The central thesis of JC Beall’s paraconsistent Christology is that Christ, being human and divine, is a contradictory being, and a rational Christology can accept it, since logic nowadays does not exclude the possibility of true contradictions. In this paper, I move from Beall’s theory and I present an alternative view. I quote seven statements of the so-called ‘Athanasian Creed’ which synthesizes the results of conciliar Christology. The aim of the Creed is to combat monophysitism by stressing the duplicity and (...) unity of Christ: two (incompatible) natures inseparably joined in only one person. I note that the two-in-one principle, so intended, may be seen as an ancestor of what has been called ‘conjunctive paraconsistency’, whereby there could be true contradictions but contradictories cannot be separately true. I specifically oppose this view to Beall’s idea of Christ’s human divinity (or divine humanity) as a glut, showing that in the conjunctive account, true contradictions do not require any overlapping or joint ascription of truth and falsity. (shrink)

Many authors have considered that the notions of paraconsistency and dialetheism are intrinsically connected, in many cases, to the extent of confusing both phenomena. However, paraconsistency is a formal feature of some logics that consists in invalidating the rule of explosion, whereas dialetheism is a semantical/ontological position consisting in accepting true contradictions. In this paper, we argue against this connection and show that it is perfectly possible to adopt a paraconsistent logic and reject dialetheism, and, moreover, that there are examples (...) of non-paraconsistent logics that can be interpreted in a dialetheic way. (shrink)