This article compares the theories of democracy of John Dewey and Claude Lefort, identifying some common themes in their otherwise radically different philosophical outlooks. In so doing, it attempts to analyze the philosophical implications of a ‘democracy first’ approach to politics. It then explains in what sense Dewey’s idea of ‘democracy as a way of life’ and Claude Lefort’s conception of ‘democracy as a form of society’ provide the cornerstone of an original and so far insufficiently explored approach to political (...) philosophy. Such an approach offers an alternative both to the classical-liberal and to the critical-radical projects which still dominate contemporary political philosophy. It then indicates some of the potential advantages of such a ‘wide view’ for contemporary debates in democratic theory. (shrink)

This paper examines the “Dewey-Lippmann debate” and its enduring significance for contemporary democracy, which currently suffers from deep political polarization within a fractured media landscape. The examination begins with communication theorist James Carey’s original characterization of Lippmann as a positivist seeking a world of objective, accurate information in contrast to Dewey, who identifies the contingent, constructed nature of knowledge achieved through processes of communication. This analysis re-examines Lippmann’s and Dewey’s positions in light of subsequent arguments that challenge Carey’s conclusions. It (...) will be argued that, while Carey’s critics are correct that Lippmann held a more nuanced position on democracy than Carey acknowledges, they also largely misunderstand his Dewey-inspired arguments about the meaning making functions of communication. By highlighting the role of the habits of communication in Dewey’s democratic analysis, this paper points toward suggestions for bolstering participatory democracy while simultaneously fostering a less polarized culture. (shrink)

This paper aims at renovating the prospects for social philosophy through a confrontation between pragmatism and critical theory. In particular, it contends that the resources of pragmatism for advancing a project of emancipatory social philosophy have so far been neglected. After contrasting the two major traditions in social philosophy—the analytical and the critical—I proceed to outline the main traits of a pragmatist social philosophy. By inscribing pragmatism within the tradition of social philosophy, my aim is to promote a new understanding (...) of pragmatism as one of the central Euro-American traditions in social and political philosophy, deserving to be on an equal footing with critical theory and political liberalism. And, furthermore, one whose critical and radical force may be of great help in the wake of the dismissal of the metaphysical certainties upon which the critical program of social philosophy had once set its hopes of social emancipation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:John Dewey and India:Expanding the John Dewey-Bhimrao Ambedkar StoryScott R. StroudFor those who appreciate the complexity of the pragmatist tradition, the addition of international aspects and figures into recent narratives of its evolution comes as no surprise. John Dewey's influence on his students—and future reformers—from China has been usefully explored, focusing most notably on Hu Shih. Hu saw the value of Dewey's thought, even though he did not imbibe (...) all of it. Later, he would recall the power of the pragmatist's thoughts to provoke creative new ways of expanding pragmatism as a practical philosophy: "John Dewey, with his slow way of lecturing and conversation, was always throwing out right and left these 'seed ideas'—ideas which may fall on fertile soil in the mind of some of his students and grow into intellectual structures probably beyond the dream of the originator" (Hu Shih 95). Hu would return to China after his time in Dewey's classroom and nurture various "seeds" planted in the classrooms of Columbia University into his own creative literary and philosophical approaches to China's problems in the early twentieth century.By now, the Chinese episode of pragmatism's global history is well-known.1 But what of pragmatism's connection to India? Sitting in the same classroom as Hu and Dewey in 1915–1916 was a young Indian student, Bhimrao Ambedkar (1891–1956)—a thinker and leader who would serve a similar function to Hu, germinating useful ideas from Dewey into a new philosophy and a new context. Ambedkar would become a profound thinker who authored many books on a range of subjects pertinent to India's social problems and its democratic hopes. As a political leader, he led many protests for "untouchable" rights, and he served as one of the chief architects for India's democratic constitution in the 1940s. But he was also a deeply pragmatic thinker, one who took inspiration from parts of Dewey's thought that he first encountered while a student at Columbia University 1913–1916. [End Page 65] Ambedkar would write in the Columbia Alumni News in 1930 that "the best friends I have had in my life were some of my classmates at Columbia and my great professors, John Dewey, James Shotwell, Edwin Seligman, and James Harvey Robinson" (qtd. in "'Untouchables' Represented" 12). Ambedkar would be called back to Columbia in 1952 to receive an honorary degree; while he was bouncing around from airport to airport on his way to New York, Dewey died of pneumonia. Ambedkar sat in the King's Crown Hotel across from Columbia University's campus on 4 June and wrote to his wife, Savita, lamenting the news of Dewey's passing: "I am so sorry. I owe all my intellectual life to him. He was a wonderful man."2 Ambedkar had not seen Dewey in person since June 1916, but his work bears the undeniable marks of pragmatism in its unique anti-caste democratic emphases.3Ambedkar would imbibe the thought of Dewey—along with his other progressive professors at Columbia University (as well as institutions in London after 1916)—and return to India to get increasingly involved in the fight for "untouchable" (now referred to as "Dalit," the self-chosen Marathi term meaning "crushed") rights in India. His insistence on gaining the respect that thousands of years of the caste system had denied to him and his fellow Dalits put him at odds with figures like Gandhi, who wanted to emphasize political independence of the Indian nation over what they considered social challenges like caste. While all parts of Ambedkar's education were significant for his fight against caste oppression, he had a particular affinity for Dewey. As recent research has demonstrated, Ambedkar extended and adapted the ideal of social democracy and psychological ethics that he learned from Dewey's courses (Philosophy 231 in the Fall of 1914) and engaged the conversation on custom and force that he heard in Dewey's Philosophy 131-132 course on Moral and Political Philosophy in 1915–1916 (Stroud, "Recovering the Story"). Ambedkar also appropriated Dewey's method of reconstruction and employed it in novel argumentative ways in... (shrink)

In Democracy and Moral Conflict, Robert Talisse defends a folk epistemological justification of democracy. This is a universalist and non-moral justification that he deems necessary to accommodate moral pluralism. In contrast, I argue that this attempt fails to justify democracy, on three grounds. First, democracy cannot accommodate moral pluralism, as Talisse understands it. Second, Talisse's own conception of democracy is inconsistent with moral pluralism. And third, democracy requires moral justification and motivation, both of which can be made consistent from within (...) an experimental moral pluralism. (shrink)

This paper suggests that pragmatism makes a distinctive contribution to the theory and practice of radical democracy. It investigates the relation ship between the renewal of interest in pragmatism and the recent attempts to develop radical democratic alternatives to political liberalism. With particular reference to the contemporary critical social theory of Habermas and Honneth, the paper outlines key dimensions of the civic republican, deliberative democratic and reflexive cooperative reconstructions of John Dewey's conception of democracy. These reconstructions are shown to have (...) explicated important pragmatist insights concerning public participation in civic associations, the discursive practices of deliberation, and the cooperative organization of the division of labour. However, it is argued that each of these reconstructions pre suppose some facet of the additional pragmatist understanding of the creativity of action and that the most distinctive contributions of pragmatism to radical democratic theory and practice derive from a notion of democracy as instituted and emergent meaning. (shrink)

This article intervenes in the debate on populism and democratic reform. Assuming that neither progressive populist counter-projects nor reforms broadening participation or deepening deliberation provide an immediate and realistic solution to the problematic political condition, the article engages with John Dewey’s work and presents a democratic praxis focused on problem solving as the most promising remedy to the populist challenge. The analysis shows that Dewey conceptualizes human action as inherently focused on problem solving, which allows him to think democracy as (...) an associated activity to articulate and solve problems through public inquiry. Drawing on the critique that powerful groups prevent democratic problem solving activities, I develop his argument that a problem-centred democratic project must attach itself to ‘wants and interests that are actually operating’. Against this backdrop, the pragmatic way forward to the repression of populist authoritarianism lies in the expansion of democratic problem solving, which, I conclude, can be realized by interweaving intelligent action into the habits of democratic parties. (shrink)

Many recent writers on democracy have lamented its decay and warned of its imminent death. We argue that the concerns are focused at three different levels of democracy. The most fundamental of these, celebrated by Tocqueville and by Dewey, recognizes the interactions and joint deliberations among citizens who seek sympathetic mutual engagement. Such engagement is increasingly rare in large-scale political life. In diagnosing and treating the problems, we recommend returning to the debate between Lippmann and Dewey, in which many of (...) the concerns now prominent were already voiced. This inspires the main work of the paper – the reconstruction of Dewey’s conception of democracy as a ‘mode of associated living’. We focus on the thesis that democracy is educative and explicate Dewey’s notion of growth, showing how democratic education contributes to three important functions: the capacity for sustaining oneself, the enrichment of individual experience, and the ability to enter into cooperative discussions with fellow citizens. Dewey’s conception of democratic education is directed at fostering particular virtues and, if citizens come to possess them, the need for Lippmann’s ‘omnicompetent individual’ vanishes. We conclude by suggesting that Dewey’s project of educating democratic character is pertinent for addressing the disaffection of our times. (shrink)