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Do bad people know more? Interactions between attributions of knowledge and blame

James R. Beebe

Synthese 193 (8):2633–2657 (2016)

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On Second Thought: Reflections on the Reflection Defense.Markus Kneer, David Colaco, Joshua Alexander & Edouard Machery - 2022 - In Tania Lombrozo, Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe, Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 257–296.details This chapter sheds light on a response to experimental philosophy that has not yet received enough attention: the reflection defense. According to proponents of this defense, judgments about philosophical cases are relevant only when they are the product of careful, nuanced, and conceptually rigorous reflection. The chapter argues that the reflection defense is misguided: Five studies (N>1800) are presented, showing that people make the same judgments when they are primed to engage in careful reflection as they do in the conditions (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations
Epistemic Side-Effect Effect: A Meta-Analysis.Bartosz Maćkiewicz, Katarzyna Kuś, Katarzyna Paprzycka-Hausman & Marta Zaręba - 2024 - Episteme 21 (2):609-643.details Beebe and Buckwalter (2010) made the surprising discovery that people are more inclined to attribute knowledge when norms are violated than when they are conformed to. The epistemic side-effect effect (ESEE) is the analogue of the Knobe effect (Knobe 2003a). ESEE was replicated in a number of experiments. It was also studied under various conditions. We have carried out a meta-analysis of research on ESEE. The results suggest that ESEE is a robust finding but its magnitude is highly variable. Two (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Knowledge of consequences: an explanation of the epistemic side-effect effect.Katarzyna Paprzycka-Hausman - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5457-5490.details The Knobe effect :190–194, 2003a) consists in our tendency to attribute intentionality to bringing about a side effect when it is morally bad but not when it is morally good. Beebe and Buckwalter have demonstrated that there is an epistemic side-effect effect : people are more inclined to attribute knowledge when the side effect is bad in Knobe-type cases. ESEE is quite robust. In this paper, I present a new explanation of ESEE. I argue that when people attribute knowledge in (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
The Doxastic Heuristic and the Consequence Account of the Epistemic Side-Effect Effect.Katarzyna Paprzycka-Hausman, Bartosz Maćkiewicz, Katarzyna Kuś & Marta Zaręba - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (4):1443-1470.details We discuss two philosophical explanations of the epistemic side-effect effect: the doxastic heuristic account (Alfano et al. The Monist 95 (2): 264–289, 2012) and the consequence account (Paprzycka-Hausman Synthese 197: 5457–5490, 2020). We argue that the doxastic heuristic account has problems with explaining knowledge attributions in cases where the probability that the side effect will occur is low and where the side effect does not ultimately occur. It can explain why there is a difference between the harm and the help (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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