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Knowledge of logical generality and the possibility of deductive reasoning

Corine Besson

In Anders Nes & Timothy Hoo Wai Chan (eds.), Inference and Consciousness. London: Routledge. pp. 172-196 (2019)

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Countering Justiﬁcation Holism in the Epistemology of Logic: The Argument from Pre-Theoretic Universality.Frederik J. Andersen - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Logic 20 (3):375-396.details A key question in the philosophy of logic is how we have epistemic justiﬁcation for claims about logical entailment (assuming we have such justiﬁcation at all). Justiﬁcation holism asserts that claims of logical entailment can only be justiﬁed in the context of an entire logical theory, e.g., classical, intuitionistic, paraconsistent, paracomplete etc. According to holism, claims of logical entailment cannot be atomistically justiﬁed as isolated statements, independently of theory choice. At present there is a developing interest in—and endorsement of—justiﬁcation holism (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Nonsense: a user's guide.Manish Oza - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details Many philosophers suppose that sometimes we think we are saying or thinking something meaningful when in fact we’re not saying or thinking anything at all: we are producing nonsense. But what is nonsense? An account of nonsense must, I argue, meet two constraints. The first constraint requires that nonsense can be rationally engaged with, not just mentioned. In particular, we can reason with nonsense and use it within that-clauses. An account which fails to meet this constraint cannot explain why nonsense (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Logical Form and the Limits of Thought.Manish Oza - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Torontodetails What is the relation of logic to thinking? My dissertation offers a new argument for the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking in the following sense: representational activity counts as thinking only if it manifests sensitivity to logical rules. In short, thinking has to be minimally logical. An account of thinking has to allow for our freedom to question or revise our commitments – even seemingly obvious conceptual connections – without loss of understanding. This freedom, I argue, requires that (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Lewis Carroll’s regress and the presuppositional structure of arguments.Carlotta Pavese - 2021 - Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (1):1-38.details This essay argues that the main lesson of Lewis Carroll's Regress is that arguments are constitutively presuppositional. Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations
Logical Disagreement.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrewsdetails While the epistemic signiﬁcance of disagreement has been a popular topic in epistemology for at least a decade, little attention has been paid to logical disagreement. This monograph is meant as a remedy. The text starts with an extensive literature review of the epistemology of (peer) disagreement and sets the stage for an epistemological study of logical disagreement. The guiding thread for the rest of the work is then three distinct readings of the ambiguous term ‘logical disagreement’. Chapters 1 and (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Validity as a thick concept.Sophia Arbeiter - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (10):2937-2953.details This paper presents a novel position in the philosophy of logic: I argue that _validity_ is a thick concept. Hence, I propose to consider _validity_ in analogy to other thick concepts, such as _honesty_, _selfishness_ or _justice_. This proposal is motivated by the debate on the normativity of logic: while logic textbooks seem simply descriptive in their presentation of logical truths, many have argued that logic has consequences for how we ought to reason, for what we ought to believe, or (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation

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