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  1. Evidence, reasons, and knowledge in the reasons-first program.Paul Silva & Sven Bernecker - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):617-625.
    Mark Schroeder’s Reasons First is admirable in its scope and execution, deftly demonstrating the theoretical promise of extending the reasons-first approach from ethics to epistemology. In what follows we explore how (not) to account for the evidence-that relation within the reasons-first program, we explain how factive content views of evidence can be resilient in the face of Schroeder’s criticisms, and we explain how knowledge from falsehood threatens Schroeder’s view of knowledge. Along the way we sketch a reliabilist account of the (...)
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  • The Problem of Defining Useful False Beliefs.Robert K. Shope - 2024 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 101 (1):47-69.
    Those who recognize the type of knowledge acquisition that involves what Peter D. Klein calls ‘a useful false belief’ face the problem of defining appropriate boundaries for such a belief. Klein’s own proposal encounters counterexamples and should be replaced by a definition inspired by a position that may be called ‘circumstantialism,’ which emphasizes certain circumstances belonging to the knower’s situation. The revised definition also offers a solution to ‘The False Lemma Problem’ of distinguishing cases involving useful false beliefs from classic (...)
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