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Substratum

In Vere Claiborne Chappell (ed.), Locke. New York: Oxford University Press (1998)

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  1. Niezauważona rewolucja. Konstruktywistyczny idealizm Richarda Burthogge'a (Unnoticed Revolution. Richard Burthogge's Constructivist Idealism).Bartosz Żukowski - 2019 - Lodz: Lodz University Press.
    The book "Unnoticed Revolution. Richard Burthogge's Constructivist Idealism" focuses on the theory of cognition developed by Richard Burthogge, the seventeenth-century English philosopher and author, among other works, of the "Organum Vetus & Novum" (1678) and "An Essay upon Reason and the Nature of Spirits" (1694). Burthogge’s ideas had a minimal impact on the philosophy of his time and have hitherto not been the subject of a detailed study. Nevertheless, his writings contain a highly original concept of constructivist idealism, which, when (...)
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  • Watts and Trotter Cockburn on the Power of Thinking.Ruth Boeker - 2024 - In Sebastian Bender & Dominik Perler (eds.), Powers and Abilities in Early Modern Philosophy. New York, NY: Routledge.
    My chapter examines Isaac Watts’s and Catharine Trotter Cockburn’s views concerning the metaphysics of the mind and their underlying accounts of powers and substances. In Philosophical Essays on Various Subjects Watts criticizes Locke’s account of substances and argues for his own preferred account of substance. Watts argues that there is no need to postulate an unknown substratum, as Locke does. Instead, Watts searches for a better explanation of what substances are. His proposal is that bodily substance just is solid extension (...)
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  • Locke on Substance.Han-Kyul Kim - 2021 - In Jessica Gordon-Roth & Shelley Weinberg (eds.), The Lockean Mind. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 226-236.
    In the Essay, Locke refers to the ordinary-sized natural things as ‘particular sorts of Substances’ (2.23), whereas the ‘three sorts of Substances’ (2.27) are more metaphysically laden sorts: God, finite spirits, and fundamental material particles. He posits the much-contested ‘substratum’ in each particular sort of substance but not any of the three sorts. It should also be noted that his list of the particular sorts includes ‘men’. In regard to this nobler sort, he refers to a further classification – viz., (...)
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  • The Contours of Locke’s General Substance Dualism.Graham Clay - 2022 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 4 (1):1-20.
    In this paper, I will argue that Locke is a substance dualist in the general sense, in that he holds that there are, independent of our classificatory schema, two distinct kinds of substances: wholly material ones and wholly immaterial ones. On Locke’s view, the difference between the two lies in whether they are solid or not, thereby differentiating him from Descartes. My way of establishing Locke as a general substance dualist is to be as minimally committal as possible at the (...)
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  • Material Objects and Essential Bundle Theory.Stephen Barker & Mark Jago - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):2969-2986.
    In this paper we present a new metaphysical theory of material objects. On our theory, objects are bundles of property instances, where those properties give the nature or essence of that object. We call the theory essential bundle theory. Property possession is not analysed as bundle-membership, as in traditional bundle theories, since accidental properties are not included in the object’s bundle. We have a different story to tell about accidental property possession. This move reaps many benefits. Essential bundle theory delivers (...)
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  • (1 other version)Locke vs. Hume: Who Is the Better Concept-Empiricist?Ruth Weintraub - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (3):481-500.
    According to the received view, Hume is a much more rigorous and consistent concept-empiricist than Locke. Hume is supposed to have taken as a starting point Locke's meaning-empiricism, and worked out its full radical implications. Locke, by way of contrast, cowered from drawing his theory's strange consequences. The received view about Locke's and Hume's concept-empiricism is mistaken, I shall argue. Hume may be more uncompromising (although he too falters), but he is not more rigorous than Locke. It is not because (...)
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  • (1 other version)Locke vs. Hume: Who Is the Better Concept-Empiricist?Ruth Weintraub - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (3):481-500.
    According to the received view, Hume is a much more rigorous and consistent concept-empiricist than Locke. Hume is supposed to have taken as a starting point Locke's meaning-empiricism, and worked out its full radical implications. Locke, by way of contrast, cowered from drawing his theory's strange consequences. The received view about Locke's and Hume's concept-empiricism is mistaken, I shall argue. Hume may be more uncompromising (although he too falters), but he is not more rigorous than Locke. It is not because (...)
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  • Thinking Nature, "Pierre Maupertuis and the Charge of Error Against Fermat and Leibniz".Richard Samuel Lamborn - unknown
    The purpose of this dissertation is to defend Pierre Fermat and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz against the charge of error made against them by Pierre Maupertuis that they errantly applied final causes to physics. This charge came in Maupertuis’ 1744 speech to the Paris Academy of Sciences, later published in different versions, entitled Accord Between Different Laws Which at First Seemed Incompatible. It is in this speech that Maupertuis lays claim to one of the most important discoveries in the history of (...)
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  • Locke y Putnam sobre la referencia (Locke and Putnam on Reference).Luis Fernández Moreno - 2010 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 25 (1):21-36.
    RESUMEN: La teoría causal formulada por Kripke y Putnam es la teoría semántica dominante de los términos de género natural y, en especial, de los términos de sustancia. La teoría semántica de los términos de sustancia de Locke ha sido, supuestamente, refutada por aquélla. Según Putnam, la teoría de Locke ha pasado por alto dos importantes contribuciones a la semántica, y principalmente a la referencia, de los términos de sustancia, a saber, la contribución de la sociedad y la del entorno. (...)
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  • O estatuto ontológico das pessoas no Ensaio de Locke.Ulysses Pinheiro - 2012 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 38 (2):131-170.
    La teoría de la identidad personal, añadida por Locke a la segunda edición de su Ensayo sobre el entendimiento humano, presenta una caracterización ontológica ambigua de la naturaleza de las personas. Por un lado, pareciera que las personas no pueden ser caracterizadas como sustancias. Por otro, sin embargo, la única alternativa disponible -es decir, la que las caracteriza como modos- no es totalmente satisfactoria. Se podría considerar a las personas como correspondientes a una simple actitud pragmática de los hombres en (...)
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  • The substance of citizenship: is it rights all the way down?Chiara Raucea - 2018 - Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 47 (1):67-92.
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