I argue that by considering Kant’s engagement with previous theorists of natural right, we can gain a clearer understanding of how he transformed the discipline from its foundations. To do this, I focus my analysis on Kant’s (critical) reception of two models of natural right with which he was very familiar: one from Alexander Baumgarten’s Elements of First Practical Philosophy [Initia philosophiae practicae primae], the other from Gottfried Achenwall’s Natural Law [Ius naturae]. The Initia served as a basis for Kant’s (...) lectures on moral philosophy for over three decades and may thus be considered as having played an important role in shaping his practical philosophy as a whole. Achenwall’s Ius naturae was the textbook that Kant employed in his lectures on natural right for over two decades. I argue that Kant distances himself from previous models of natural right in three main regards: the identification of moral laws with laws of nature, the normative connection between the principles of right and a natural end, and the place of God as the author of moral laws. I then briefly discuss what Kant retains of Baumgarten’s and Achenwall’s models of natural right. Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals preserves the view that a rational doctrine of right belongs to a broader systematic doctrine that comprehends the entire system of duties. I address the question of the division of the Sittenlehre into two branches and claim that, whereas Kant did not consider Baumgarten’s answer to the problem of distinguishing juridical from ethical principles to be satisfactory, he found a key piece of his own resolution in Achenwall’s Ius naturae, namely the definition of right as a power to coerce. (shrink)

La posición sistemática de la Metafísica de las costumbres de Kant y en concreto de su segunda parte, la Doctrina de la virtud, es análoga a la del Sistema de la doctrina de las costumbres según los principios de la Doctrina de la Ciencia de Fichte. Sin embargo, en dicha obra, Fichte califica la ética kantiana de “formalista” y pretende que la suya es más concreta y aplicable por su teoría de la conciliación entre el impulso natural y el impulso (...) moral. En este artículo se explica y discute dicha postura de Fichte, mostrando que la crítica a Kant es injusta, dado que precisamente la Doctrina de la virtud ofrece, de un modo metódicamente diverso pero sólido y coherente con la ética de la autonomía, la “ética material” kantiana. (shrink)