diagnose the causes of observed facts. We plan actions and solve problems using knowledge about cause-effect relations. Without our ability to discover and empirically test causal theories, we would not have made progress in various empirical sciences. In the past decades, the important role of causal knowledge has been discovered in many areas of cognitive (...) psychology. Despite the ubiquity of causal reasoning, textbooks of cognitive psychology have neglected this growing field. The goal of The Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning is to fill this gap. The handbook brings together the leading researchers in the field of causal reasoning and offers state-of-the-art presentations of theories and research. It provides introductions of competing theories of causal reasoning, and discusses its role in various cognitive functions and domains. The final section presents research from neighboring fields. 1. Causal Reasoning: An Introduction Michael R. Waldmann Part I: Theories of Causal Cognition 2. Associative Accounts of Causal Cognition Mike E. Le Pelley, Oren Griffiths, and Tom Beesley 3. Rules of Causal Judgment: Mapping Statistical Information Onto Causal Beliefs José C. Perales, Andrés Catena, Antonio Cándido, and Antonio Maldonado 4. The Inferential Reasoning Theory of Causal Learning: Toward a Multi- Process Propositional Account Yannick Boddez, Jan De Houwer, and Tom Beckers 5. Causal Invariance as an Essential Constraint for Creating a Causal Representation of the World: Generalizing the Invariance of Causal Power Patricia W. Cheng and Hongjing Lu 6. The Acquisition and Use of Causal Structure Knowledge Benjamin Margolin Rottman 7. Formalizing Prior Knowledge in Causal Induction Thomas L. Griffiths 8. Causal Mechanisms Samuel G. B. Johnson and Woo-kyoung Ahn 9. Force Dynamics and Causation Phillip Wolff and Robert Thorstad 10. Mental Models and Causation P. N. Johnson- Laird and Sangeet S. Khemlani 11. Pseudocontingencies Klaus Fiedler and Florian Kutzner 12. Singular Causation David Danks 13. Cognitive Neuroscience of Causal Reasoning Joachim T. Operskalski and Aron K. Barbey Part II: Basic Cognitive Functions 14. Visual Impressions of Causality Peter White 15. Goal-Directed Actions Bernhard Hommel 16. Planning and Control Magda Osman 17. Reinforcement Learning and Causal Models Samuel J. Gershman 18. Causation and the Probability of Causal Conditionals David E. Over 19. Causal Models and Conditional Reasoning Mike Oaksford and Nick Chater 20. Concepts as Causal Models: Categorization Bob Rehder 21. Concepts as Causal Models: Induction Bob Rehder 22. Causal Explanation Tania Lombrozo and Nadya Vasilyeva 23. Diagnostic Reasoning Björn Meder and Ralf Mayrhofer 24. Inferring Causal Relations by Analogy Keith J. Holyoak and Hee-Seung Lee 25. Causal Argument Ulrike Hahn, Roland Bluhm, and Frank Zenker 26. Causality in Decision- Making York Hagmayer and Philip M. Fernbach Part III: Domains of Causal Reasoning 27. Intuitive Theories Tobias Gerstenberg and Joshua B. Tenenbaum 28. Space, Time, and Causality Marc J. Buehner 29. Causation in Legal and Moral Reasoning David A. Lagnado and Tobias Gerstenberg 30. The Role of Causal Knowledge in Reasoning About Mental Disorders Woo-kyoung Ahn, Nancy S. Kim, and Matthew S. Lebowitz 31. Causality and Causal Reasoning in Natural Language Torgrim Solstad and Oliver Bott 32. Social Attribution and Explanation Denis Hilton Part IV: Development, Phylogeny, and Culture 33. The Development of Causal Reasoning Paul Muentener and Elizabeth Bonawitz 34. Causal Reasoning in Non-Human Animals Christian Schloegl and Julia Fischer 35. Causal Cognition and Culture Andrea Bender, Sieghard Beller, and Douglas L. Medin. (shrink)

Although a substantial literature is developing regarding the effects of stress on decision-making, the literature on stress and social decision-making is still in the beginning stage. The present research extends this new literature by examining the mediating and moderating factors of the effect of stress on social decision-making. Furthermore, a novel aspect of the research is its effort to connect the information-processing and functional perspectives, with regard to the acute stress response. Dual-mode theories state that emotional processing, relative to cognitive (...) processing, occurs early during information processing and is associated with stimulus-driven behaviors. Therefore, an intensification of emotional processing and inhibition of cognitive control processes may lead to an earlier and more stimulus-driven initiation of behavioral responses than under normal circumstances. Moreover, such quick, automatic behavioral responses to environmental stimuli may be particularly useful during an acute stress response in that such responses could help prevent disturbances to homeostasis. In order to facilitate such quick, automatic behavioral responses, emotional processing may be intensified and cognitive processing inhibited, during an acute stress response. In support of this notion, empirical findings show that acute stress increases emotion-related phenomena, such as reward salience and emotional learning. However, in a social decision-making context, such enhancement of emotional processing may negatively affect the social interactions, such that negative emotions from perceived unfairness may be amplified when people are undergoing an acute stress response. More specifically, in the context of an Ultimatum Game, people who are stressed may reject more unfair offers than people under normal conditions. This research tested this main hypothesis, and examined emotions and trait emotion regulation tendencies as mediating and moderating factors, respectively, of the relationship between acute stress and Ultimatum Game rejections. These arguments are elaborated in Chapters 1, 2, and 3 of this dissertation. In two experiments, participants played the Ultimatum Game as the Responder after completing a stress or control task. The Cold Pressor Test was used as the stress induction method. Before and after the Ultimatum Game, participants completed state emotion ratings as well as trait emotion regulation questionnaires. Results from Experiment 1 showed a successful stress induction, indicated by higher cortisol levels in the stress, relative to control, group. Moreover, Experiment 1 revealed a significant Stress x Amount interaction, with stress having an effect on rejections of unfair offers, in comparison to fair offers. However, the emotion and emotion regulation results did not indicate the expected pattern, with emotions being uncorrelated with fair, nor unfair offers, and emotion regulation being associated with reduced rejections of fair, but not unfair, offers. In Experiment 2, an experimental manipulation designed to influence negative emotions, namely partner type, was employed. Results did not replicate the results of the first experiment, but unexpected results were found involving partner type and negative emotions, namely that participants who played with human partners, relative to those who played with computer partners, rejected more unfair offers and that negative emotions were positively correlated with rejections of fair and unfair offers. The experiments and their results are described in Chapter 4. It is difficult to draw firm conclusions from these results, but they do offer a starting point for interesting future research questions. Chapter 5 discusses some implications as well as limitations of the present research. (shrink)