Experiences—visual, emotional, or otherwise—play a role in providing us with justification to believe claims about the world. Some accounts of how experiences provide justification emphasize the role of the experiences’ distinctive phenomenology, i.e. ‘what it is like’ to have the experience. Other accounts emphasize the justificatory role to the experiences’ etiology. A number of authors have used cases of cognitively penetrated visual experience to raise an epistemic challenge for theories of perceptual justification that emphasize the justificatory role of phenomenology rather (...) than etiology. Proponents of the challenge argue that cognitively penetrated visual experiences can fail to provide the usual justification because they have improper etiologies. However, extant arguments for the challenge’s key claims are subject to formidable objections. In this paper, I present the challenge’s key claims, raise objections to previous attempts to establish them, and then offer a novel argument in support of the challenge. My argument relies on an analogy between cognitively penetrated visual and emotional experiences. I argue that some emotional experiences fail to provide the relevant justification because of their improper etiologies and conclude that analogous cognitively penetrated visual experiences fail to provide the relevant justification because of their etiologies, as well. (shrink)

Several theorists argue that one does not experience something as being at or coming from a distance or direction in olfaction. In contrast to this, I suggest that there can be a variety of spatial aspects of both synchronic and diachronic olfactory experiences, including spatial distance and direction. I emphasise, however, that these are not aspects of every olfactory experience. Thus, I suggest renouncing the widespread assumption there is a uniform account of the nature, including the spatial nature, of what (...) is experienced in olfactory experience. (shrink)

While there is a growing philosophical interest in analysing olfactory experiences, the mereological structure of odours considered in respect of how they are perceptually experienced has not yet been extensively investigated. The paper argues that odours are perceptually experienced as having a mereological structure, but this structure is significantly different from the spatial mereological structure of visually experienced objects. Most importantly, in the case of the olfactory part-structure, the classical weak supplementation principle is not satisfied. This thesis is justified by (...) referring to empirical results in olfactory science concerning the human ability to identify components in complex olfactory stimuli. Further, it is shown how differences between olfactory and visual mereologies may arise from the way in which these modalities represent space. (shrink)

This chapter argues that olfactory experiences represent either everyday objects or ad hoc olfactory objects as having primitive olfactory properties, which happen to be uninstantiated. On this picture, olfactory experiences reliably misrepresent: they falsely represent everyday objects or ad hoc objects as having properties they do not have, and they misrepresent in the same way on multiple occasions. One might worry that this view is incompatible with the plausible claim that olfactory experiences at least sometimes justify true beliefs about the (...) world. This chapter argues that there is no such incompatibility. Since olfactory experiences reliably misrepresent, they can lead to true and justified beliefs about putatively smelly objects. (shrink)

I sketch and defend an imperativist treatment of the phenomenology associated with disgusting smells. This treatment, I argue, allows us to make better sense than other intentionalist alter-natives both of the neuroanatomy of olfaction, and of a natural pre-theoretical stance regarding the sense of smell.

In the contemporary analytic discussions concerning human olfactory perception, it is commonly claimed that (1) olfactory experiences are representations having content and (2) olfactory experiences represent odours, like coffee odour or vanilla odour. However, despite these common assumptions, there seems to be an ontological controversy between two views: the first states that odours are perceptually represented as features and the second states that they are represented as objects. In this paper, I aim to systematically address the Bfeature or object^ status (...) of represented odours by concerning whether odours are represented (a) as subjects of properties, (b) as mereological wholes, and (c) entities persisting in a way characteristic for objects. I argue that olfactorily represented odours constitute a sui generis category and cannot be easily classified as objects or features. Such investigations constitute a step in establishing whether various human modalities are unified by organising the environment according to the same categories. (shrink)

According to a common opinion, human olfactory experiences are significantly different from human visual experiences. For instance, olfaction seems to have only rudimentary abilities to represent space; it is not clear whether olfactory experiences have any mereological structure; and while vision presents the world in terms of objects, it is a matter of debate whether there are olfactory object-representations. This paper argues that despite these differences visual and olfactory experiences share a hierarchical subject/property structure. Within this structure, olfactorily experienced odours (...) and visual objects have the same status: they are primary subjects which unify other represented elements into perceptual units. (shrink)

Visual perception is widely taken to present properties such as redness, roundness, and so on. This in turn might be thought to give rise to accuracy conditions for experience, and so content, regardless of which metaphysical view of perception one endorses. An influential version of this argument—Susanna Siegel’s ’Argument from Appearing’—aims to establish the existence of content as common ground between representational and relational views of perception. This goes against proponents of ‘austere’ relationalism who deny that content plays a substantive (...) role in philosophical explanations of conscious perceptual experience. Though Siegel’s argument purports to be neutral with respect to the metaphysics of perception, it relies upon an equivocation between the presentation of property-types and property-instances. Consequently, the argument begs the question against the austere relational view, and so fails to establish the desired conclusion. So while relationalists can and should allow that experiences have accuracy conditions, it does not follow from this that they have contents of any philosophically interesting or significant kind. (shrink)

This paper investigates the spatial dimensions of olfactory perception, challenging philosophical views that marginalize smell in spatial navigation and cognition compared to visual phenomenology. I argue that both olfactory and visual perceptions—despite smell often being considered non-spatial or minimally spatial—involve intricate spatial structuring when processed through unconscious cognitive processes. An information-theoretical approach shows that cognitive inferences turn spatially deficient sensory data into spatialized perceptual content to generate spatial perception across sensory modalities. This challenges the idea that spatial perception is tied (...) to external features. My argument is supported by two lines of evidence: (i) figure-ground segregation across sensory modalities, suggesting a general mechanism in perceptual processing; (ii) recent neuroscientific evidence demonstrating how spatial information is processed in olfaction for navigation and environmental mapping. My analysis calls for a reevaluation of assumptions about the non-spatial nature of smell, highlighting significant cognitive and spatial capabilities in olfaction. (shrink)

Perception not only registers property instances, but also connects with and attributes properties to individual entities—so‐called sensory individuals, or SIs. But what are SIs? The most‐discussed answers are: (i) SIs are ordinary material objects—cohesive, temporally persistent objects extended and bounded in space, and (ii) SIs are locations or regions in spacetime. I will argue for the object view of SIs on the grounds that its rival, the locational view, faces obstacles concerning the relationship between SIs and spacetime: it makes a (...) mystery of perception's representation of SIs as occupying locations in and moving in ordinary spacetime. (shrink)

In the contemporary analytic discussions concerning human olfactory perception, it is commonly claimed that olfactory experiences are representations having content and olfactory experiences represent odours, like coffee odour or vanilla odour. However, despite these common assumptions, there seems to be an ontological controversy between two views: the first states that odours represented by olfaction should be characterised as features and the second states that they should be interpreted as objects. In this paper, I aim to systematically address the “feature or (...) object” status of odours by comparing their ontological characteristics to those possessed by visually represented objects and features. I argue that olfactorily represented odours constitute a sui generis ontological category which differs from the categories of visually represented entities and cannot be easily classified as objects or features. Such investigations constitute a step in establishing whether various human modalities are ontologically unified by organising the environment according to the same categories. (shrink)