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  1. Why Phenomenology Doesn't Need Disjunctivism: Merleau-Ponty on Intentionality and Transcendence.Peter Antich - 2021 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 38 (1):81-102.
    Commentators have argued that disjunctivism, from a phenomenological perspective, is the most coherent response to certain skeptical concerns. They find two phenomenological beliefs in tension: that intentionality is transcendent and that perceptions and hallucinations have a similar intentional content. While not ruling out a disjunctivist phenomenology, I show that phenomenologists are not forced into disjunctivism in order to avoid skeptical problems posed by hallucination. Instead, Merleau-Ponty's approach to the horizonal structure of experience supports a novel nondisjunctivist solution: first, by distinguishing (...)
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  • Phenomenologists on Perception and Hallucination: Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty.Søren Overgaard - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (8):e12861.
    There is a chasm in current analytic philosophy of perception between disjunctivists (and naïve realists), on the one hand, and ‘conjunctivists’ (intentionalists), on the other. For more than a decade, scholars of phenomenology have debated how classical phenomenologists such as Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty are to be located vis‐à‐vis this chasm. While there seems to be an emerging consensus that Merleau‐Ponty was a disjunctivist avant la lettre, how to interpret Husserl remains contested.
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  • Daubert’s Naïve Realist Challenge to Husserl.Matt E. M. Bower - 2019 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 96 (2):211-243.
    Despite extensive discussion of naïve realism in the wider philosophical literature, those influenced by the phenomenological movement who work in the philosophy of perception have hardly weighed in on the matter. It is thus interesting to discover that Edmund Husserl’s close philosophical interlocutor and friend, the early twentieth-century phenomenologist Johannes Daubert, held the naive realist view. This article presents Daubert’s views on the fundamental nature of perceptual experience and shows how they differ radically from those of Husserl’s. The author argues, (...)
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  • Perception and self‐awareness in Merleau‐Ponty and Martin.David Suarez - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1028-1040.
    Merleau-Ponty suggests that to perceive is to be “geared into” the world. In perceiving, we are related to a temporally structured modal space of bodily possibilities that is co-constituted by the body and the world. When we perceive, we are “geared into” this structure and responsive to it; when we misperceive, we are not. In misperceiving, we are unaware of our failure to be geared into the world, and in this respect, we lack awareness of what we are doing. In (...)
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  • Perceptual Error, Conjunctivism, and Husserl.Søren Overgaard - 2018 - Husserl Studies 34 (1):25-45.
    Claude Romano and Andrea Staiti have recently discussed Husserl’s account of perception in relation to debates in current analytic philosophy between so-called “conjunctivists” and “disjunctivists”. Romano and Staiti offer strikingly different accounts of the nature of illusion and hallucination, and opposing readings of Husserl. Romano thinks hallucinations and illusions are fleeting, fragile phenomena, while Staiti claims they are inherently retrospective phenomena. Romano reads Husserl as being committed to a form of conjunctivism that Romano rejects in favour of a version of (...)
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