Critical realists argue that the condition of possibility of the sciences is that they are based on a correct set of ontological assumptions or definitions. The task of philosophy is to underlabor for the sciences, by ensuring that the explanations developed are congruent with the ontological condition of possibility of the sciences. This requires critical realists to justify their claims about ontology and, to do this, they turn to ontological assumptions that are held to obtain in natural scientific knowledge and (...) social agents’ lay knowledge. A number of problems with this approach are discussed and a problem-solving alternative is advocated. (shrink)

In the context of calls for "postpositivist" sociology, realism has emerged as a powerful and compelling epistemology for social science. In transferring and transforming scientific realism --a philosophy of natural science--into a justificatory discourse for social science, realism splits into two parts: a strict, highly naturalistic realism and a reflexive, more mediated, and critical realism. Both forms of realism, however, suffer from conceptual ambiguities, omissions, and elisions that make them an inappropriate epistemology for social science. Examination of these problems in (...) detail reveals how a different perspective--centered on the interpretation of meaning--could provide a better justification for social inquiry, and in particular a better understanding of sociological theory and the construction of sociological explanations. (shrink)

This article explores the difficulties raised for social scientific investigation by the absence of experiment, critically reviewing realist responses to the problem such as those offered by Bhaskar, Collier and Sayer. It suggests that realist arguments for a shift from prediction to explanation, the use of abstraction, and reliance upon interpretive forms of investigation fail to demonstrate that these approaches compensate for the lack of experimental control. Instead, it is argued that the search for regularities, when suitably conceived, provides the (...) best alternative to experiment for the social sciences. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article responds to McWherter’s detailed critique of my assessment of Roy Bhaskar’s method of transcendental argumentation in chapter four of my Naturalizing Critical Realist Social Ontology. I begin by describing some naturalist ontological and epistemological views defended in my book, thereby showing that my naturalist challenge to the original version of critical realism is not only methodological but also substantial. I also indicate that this point is effectively downplayed in McWherter’s framing of the debate in terms of competing metaphilosophies. (...) I then consider how the doctrine of transcendental idealism is presupposed in Kant’s transcendental deduction and question the consistency of McWherter’s various descriptions of Bhaskar’s transcendental arguments. Finally, I provide detailed responses to McWherter’s objectives to my views. My conclusion is that naturalized critical realism is a more coherent and scientifically viable position than the neo-Kantian version of critical realism defended by McWherter. Nevertheless, I think that there is enough overlap between original and naturalized critical realism to regard the latter as a revised and elaborated version of the former. (shrink)