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Background Medical aid in dying (MAID) is legal in a number of countries, including some states in the U.S. While MAID is only permitted for terminal illnesses in the U.S., some other countries allow it for persons with psychiatric illness. Psychiatric MAID, however, raises unique ethical concerns, especially related to its effects on mental illness stigma and on how persons with psychiatric illnesses would come to feel about treatment and suicide. To explore those concerns, we conducted several focus groups with (...) |
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This paper offers an overview of the philosophical work on epistemic injustices as it relates to psychiatry. After describing the development of epistemic injustice studies, we survey the existing literature on its application to psychiatry. We describe how the concept of epistemic injustice has been taken up into a range of debates in philosophy of psychiatry, including the nature of psychiatric conditions, psychiatric practices and research, and ameliorative projects. The final section of the paper indicates future directions for philosophical research (...) |
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Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page W14-W17. |
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Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page 48-50. |
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Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page 50-51. |
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Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page 3-7. |
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Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page 57-59. |
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In their insightful article, Brent Kious and Margaret Battin (2019) correctly identify an inconsistency between an involuntary psychiatric commitment for suicide prevention and physician aid in dying (PAD). They declare that it may be possible to resolve the problem by articulating “objective standards for evaluating the severity of others’ suffering,” but ultimately they admit that this task is beyond the scope of their article since the solution depends on “a deep and difficult” question about comparing the worseness of two possible (...) |
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The standard of care in the United States favors stabilizing any adult who arrives in an emergency department after a failed suicide attempt, even if he appears decisionally capacitated and refuses life‐sustaining treatment. I challenge this ubiquitous practice. Emergency clinicians generally have a moral obligation to err on the side of stabilizing even suicide attempters who refuse such interventions. This obligation reflects the fact that it is typically infeasible to determine these patients’ level of decisional capacitation—among other relevant information—in this (...) |
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Critics of medical aid in dying (MAID) often argue that it is impermissible because background social conditions are insufficiently good for some persons who would utilize it. I provide a critical evaluation of this view. I suggest that receiving MAID is a sort of “hard choice,” in that death is prima facie bad for the individual and only promotes that person’s interests in special circumstances. Those raising this objection to MAID are, I argue, concerned primarily about the effects of injustice (...) |
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The literature on rational suicide (RS) holds that if a rational person wishes to suicide under circumstances deemed rational, there is no moral reason to prohibit a person from suiciding. There are forty years of literature dedicated to establishing what rational suicide is and demonstrating its moral permissibility. What is shocking is that in this literature, almost no attempts are made to include the perspectives of mental health users. Drawing from the work of Hilde Lindemann, I argue that ignoring of (...) |
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Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page 59-60. |
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Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page 40-42. |
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Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page 46-47. |
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Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page 43-46. |
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Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page 65-68. |
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Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page 63-65. |
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Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page 68-70. |
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Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page 61-63. |
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Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page 52-54. |
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