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This article puts forward a revisionary reading of Hegel's reception in Britain at the turn of the nineteenth century, in suggesting that the stance of the British Hegelians is very close to the sort of non-metaphysical or category theory interpretations that have been in vogue amongst contemporary commentators. It is shown that the British Hegelians arrived at this position as a way of responding to the hostile existentialist reaction to Hegel begun by Schelling in the 1840s, which led them to (...) |
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This essay offers an introduction to Hegel's philosophy of sound as elaborated in the 1830 Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline. The first section begins with essential context for interpreting the a priori status of nature and sound in Hegel's Philosophy of Nature. Next, I develop a general account of the Aristotelian character of Hegel's ‘Physics’, and a commentary on the categories of specific gravity and cohesion leading up to sound (and heat) in the ‘Physics of Particular Individuality’. (...) |
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In this paper James’s pluralism is examined in light of his critiques of ‘intellectualism’ and monistic idealism in order to elucidate his relationship to Hegel. Contrary to the strong anti-Hegelianism found throughout the writings of James, Hegel’s dialectic and speculative logic are able to give a rational account of the continuity of objects and relations within experience that James struggled to articulate in A Pluralistic Universe. Neither James nor Hegel is an absolute pluralist or monist due to the interdependence of (...) |
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ABSTRACTHere, I pursue consequences, for the interpretation of Sellars’ critique of the ‘Myth of the Given’, of separating the modal significance that Kant attributed to empirical intuition from th... |
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Perhaps one of the most difficult passages in Hegel's Science of Logic is his treatment of contradiction. If each moment of Hegel's logic is understood to constitute a sort of proof and since contradiction itself is presented as a moment of the logic, then in what sense can one comprehend a proof of contradiction as such? It is difficult to formulate this in any way that does not sound fundamentally incoherent, since it is not just at odds with our ordinary (...) |
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The growing field of Lenin Studies has been nurtured by the growth of crises and struggles in our own time and may contribute to present-day activists’ efforts at developing revolutionary strategy, organisation and struggle. Surveying this field, it is worth focusing on three recent studies by Antonio Negri, Tamás Krausz and Alan Shandro which give attention to the methodological core of what can be called ‘Leninism’. All three distinguish Lenin’s approach to Marxism from that of such prominent Marxists as Kautsky. (...) |
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I propose a new reading of Hegel’s discussion of modality in the ‘Actuality’ chapter of the Science of Logic. On this reading, the main purpose of the chapter is a critical engagement with Spinoza’s modal metaphysics. Hegel first reconstructs a rationalist line of thought — corresponding to the cosmological argument for the existence of God — that ultimately leads to Spinozist necessitarianism. He then presents a reductio argument against necessitarianism, contending that as a consequence of necessitarianism, no adequate explanatory accounts (...) |
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-/- Amongst contemporary theorists, the most widespread interpretation of Hegel's theory of punishment is that it is a retributivist theory of annulment, where punishments cancel the performance of crimes. The theory is retributivist insofar as the criminal punished must be demonstrated to be deserving of a punishment that is commensurable in value only to the nature of his crime, rather than to any consequentialist considerations. As Antony Duff says: -/- [retributivism] justifies punishment in terms not of its contingently beneficial effects (...) |
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