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Gupta’s gambit

Philosophical Studies 152 (1):17-39 (2011)

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On The Hypothetical Given.Adam Marushak - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):497-514.details My aim in this paper is to assess the viability of a perceptual epistemology based on what Anil Gupta calls the “hypothetical given”. On this account, experience alone yields no unconditional entitlement to perceptual beliefs. Experience functions instead to establish relations of rational support between what Gupta calls “views” and perceptual beliefs. I argue that the hypothetical given is a genuine alternative to the prevailing theories of perceptual justification but that the account faces a dilemma: on a natural assumption about (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Replies to Selim Berker and Karl Schafer.Anil Gupta - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):41 - 53.details I respond to six objections, raised by Selim Berker and Karl Schafer, against the theory offered in my Empiricism and Experience: (1) that the theory needs a problematic notion of subjective character of experience; (2) that the transition from the hypothetical to the categorical fails because of a logical difficulty; (3) that the constraints imposed on admissible views are too weak; (4) that the theory does not deserve the label 'empiricism'; (5) that the motivations provided for the Reliability constraint are (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
Adam Marushak on the hypothetical given.Anil Gupta - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):167-174.details Adam Marushak raises a dilemma for the proponents of the hypothetical given. On one of its horns, the proponents are said to be committed to rationalism; and on the other horn, to skepticism. I argue, in response, that even if we grant that the arguments of both horns are sound, the commitments incurred are light and unproblematic. I argue also that the dilemma is based on a reading of the hypothetical that, though valuable, needs to be refined in light of (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Coherentism via Graphs.Selim Berker - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):322-352.details Once upon a time, coherentism was the dominant response to the regress problem in epistemology, but in recent decades the view has fallen into disrepute: now almost everyone is a foundationalist (with a few infinitists sprinkled here and there). In this paper, I sketch a new way of thinking about coherentism, and show how it avoids many of the problems often thought fatal for the view, including the isolation objection, worries over circularity, and concerns that the concept of coherence is (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 15 citations

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