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Nonclassical theories of truth

In Jc Beall & David Ripley (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Truth (2018)

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  1. LP, K3, and FDE as Substructural Logics.Lionel Shapiro - 2017 - In Arazim Pavel & Lávička Tomáš (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2016. College Publications.
    Building on recent work, I present sequent systems for the non-classical logics LP, K3, and FDE with two main virtues. First, derivations closely resemble those in standard Gentzen-style systems. Second, the systems can be obtained by reformulating a classical system using nonstandard sequent structure and simply removing certain structural rules (relatives of exchange and contraction). I clarify two senses in which these logics count as “substructural.”.
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  • (1 other version)Dialetheism.Francesco Berto, Graham Priest & Zach Weber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2018 (2018).
    A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, ¬A, are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or whatever one takes as her favourite truth-bearer: this would make little difference in the context). Assuming the fairly uncontroversial view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and false.
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  • (1 other version)Dialetheism.Graham Priest - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, A, are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or whatever one takes as her favourite truth bearer: this would make little difference in the context). Assuming the fairly uncontroversial view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and (...)
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  • Substructural approaches to paradox: an introduction to the special issue.Elia Zardini - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3):493-525.
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  • Paradox and Logical Revision. A Short Introduction.Julien Murzi & Massimiliano Carrara - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):7-14.
    Logical orthodoxy has it that classical first-order logic, or some extension thereof, provides the right extension of the logical consequence relation. However, together with naïve but intuitive principles about semantic notions such as truth, denotation, satisfaction, and possibly validity and other naïve logical properties, classical logic quickly leads to inconsistency, and indeed triviality. At least since the publication of Kripke’s Outline of a theory of truth , an increasingly popular diagnosis has been to restore consistency, or at least non-triviality, by (...)
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  • Inconsistency, Paraconsistency and ω-Inconsistency.Bruno Da Ré - 2018 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 22 (1):171-188.
    In this paper I’ll explore the relation between ω-inconsistency and plain inconsistency, in the context of theories that intend to capture semantic concepts. In particular, I’ll focus on two very well known inconsistent but non-trivial theories of truth: LP and STTT. Both have the interesting feature of being able to handle semantic and arithmetic concepts, maintaining the standard model. However, it can be easily shown that both theories are ω- inconsistent. Although usually a theory of truth is generally expected to (...)
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  • The very idea of a substructural approach to paradox.Lionel Shapiro - 2016 - Synthese 199 (Suppl 3):767-786.
    This paper aims to call into question the customary division of logically revisionary responses to the truth-theoretic paradoxes into those that are “substructural” and those that are “ structural.” I proceed by examining, as a case study, Beall’s recent proposal based on the paraconsistent logic LP. Beall formulates his response to paradox in terms of a consequence relation that obeys all standard structural rules, though at the price of the language’s lacking a detaching conditional. I argue that the same response (...)
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  • Substructural heresies.Bogdan Dicher - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    The past decades have seen remarkable progress in the study of substructural logics, be it mathematically or philosophically oriented. This progress has a somewhat perplexing effect: the more subst...
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  • Non-reflexivity and Revenge.Julien Murzi & Lorenzo Rossi - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (1):201-218.
    We present a revenge argument for non-reflexive theories of semantic notions – theories which restrict the rule of assumption, or initial sequents of the form φ ⊩ φ. Our strategy follows the general template articulated in Murzi and Rossi [21]: we proceed via the definition of a notion of paradoxicality for non-reflexive theories which in turn breeds paradoxes that standard non-reflexive theories are unable to block.
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