Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (SSI) and Epistemic Contextualism (EC) are rival theories in epistemology. Both involve shifting epistemic standards, but they differ in how they explain this shiftiness. SSI is primarily a metaphysical thesis about the knowledge relation, whereas EC is primarily a semantic thesis about knowledge attributions. This paper revisits some of the central problems faced by SSI, especially those concerning Dutch books and third-person knowledge ascriptions. The main aim is to show that existing responses that stay true to SSI do (...) not succeed, leaving SSI in serious jeopardy. Some strategies put forward by, or on behalf of, SSI-friendly philosophers fare better. But these involve forsaking central features of SSI, ceding ground to EC, and falling back on a defense of impurism. I sketch what such an impurist fallback position might look like and argue that the more ground it cedes to EC, the more attractive it will be. It is shown that such an impurist, contextualist position can handle all the difficulties I discuss in relation to SSI. The paper concludes by briefly considering what new challenges this kind of position faces instead. (shrink)