Evidence, reasons, and knowledge in the reasons-first program

Philosophical Studies 181 (2):617-625 (2023)
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Abstract

Mark Schroeder’s Reasons First is admirable in its scope and execution, deftly demonstrating the theoretical promise of extending the reasons-first approach from ethics to epistemology. In what follows we explore how (not) to account for the evidence-that relation within the reasons-first program, we explain how factive content views of evidence can be resilient in the face of Schroeder’s criticisms, and we explain how knowledge from falsehood threatens Schroeder’s view of knowledge. Along the way we sketch a reliabilist account of the reasons-for relation (inspired by Alston) and show how it limits the applicability of Schroeder’s arguments.

Author Profiles

Paul Silva Jr.
University of Cologne
Sven Bernecker
University of Cologne

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