People commonly believe that any form of deception, no matter how innocuous it is and no matter whether the deceiving person intended it otherwise, is always morally wrong. In this paper, I will argue that deceiving in real-time is morally distinguishable from deceiving on-line because online actions aren’t as fine-grained as actions occurring in real-time. Our failure to detect the fine-grained characteristics of another avatar leads us to believe that that avatar intended to do a moral harm. Openly deceiving someone (...) on Facebook or Twitter is not a way to build wholesome virtual friendships but to destroy them. This paper will show how the traditional understanding of the doing / allowing distinction fails to apply in cyberspace. (shrink)

If it is within our power to provide a significantly better world for future generations at a comparatively small cost to ourselves, we have a strong moral reason to do so. One way of providing a significantly better world may involve replacing our species with something better. It is plausible that in the not‐too‐distant future, we will be able to create artificially intelligent creatures with whatever physical and psychological traits we choose. Granted this assumption, it is argued that we should (...) engineer our extinction so that our planet's resources can be devoted to making artificial creatures with better lives. (shrink)

Past work has demonstrated that people’s moral judgments can influence their judgments in a number of domains that might seem to involve straightforward matters of fact, including judgments about freedom, causation, the doing/allowing distinction, and intentional action. The present studies explore whether the effect of morality in these four domains can be explained by changes in the relevance of alternative possibilities. More precisely, we propose that moral judgment influences the degree to which people regard certain alternative possibilities as relevant, which (...) in turn impacts intuitions about freedom, causation, doing/allowing, and intentional action. Employing the stimuli used in previous research, Studies 1a, 2a, 3a, and 4a show that the relevance of alternatives is influenced by moral judgments and mediates the impact of morality on non-moral judgments. Studies 1b, 2b, 3b, and 4b then provide direct empirical evidence for the link between the relevance of alternatives and judgments in these four domains by manipulating (rather than measuring) the relevance of alternative possibilities. Lastly, Study 5 demonstrates that the critical mechanism is not whether alternative possibilities are considered, but whether they are regarded as relevant. These studies support a unified framework for understanding the impact of morality across these very different kinds of judgments. (shrink)

In this article I attempt to show conclusively that the apparent intrinsic difference between causing collateral damage and directly attacking innocents is an illusion. I show how eleven morally irrelevant alterations can transform an apparently permissible case of harming as a side-effect into an apparently impermissible case of harming as a means. The alterations are as obviously irrelevant as the victims’ skin colour, and consistently treating them as relevant would have unacceptable implications for choices between more and less harmful ways (...) of securing greater goods. This shows not only how the principles philosophers have proposed for distinguishing between these cases cannot withstand scrutiny, but how we can be sure that there are no relevant differences yet to be discovered. I conclude by considering reasons to think that there are deontological constraints against harming, but that they apply just as forcefully against collateral harms as they do against intended harms. (shrink)

In order to discuss the normative aspects of euthanasia one has to clarify what is meant by active and passive euthanasia. Many philosophers deny the possibility of distinguishing the two by purely descriptive means, e.g. on the basis of theories of action or the differences between acting and omitting to act. Against this, such a purely descriptive distinction will be defended in this paper by discussing and refining the theory developed by Dieter Birnbacher in his “Tun und Unterlassen”. On this (...) basis I will suggest a new definition of active and passive euthanasia. (shrink)

Philosophers debate over the truth of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the thesis that there is a morally significant difference between doing harm and merely allowing harm to happen. Deontologists tend to accept this doctrine, whereas consequentialists tend to reject it. A robust defence of this doctrine would require a conceptual distinction between doing and allowing that both matches our ordinary use of the concepts in a wide range of cases and enables a justification for the alleged moral difference. (...) In this article, I argue not only that a robust defence of this doctrine is available, but also that it is available within a consequentialist framework. (shrink)

Some philosophers have argued that refraining from performing an action consists in actively keeping oneself from performing that action or preventing one’s performing it. Since activities must be held to be positive actions, this implies that negative actions are a species of positive actions which is to say that all actions are positive actions. I defend the following claims: (i) Positive actions necessarily include activity or effort, negative actions may require activity or effort, but never include the activity or effort (...) which may be required. (ii) Unless it is, or was, at some time in P’s power to Q, P does not refrain from Q-ing. (iii) Negative actions are actions , they are causings of negative facts. (shrink)

Many assume that the best, and perhaps only, way to address the so-called Problem of Evil is to claim that God does not do evil, but that God merely allows evil. This assumption depends on two claims: the doing-allowing distinction exists and the doing-allowing distinction is morally significant. In this paper I try to undermine both of these claims. Against I argue that some of the most influential analyses of the doing-allowing distinction face grave difficulties and that these difficulties are (...) only exacerbated when applied to God. Against I argue that broadly Kantian considerations give a better explanation of the moral differences in paradigm cases than the doing-allowing distinction and, when applied to God, effectively dissolve the moral significance of the doing-allowing distinction. The upshot of this is that those who claim God does evil are no worse off than those who claim God allows evil regarding the PoE. (shrink)

RESUMEN Los defensores del liberalismo político sostienen que el ejercicio del poder político es legítimo solo cuando es justificado por razones públicas que todos los ciudadanos pueden aceptar con independencia de la doctrina religiosa, filosófica o moral a la que se adhieren. Según John Rawls, satisfacer esa concepción de la legitimidad exige apelar, en la justificación pública de la acción del Estado, a "concepciones políticas de la justicia". Se busca elaborar un nuevo tipo de argumento a favor de la posición (...) de Rawls. ABSTRACT The supporters of political liberalism hold that the exercise of political power is legitimate only when it is justified by public reasons acceptable to all citizens, independently of the religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine they adhere to. In John Rawls' view, satisfying this conception of legitimacy makes it necessary to appeal to "political conceptions of justice" when attempting to publicly justify actions by the State. The article sets forth a new type of argument in favor of Rawls' position. RESUMO Os defensores do liberalismo político sustêm que o exercício do poder político é legítimo só quando é justificado por razões públicas que todos os cidadãos podem aceitar com independência da doutrina religiosa, filosófica ou moral à qual se aderem. Segundo John Rawls, satisfazer essa concepção da legitimidade exige apelar, na justificativa pública da ação do Estado, a "concepções políticas da justiça". Procura-se elaborar um novo tipo de argumento a favor da posição de Rawls. (shrink)