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  1. Chasing the Rainbow: The Non-conscious Nature of Being.David A. Oakley & Peter W. Halligan - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8:281365.
    Despite the compelling subjective experience of executive self-control, we argue that ‘consciousness’ contains no top-down control processes. We propose that ‘consciousness’ involves no executive, causal or controlling relationship with any of the familiar psychological processes conventionally attributed to it. In our view all psychological processing and psychological products are non-conscious. In particular, we argue that all ‘contents of consciousness’ are generated by and within non-conscious brain systems in the form of a continuous self-referential personal narrative that is not directed or (...)
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  • Fluid Biosemiotic Mechanisms Underlie Subconscious Habits.V. N. Alexander & Valerie Grimes - 2017 - Biosemiotics 10 (3):337-353.
    Although research into the biosemiotic mechanisms underlying the purposeful behavior of brainless living systems is extensive, researchers have not adequately described biosemiosis among neurons. As the conscious use of signs is well-covered by the various fields of semiotics, we focus on subconscious sign action. Subconscious semiotic habits, both functional and dysfunctional, may be created and reinforced in the brain not necessarily in a logical manner and not necessarily through repeated reinforcement. We review literature that suggests hypnosis may be effective in (...)
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  • Hearing a Voice as one’s own: Two Views of Inner Speech Self-Monitoring Deficits in Schizophrenia.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):675-699.
    Many philosophers and psychologists have sought to explain experiences of auditory verbal hallucinations and “inserted thoughts” in schizophrenia in terms of a failure on the part of patients to appropriately monitor their own inner speech. These self-monitoring accounts have recently been challenged by some who argue that AVHs are better explained in terms of the spontaneous activation of auditory-verbal representations. This paper defends two kinds of self-monitoring approach against the spontaneous activation account. The defense requires first making some important clarifications (...)
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  • (1 other version)Unusual Experiences, Reality Testing and Delusions of Alien Control.Raben Rosenberg Jakob Hohwy - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):141-162.
    Some monothematic types of delusions may arise because subjects have unusual experiences. The role of this experiential component in the pathogenesis of delusion is still not understood. Focussing on delusions of alien control, we outline a model for reality testing competence on unusual experiences. We propose that nascent delusions arise when there are local failures of reality testing performance, and that monothematic delusions arise as normal responses to these. In the course of this we address questions concerning the tenacity with (...)
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  • Agentive awareness is not sensory awareness.Myrto I. Mylopoulos - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):761-780.
    In this paper, I argue that the conscious awareness one has of oneself as acting, i.e., agentive awareness, is not a type of sensory awareness. After providing some set up in Sect. 1, I move on in Sect. 2 to sketch a profile of sensory agentive experiences as representational states with sensory qualities by which we come to be aware of ourselves as performing actions. In Sect. 3, I critique two leading arguments in favor of positing such sensory experiences: the (...)
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  • Using suggestion to model different types of automatic writing.E. Walsh, M. A. Mehta, D. A. Oakley, D. N. Guilmette, A. Gabay, P. W. Halligan & Q. Deeley - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 26:24-36.
    Our sense of self includes awareness of our thoughts and movements, and our control over them. This feeling can be altered or lost in neuropsychiatric disorders as well as in phenomena such as “automatic writing” whereby writing is attributed to an external source. Here, we employed suggestion in highly hypnotically suggestible participants to model various experiences of automatic writing during a sentence completion task. Results showed that the induction of hypnosis, without additional suggestion, was associated with a small but significant (...)
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  • Can we recreate delusions in the laboratory?Lisa Bortolotti, Rochelle Cox & Amanda Barnier - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):109 - 131.
    Clinical delusions are difficult to investigate in the laboratory because they co-occur with other symptoms and with intellectual impairment. Partly for these reasons, researchers have recently begun to use hypnosis with neurologically intact people in order to model clinical delusions. In this paper we describe striking analogies between the behavior of patients with a clinical delusion of mirrored self misidentification, and the behavior of highly hypnotizable subjects who receive a hypnotic suggestion to see a stranger when they look in the (...)
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  • The Phenomenology of Action: A Conceptual Framework.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2008 - Cognition 107 (1):179 - 217.
    After a long period of neglect, the phenomenology of action has recently regained its place in the agenda of philosophers and scientists alike. The recent explosion of interest in the topic highlights its complexity. The purpose of this paper is to propose a conceptual framework allowing for a more precise characterization of the many facets of the phenomenology of agency, of how they are related and of their possible sources. The key assumption guiding this attempt is that the processes through (...)
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  • Anomalous control: When "free will" is not conscious.Patrick Haggard, Peter Cartledge, Meilyr Dafydd & David A. Oakley - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (3):646-654.
    The conscious feeling of exercising ‘free-will’ is fundamental to our sense of self. However, in some psychopathological conditions actions may be experienced as involuntary or unwilled. We have used suggestion in hypnosis to create the experience of involuntariness in normal participants. We compared a voluntary finger movement, a passive movement and a voluntary movement suggested by hypnosis to be ‘involuntary.’ Hypnosis itself had no effect on the subjective experience of voluntariness associated with willed movements and passive movements or on time (...)
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  • Deluding the motor system.Sarah-Jayne Blakemore - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):647-655.
    How do we know that our own actions belong to us? How are we able to distinguish self-generated sensory events from those that arise externally? In this paper, I will briefly discuss experiments that were designed to investigate these questions. In particularly, I will review psychophysical and neuroimaging studies that have investigated how we recognise the consequences of our own actions, and why patients with delusions of control confuse self-produced and externally produced actions and sensations. Studies investigating the failure of (...)
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  • (1 other version)Unusual experiences, reality testing and delusions of alien control.Jakob Hohwy & Raben Rosenberg - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):141-162.
    Some monothematic types of delusions may arise because subjects have unusual experiences. The role of this experiential component in the pathogenesis of delusion is still not understood. Focussing on delusions of alien control, we outline a model for reality testing competence on unusual experiences. We propose that nascent delusions arise when there are local failures of reality testing performance, and that monothematic delusions arise as normal responses to these. In the course of this we address questions concerning the tenacity with (...)
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  • Phenomenology and delusions: Who put the 'alien' in alien control?Elisabeth Pacherie, Melissa Green & Tim Bayne - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):566-577.
    Current models of delusion converge in proposing that delusional beliefs are based on unusual experiences of various kinds. For example, it is argued that the Capgras delusion (the belief that a known person has been replaced by an impostor) is triggered by an abnormal affective experience in response to seeing a known person; loss of the affective response to a familiar person’s face may lead to the belief that the person has been replaced by an impostor (Ellis & Young, 1990). (...)
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  • Introduction: The Hard Problem of Consciousness.Glenn Carruthers & Elizabeth Schier - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):1-3.
    In this paper we try to diagnose one reason why the debate regarding the Hard Problem of consciousness inevitably leads to a stalemate: namely that the characterisation of consciousness assumed by the Hard Problem is unjustified and probably unjustifiable. Following Dennett : 4–6, 1996, Cognition 79:221–237, 2001, J Conscious Stud 19:86, 2012) and Churchland :402–408, 1996, Brainwise: studies in neurophilosophy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002), we argue that there is in fact no non-question begging argument for the claim that consciousness (...)
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  • Simulated thought insertion: Influencing the sense of agency using deception and magic.Jay A. Olson, Mathieu Landry, Krystèle Appourchaux & Amir Raz - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 43:11-26.
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  • Unraveling the mind.Philip Gerrans - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):214-215.
    A radical interpretation of the predictive coding approach suggests that the mind is “seamless” – that is, that cancellation of error signals can propagate smoothly from highest to lowest levels of the control hierarchy, dissolving a distinction between belief and perception. Delusions of alien control provide a test case. Close examination suggests that while they are evidence of predictive coding within the cortex, they are not evidence for the seamless interpretation.
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  • The timing of brain events: Authors’ response to Libet’s ‘Reply’.David A. Oakley & Patrick Haggard - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):548-550.
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  • The self in action: Lessons from delusions of control.Chris Frith - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):752-770.
    Patients with delusions of control are abnormally aware of the sensory consequences of their actions and have difficulty with on-line corrections of movement. As a result they do not feel in control of their movements. At the same time they are strongly aware of the action being intentional. This leads them to believe that their actions are being controlled by an external agent. In contrast, the normal mark of the self in action is that we have very little experience of (...)
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  • The sense of agency: A philosophical and empirical review of the “Who” system.Frédérique de Vignemont & Pierre Fourneret - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):1-19.
    How do I know that I am the person who is moving? According to Wittgenstein (1958), the sense of agency involves a primitive notion of the self used as subject, which does not rely on any prior perceptual identification and which is immune to error through misidentification. However, the neuroscience of action and the neuropsychology of schizophrenia show the existence of specific cognitive processes underlying the sense of agency—the ‘‘Who'' system (Georgieff & Jeannerod, 1998) which is disrupted in delusions of (...)
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  • Does 'hypnosis' by any other name smell as sweet? The efficacy of 'hypnotic' inductions depends on the label 'hypnosis'.Balaganesh Gandhi & David A. Oakley - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2):304-315.
    Hypnosis is associated with profound changes in conscious experience and is increasingly used as a cognitive tool to explore neuropsychological processes. Studies of this sort typically employ suggestions following a hypnotic induction to produce changes in perceptual experience and motor control. It is not clear, however, to what extent the induction procedure serves to facilitate suggested phenomena. This study investigated the effect on suggestibility of a hypnotic induction and labelling that procedure ‘hypnosis.’ Suggestibility of participants was tested before and after (...)
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  • Using hypnosis to gain insights into healthy and pathological cognitive functioning.David A. Oakley & Peter W. Halligan - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):328-331.
    The demonstration that hypnotic suggestion can inhibit word/colour Stroop highlights one of the benefits of using hypnosis to explore cognitive psychology and in particular attentional processes. The compelling results using a rigorous design have particular relevance for the presumed automaticity of some forms of information processing. Moreover the results support the potential that hypnotic suggestion offers for creating clinically informed analogues of relevant psychological and neuropsychological conditions. As with all novel research, the results of Raz and Campbell raise further operational (...)
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  • When our thoughts are not our own: Investigating agency misattributions using the Mind-to-Mind paradigm.Lauren Swiney & Paulo Sousa - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2):589-602.
    At the core of the sense of agency for self-produced action is the sense that I, and not some other agent, am producing and directing those actions. While there is an ever-expanding body of empirical research investigating the sense of agency for bodily action, there has, to date, been little empirical investigation of the sense of agency for thought. The present study uses the novel Mind-to-Mind paradigm, in which the agentive source of a target thought is ambiguous, to measure misattributions (...)
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  • Did I Do That? Brain–Computer Interfacing and the Sense of Agency.Pim Haselager - 2013 - Minds and Machines 23 (3):405-418.
    Brain–computer interfacing (BCI) aims at directly capturing brain activity in order to enable a user to drive an application such as a wheelchair without using peripheral neural or motor systems. Low signal to noise ratio’s, low processing speed, and huge intra- and inter-subject variability currently call for the addition of intelligence to the applications, in order to compensate for errors in the production and/or the decoding of brain signals. However, the combination of minds and machines through BCI’s and intelligent devices (...)
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  • Fractured phenomenologies: Thought insertion, inner speech, and the puzzle of extraneity.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (4):369-401.
    Abstract: How it is that one's own thoughts can seem to be someone else's? After noting some common missteps of other approaches to this puzzle, I develop a novel cognitive solution, drawing on and critiquing theories that understand inserted thoughts and auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia as stemming from mismatches between predicted and actual sensory feedback. Considerable attention is paid to forging links between the first-person phenomenology of thought insertion and the posits (e.g. efference copy, corollary discharge) of current cognitive (...)
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  • Impulsivity, self-control, and hypnotic suggestibility.V. U. Ludwig, C. Stelzel, H. Krutiak, C. E. Prunkl, R. Steimke, L. M. Paschke, N. Kathmann & H. Walter - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2):637-653.
    Hypnotic responding might be due to attenuated frontal lobe functioning after the hypnotic induction. Little is known about whether personality traits linked with frontal functioning are associated with responsiveness to hypnotic suggestions. We assessed whether hypnotic suggestibility is related to the traits of self-control and impulsivity in 154 participants who completed the Brief Self-Control Scale, the Self-Regulation Scale, the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale , and the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility . BIS-11 non-planning impulsivity correlated positively with HGSHS:A . Furthermore, (...)
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  • (1 other version)How to understand delusions of control? A critical review of frith’s hypothesis.Camilo Sánchez - 2017 - Ideas Y Valores 66 (S3):157-192.
    RESUMEN Desde 1980, C. D. Frith investiga la esquizofrenia, y explica sus síntomas centrales como las alucinaciones, con miras a aclarar cuál es el déficit originario de este trastorno mental. Frith propone una hipótesis centrada en el concepto de conciencia, que ha elaborado como parte del desarrollo científico contemporáneo. En primer lugar, como parte de la aplicación de modelos neurocognitivos de control motor, según los cuales el déficit se atribuye al concepto de copia eferente y su función. En segundo lugar, (...)
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  • Tickle me, I think I might be dreaming! Sensory attenuation, self-other distinction, and predictive processing in lucid dreams.Jennifer M. Windt, Dominic L. Harkness & Bigna Lenggenhager - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
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  • Direct verbal suggestibility: Measurement and significance.David A. Oakley, Eamonn Walsh, Mitul A. Mehta, Peter W. Halligan & Quinton Deeley - 2021 - Consciousness and Cognition 89:103036.
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  • Hypnotic induction is followed by state-like changes in the organization of EEG functional connectivity in the theta and beta frequency bands in high-hypnotically susceptible individuals.Graham A. Jamieson & Adrian P. Burgess - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8:86859.
    Altered state theories of hypnosis posit that a qualitatively distinct state of mental processing, which emerges in those with high hypnotic susceptibility following a hypnotic induction, enables the generation of anomalous experiences in response to specific hypnotic suggestions. If so then such a state should be observable as a discrete pattern of changes to functional connectivity (shared information) between brain regions following a hypnotic induction in high but not low hypnotically susceptible participants. Twenty-eight channel EEG was recorded from 12 high (...)
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  • Odd man out: Reply to reviewers.Margaret A. Boden - 2008 - Artificial Intelligence 172 (18):1944-1964.
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  • How hypnotic suggestions work – A systematic review of prominent theories of hypnosis.Anoushiravan Zahedi, Steven Jay Lynn & Werner Sommer - 2024 - Consciousness and Cognition 123 (C):103730.
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  • (1 other version)¿Cómo entender los fenómenos de pasividad? Una revisión crítica de la hipótesis de Frith.Camilo Sánchez - 2017 - Ideas Y Valores 66 (S3):157-192.
    Desde 1980, C. D. Frith ha venido investigando sobre la esquizofrenia, explicando síntomas centrales como las alucinaciones, con miras a aclarar cuál es el déficit de base y originario de este trastorno mental. A lo largo de estos años, Frith ha propuesto su hipótesis centrada en el concepto de consciencia, y ha venido elaborándola como parte del desarrollo científico contemporáneo: parte de la aplicación de modelos neurocognitivos de control motor, según los cuales el déficit se atribuye al concepto de copia (...)
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  • (1 other version)Can you tickle yourself if you swap bodies with someone else?George Van Doorn, Jakob Hohwy & Mark Symmons - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 23:1-11.
    The effect of the body transfer illusion on the perceived strength of self- and externally-generated “tickle” sensations was investigated. As expected, externally generated movement produced significantly higher ratings of tickliness than those associated with self-generated movements. Surprisingly, the body transfer illusion had no influence on the ratings of tickliness, suggesting that highly surprising, and therefore hard to predict, experiences of body image and first-person perspective do not abolish the attenuation of tickle sensations. In addition, evidence was found that a version (...)
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  • Attenuated self-tickle sensation even under trajectory perturbation.George Van Doorn, Bryan Paton, Jacqui Howell & Jakob Hohwy - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:147-153.
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  • Hypnosis and hemispheric asymmetry.Peter L. N. Naish - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):230-234.
    Participants of low and high hypnotic susceptibility were tested on a temporal order judgement task, both with and without hypnosis. Judgements were made of the order of presentation of light flashes appearing in first one hemi-field then the other. There were differences in the inter-stimulus intervals required accurately to report the order, depending upon which hemi-field led. This asymmetry was most marked in hypnotically susceptible participants and reversed when they were hypnotised. This implies not only that brain activity changes in (...)
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  • Hypnosis and belief: A review of hypnotic delusions. [REVIEW]Michael H. Connors - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:27-43.
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  • A neural plasticity perspective on the schizophrenic condition.Yossi Guterman - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):400-420.
    Imbalanced plasticity of neural networks in the brain is proposed to underlie deficits in the integration of efferent and afferent processes in schizophrenia. These deficits affect the priming of the behavior implementing systems by prior knowledge, and thus impair both controlled regulation and automatic activation of mental and motor processes. The sense of self as a distinct entity can consequently be undermined. In predominantly reality-distorting patients, hypo-plasticity of neural connectivity may cause the emergence of highly focused but inflexible patterns of (...)
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  • The neural correlates of movement intentions: A pilot study comparing hypnotic and simulated paralysis.Vera U. Ludwig, Jochen Seitz, Carlos Schönfeldt-Lecuona, Annett Höse, Birgit Abler, Günter Hole, Rainer Goebel & Henrik Walter - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 35:158-170.
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  • From Freedom From to Freedom To: New Perspectives on Intentional Action.Sofia Bonicalzi & Patrick Haggard - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10:459073.
    There are few concepts as relevant as that of intentional action in shaping our sense of self and the interaction with the environment. At the same time, few concepts are so elusive. Indeed, both conceptual and neuroscientific accounts of intentional agency have proven to be problematic. On the one hand, most conceptual views struggle in defining how agents can adequately exert control over their actions. On the other hand, neuroscience settles for definitions by exclusion whereby key features of human intentional (...)
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