Democracy and Inquiry in the Post-Truth Era: A pragmatist Solution

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Post-truth has become a commonplace strategy. No longer are objective facts viewed as having evidentiary value; scientific knowledge is on a par with emotions or personal beliefs. We intend to show that in the context of post-truth, those proffering and receiving an assertion do not care about the truth-value of the assertion or about the best way to gather evidence concerning it. Such attitudes raise several questions about how relativism can be a corrupting influence in contemporary democracies. We will analyse Steve Fuller’s use of the term «post-truth» – especially, the political connotations about epistemic democracy that he highlights. Instead, we offer a pragmatist defence of the truth and an alternative meaning of epistemic democracy.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MONDAI-3
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-01-30
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-01-30

Total views
64 ( #41,343 of 52,686 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
37 ( #17,104 of 52,686 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.