The so-called theory of karma is one of the distinguishing aspects of Hinduism and other non-Hindu south-Asian traditions. At the same time that the theory can be seen as closely connected with the freedom of will and action that we humans supposedly have, it has many times been said to be determinist and fatalist. The purpose of this paper is to analyze in some deepness the relations that are between the theory of karma on one side and determinism, fatalism and (...) free-will on the other side. In order to do that, I shall use what has been described as the best formal approach we have to indeterminism: branching time theory. More specifically, I shall introduce a branching time semantic framework in which, among other things, statements such as “state of affairs e is a karmic effect of agent a”, “a wills it to be the case that e” and “e is inevitable” could be properly represented. (shrink)

I demonstrate that a "speech act" theory of meaning for imperatives is—contra a dominant position in philosophy and linguistics—theoretically desirable. A speech act-theoretic account of the meaning of an imperative !φ is characterized, broadly, by the following claims. -/- LINGUISTIC MEANING AS USE !φ’s meaning is a matter of the speech act an utterance of it conventionally functions to express—what a speaker conventionally uses it to do (its conventional discourse function, CDF). -/- IMPERATIVE USE AS PRACTICAL !φ's CDF is to (...) express a practical (non-representational) state of mind—one concerning an agent's preferences and plans, rather than her beliefs. -/- Opposed to speech act accounts is a preponderance of views which deny that a sentence's linguistic meaning is a matter of what speech act it is used to perform, or its CDF. On such accounts, meaning is, instead, a matter of "static" properties of the sentence—e.g., how it depicts the world as being (or, more neutrally, the properties of a model-theoretic object with which the semantic value of the sentence co-varies). On one version of a static account, an imperative 'shut the window!' might, for instance, depict the world as being such that the window must be shut. -/- Static accounts are traditionally motivated against speech act-theoretic accounts by appeal to supposedly irremediable explanatory deficiencies in the latter. Whatever a static account loses in saying (prima facie counterintuitively) that an imperative conventionally represents, or expresses a picture of the world, is said to be offset by its ability to explain a variety of phenomena for which speech act-theoretic accounts are said to lack good explanations (even, in many cases, the bare ability to offer something that might meet basic criteria on what a good explanation should be like). -/- I aim to turn the tables on static accounts. I do this by showing that speech act accounts are capable of giving explanations of phenomena which fans of static accounts have alleged them unable to give. Indeed, for a variety of absolutely fundamental phenomena having to do with the conventional meaning of imperatives (and other types of practical language), speech act accounts provide natural and theoretically satisfying explanations, where a representational account provides none. (shrink)

One of the best known approaches to the logic of agency are the ‘stit’ logics. Often, it is not the actions of an individual agent that bring about a certain outcome but the joint actions of a set of agents, collectively. Collective agency has received comparatively little attention in ‘stit’. The paper maps out several different forms, several different senses in which a particular set of agents, collectively, can be said to bring about a certain outcome, and examines how these (...) forms can be expressed in ‘stit’ and stit-like logics. The outcome that is brought about may be unintentional, and perhaps even accidental; the account deliberately ignores aspects such as joint intention, communication between agents, awareness of other agents’ intentions and capabilities, even the awareness of another agent’s existence. The aim is to investigate what can be said about collective agency when all such considerations are ignored, besides mere consequences of joint actions. The account will be related to the ‘strictly stit’ of Belnap and Perloff, 25–48 1993) and their suggestions concerning ‘inessential members’ and ‘mere bystanders’. We will adjust some of those conjectures and distinguish further between ‘potentially contributing bystanders’ and ‘impotent bystanders’. (shrink)

Based on a notion of "companions to stit formulas" applied in other papers dealing with astit logics, we introduce "choice formulas" and "nested choice formulas" to prove the completeness theorems for dstit logics in a language with the dstit operator as the only non-truth-functional operator. The main logic discussed in this paper is the basic logic of dstit with multiple agents, other logics discussed include the basic logic of dstit with a single agent and some logics of dstit with multiple (...) agents each of which corresponds to a semantic condition concerning the number of possible choices for agents. (shrink)

Hamblin’s Action-State Semantics provides a sound philosophical foundation for understanding the character of the imperative. Taking this as our inspiration, in this paper we present a logic of action, which we call ST, that captures the clear ontological distinction between being responsible for the achievement of a state of affairs and being responsible for the performance of an action. We argue that a relativised modal logic of type RT founded upon a ternary relation over possible worlds integrated with a basic (...) tense logic captures intuitions of the Hamblinian model of imperatives. The logic implements a direct mapping of each of Hamblin’s key concepts: strategies, partial strategies and wholehearted satisfaction. (shrink)

Branching space-time is a simple blend of relativity and indeterminism. Postulates and definitions rigorously describe the causal order relation between possible point events. The key postulate is a version of everything has a causal origin; key defined terms include history and choice point. Some elementary but helpful facts are proved. Application is made to the status of causal contemporaries of indeterministic events, to how splitting of histories happens, to indeterminism without choice, and to Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen distant correlations.

We present in this paper an axiomatization of Belnap and Perloff's stit theory (a logic of "seeing to it that") with a single agent. The idea of the proof is to apply the notion of companion sets--the same notion as used in another paper by the author that showed the decidability of stit theory with a single agent and Refref equivalence.

This paper presents proofs of completeness and decidability of a non-temporal fragment of an Xstit logic. This shows a distinction between the non-temporal fragments of Xstit logic and regular stit logic since the latter is undecidable. The proof of decidability is via the finite model property. The finite model property is shown to hold by constructing a filtration. However, the set that is used to filter the models isn’t simply closed under subformulas, it has more complex closure conditions. The filtration (...) set is akin to the Fischer–Ladner closure of a set used to show completeness and decidability of propositional dynamic logic. (shrink)

Stit theory (a logic of seeing-to-it-that) is applied to cases involving many agents. First treated are complex nestings of stits involving distinct agents. The discussion is driven by the logical impossibility of "a sees to it that b sees to it that Q" in the technical sense, even though that seems to make sense in everyday language, Of special utility are the concepts of "forced choice", of the creation of deontic states, and of probabilities, Second, joint agency, both plain and (...) strict (every participant is essential) is given a rigorous treatment. A central theorem is that strict joint agency is itself agentive. (shrink)

In this paper, we consider two different ways in which modus-ponens type reasoning with conditional obligations may be formalized. We develop necessary and sufficient conditions for the validity of each, and make some philosophical observations about the differences between the minor premises that each formalization requires. All this is done within the context of the Belnap-Perloff stit theory.

This volume seeks to further the use of formal methods in clarifying one of the central problems of philosophy: that of our free human agency and its place in our indeterministic world. It celebrates the important contributions made in this area by Nuel Belnap, American logician and philosopher. Philosophically, indeterminism and free action can seem far apart, but in Belnap’s work, they are intimately linked. This book explores their philosophical interconnectedness through a selection of original research papers that build forth (...) on Belnap’s logical and philosophical work. Some contributions take the form of critical discussions of Belnap's published work, some develop points made in his publications in new directions, and others provide additional insights on the topics of indeterminism and free action. In Nuel Belnap’s work on indeterminism and free action, three formal frameworks figure prominently: the simple branching histories framework known as "branching time;" its relativistic spatio-temporal extension, branching space-times; and the “seeing to it that” logic of agency. As those frameworks provide the formal background for the contributed papers, the volume introduction gives an overview of the current state of their development. It also introduces case-intensional first order logic, a general intensional logic offering resources for a first-order extension of the mentioned frameworks and a recent research focus of Belnap’s. The volume also contains an extended biographical interview with Nuel Belnap. (shrink)

This paper presents a short survey of recent developments in stit theories, with an emphasis on combinations of stit and deontic logic, and those of stit and epistemic logic.

Agency can be construed as both the manner in which autonomous individuals embark on particular courses of action (or inaction), and the relationship between such agents and the outcomes of the courses of action on which they embark. A promising strategy for understanding both senses of agency consists in the combination of a modal logic of agency and branching time semantics. Such is the strategy behind stit theory, the theory of agentive action developed by Nuel Belnap and others. However, stit (...) theoretic evaluations of the agentive relationship between agents and outcomes that are uncertain—due to either the presence of indeterminism, or the possible intervention of other agents—yield counterintuitive results. This paper develops a pair of alternative operators (the “act” operators) for modeling agency with respect to uncertain outcomes. Unlike the stit-theoretic model, the act-theoretic model of agency with respect to a particular state of affairs does not require that the state of affairs be realized in every possible history. If the state of affairs in fact obtains in the actual history, and its obtaining was dependent on the agent’s pursuing a particular course of action, then the agent is deemed agentive under act theory. (shrink)

In this paper we prove the uncompactness of every stit logic that contains a generalized refref conditional and is a sublogic of the stit logic with refref equivalence, a syntactical condition of uncompactness that covers infinitely many stit logics. This result is established through the uncompactness of every stit logic whose semantic structures contain no chain of busy choice sequences with cardinality , where is any natural number . The basic idea in the proof is to apply the notion of (...) companions to stit sentences in finding busy choice sequences in structures, and to make use of a relation between chains of busy choice sequences and generalized refref conditionals in connecting the two conditions of uncompactness mentioned above. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to present some results instit theory, a theory of agency proposed by N. Belnap and M. Perloff. We will establish a correspondence between the numbers ofstit modalities and the complexity degrees ofbusy choice sequences in semantic structures, and consequently, a correspondence between the number of modes of actions/inactions instit theory and the complexity degrees ofbusy choice sequences in semantic structures.

In this paper we show that the Hilbert system of agency and ability presented by Dag Elgesem is incomplete with respect to the intended semantics. We argue that completeness result may be easily regained. Finally, we shortly discuss some issues related to the philosophical intuition behind his approach. This is done by examining Elgesem's modal logic of agency and ability using semantics with different flavours.

O propósito desse artigo é fornecer um tratamento formal para um tipo de ação até o momento negligenciada nas lógicas modais filosóficas da ação: ação em plano. Ao fazer isso nós seguimos a abordagem padrão nas lógicas modais da ação exemplificados pelos trabalhos de Belnap, Chellas and Pörn. Como nós acreditamos que existe uma relação forte entre plano, tempo e indeterminismo, nós usamos a teoria do tempo ramificado para investigar as características básicas da ação em plano. Além de introduzir uma (...) semântica do tempo ramificado, nós também apresentamos um cálculo correto e completo com relação a essa semântica. DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n3p421. (shrink)

Topic of the paper is Q-logic - a logic of agency in its temporal and modal context. Q-logic may be considered as a basal logic of agency since the most important stitoperators discussed in the literature can be defined or axiomatized easily within its semantical and syntactical framework. Its basic agent dependent operator, the Q-operator (also known as Δ- or cstit-operator), which has been discussed independently by E v. Kutschera and B. E Chellas, is investigated here in respect of its (...) relation to other temporal and modal operators. The main result of the paper, then, is a completeness result for a calculus of Q-logic with respect to a semantics defined on the tree-approach to agency as introduced and developed by, among others, E v. Kutschera and N. D. Belnap. (shrink)

This paper investigates the semantic treatment of conditional obligation, explicit permission (often called positive permission), and prohibition based on models with agents and branched time. In such models branches (rather than moments) are taken as basic, and the branching provides a way to represent the indeterminism which is normally presupposed by talk of free will, responsibility, action and ability. Careful treatment of the relation between ability and responsibility avoids many common problems with accounts of conditional obligation. Recognition of the generality (...) often involved in conditional obligations makes possible a sensitive way of expressing some kinds of general prohibitions, which in turn makes it possible to account for the special role of explicit permission. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to prove the decidability ofstit theory (a logic of seeing to it that) with a single agent andRefref Equivalence. This result is obtained through an axiomatization of the theory and a proof that it has thefinite model property. A notion ofcompanions to stit formulas is introduced and extensively used in the proof.

The main purpose of this paper is to prove that in every stit semantic structure that contains a busy choice sequence, neither does doing imply refraining from refraining from doing, nor does refraining from refraining from doing imply doing.

We explore some logics of change, focusing on commands to change the world in such a way that certain elementary propositions become true or false. This investigation starts out from the following two simplifying assumptions: (1) the world is a collection of facts (Wittgenstein), and (2), the world can be changed by changing elementary facts (Marx). These assumptions allow us to study the logic of imperatives in the simplest possible setting.