Critical theory of technology brings technology studies to bear on the social theory of rationality. This paper discusses this connection through a reconsideration of the contribution of the Frankfurt School to our understanding of what I call the paradox of rationality, the fact that the promise of the Enlightenment has been disappointed as advances in scientific and technical knowledge have led to more and more catastrophic consequences. The challenge for critical theory is to understand this paradox without romantic and anti-modern (...) afterthoughts as a contribution to a progressive worldview. (shrink)

The myths engendered by the Titanic disaster suggest the essentially literary character of myths, the importance of individuals in their creation and consumption, the frequent insistence of their consumers on literal‐historical truth, and thus the importance of discerning whether, and why, the creators of a myth distort the truth. The myth of the Titanic should be understood as a literal‐historical myth with an especially strong literary character and claim to truth; a myth whose interest has not been exhausted by time (...) because it raises perennial existential issues, and more superficially because it reflects the widespread assumption that disaster is readily avoidable and can be explained only by reference to stupidity or malfeasance. (shrink)

In this article, we argue that Ted Chiang’s short stories offer a realist philosophy of technology, one that charts a third course between the techno-pessimism and techno-optimism that characterize the history of philosophizing about technology and much of the speculative fiction about it. We begin by surveying the history of utopian and skeptical approaches to technology in philosophy and speculative fiction. We then move to discuss two of Chiang’s recent stories and use them to articulate the author’s techno-realism. Chiang’s view, (...) as it is developed in these stories, has three features: First, technology is not merely an agent of de-skilling, it can also promote self-knowledge and insight. Second, technology is not only an agent of alienation it can also provide succor and psychological relief. Finally, technology does not necessarily remake us into new beings with new capacities and needs. In many cases, it just gives us further avenues to be what we already were - to act on the tendencies and pursue the needs we always had. (shrink)

There has recently been a revived interest in temporal justice among political philosophers. For example, lone mothers have, on average, 30 h less free time per week than people in couples without children. Recent work has focussed on free time as a distinct distributive good, but this paper argues that it would be a mistake for a theory of temporal justice to focus only on shares of free time. First, I argue that the concept of free time does not succeed (...) in tracking discretionary control over time. All of time is a resource, and the particular moral relevance of free time must be established otherwise. Second, hours of time differ in use value, and we cannot fully track our concerns about the allocation of time, whether free or necessary, without taking this into account. We care about free time but also about ‘quality time’. To explain this observation, I develop an account of the value of time as a resource. The value of time periods differs with the prospects for which a time period can be used, that is, what we can do and be with it. What we are allocating when we are allocating time is not just hours; it is hours of time with a certain value. Finally, I argue that a concern for the value of time is compatible with a resourcist theory of temporal justice. (shrink)

The thesis provides a philosophically grounded account of a socialist planned economy. While I do not primarily consider a positive case for socialism, I address two major objections to it and thus argue that the possibility of socialism as an alternative form of economic organisation has been dismissed too quickly. Furthermore, I provide an account of the precise form a socialist economy should take, outlining general principles of planning and distribution. Based on a welfarist interpretation of Marx, I show that (...) distribution of consumer goods should be facilitated by an equal distribution of tokens. These tokens can be redeemed for consumer products or substituted for additional leisure time. The rates at which tokens can be redeemed for consumer products should correspond to market clearing prices. Welfare-oriented socialism is also defended against a deontological objection to socialism by Robert Nozick, who claims that socialism leads to injustice because it violates private property rights. The thesis also considers Ludwig von Mises’s calculation argument against socialism, which claims that socialism leads to the abolition of economic rationality. I show how this objection can be overcome by using optimal planning techniques which are responsive to consumer demand as signalled by the market clearing rates of consumer products. The resulting model of socialism is tested using a computer simulation. The simulation also demonstrates that a novel system of valuation based on opportunity cost leads to a better adaptation of production in response to environmental constraints when compared to the labour values of classical political economy. (shrink)

Much of what makes Hayek so controversial can be found in The Road to Serfdom, the theoretical basis of which is provided by The Counter-Revolution of Science. The first book, a polemic against the “planning mentality,” did not defend complete laissez faire, but argued that planning disrupts the coordination between prices and supply and demand; that effective planning is thus impossible in a modern industrial society; that it is coercive; and, of course, that it leads to totalitarianism. In The Counter-Revolution (...) of Science, Hayek argued that the “planning mentality” is the result of the hubristic attempt to reconstruct society along scientific lines. But the likes of Edward Bellamy envisioned a planned but free society, while John Dewey contrasted planning, where people collectively choose their goals, against a planned economy that is coercively imposed. Hayek's welcome strictures against a scientistic society and an overly ambitious social science aside, his binary approach to intellectual history distorted through oversimplification. (shrink)