- Submit
-
Browse
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- More
Switch to: References
Citations of:
Add citations
You must login to add citations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
The article develops and justifies, on the basis of the epistemological argumentation theory, two central pieces of the theory of evaluative argumentation interpretation: 1. criteria for recognizing argument types and 2. rules for adding reasons to create ideal arguments. Ad 1: The criteria for identifying argument types are a selection of essential elements from the definitions of the respective argument types. Ad 2: After presenting the general principles for adding reasons (benevolence, authenticity, immanence, optimization), heuristics are proposed for finding missing (...) |
|
|
This paper attempts to define the concept of critique, explain its function␣and properties and distinguish it from the close concept of evaluation. It is argued that, beyond the argument, a critique is concerned with the position of the proponent relatively to the reality the argument is about. Moreover, a critique is itself an argument in which assumptions regarding the position of the proponent are justified for a given audience on the basis of the proponent’s argumentative background within a specific domain. |
|
|
Argumentation logicians have recognized a specter of relativism to haunt their philosophy of argument. However, their attempts to dispel pernicious relativism by invoking notions of a universal audience or a community of model interlocutors have not been entirely successful. In fact, their various discussions of a universal audience invoke the context-eschewing formalism of Kant’s categorical imperative. Moreover, they embrace the Kantian method for resolving the antinomies that continually vacillates between opposing extremes – here between a transcendent universal audience and a (...) |
|
|
Abstract In this essay, I will argue that images can play a substantial role in argumentation: exploiting information from the context, they can contribute directly and substantially to the communication of the propositions that play the roles of premises and conclusion. Furthermore, they can achieve this directly, i.e. without the need of verbalization. I will ground this claim by presenting and analyzing some arguments where images are essential to the argumentation process. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-14 DOI 10.1007/s10503-011-9259-y Authors (...) |
|
|
The paper deals with the problem of the nature of logic and its normativity in the context of the normativity of scientific knowledge in general. We proceed from a division between fundamental aspects of scientific knowledge which are related to the nature and subject matter of particular sciences, and its applied aspects which are related to the possible applications of sciences. This division fully applies to logic. The authors note that if we view logic as a completely objective discipline, devoid (...) |
|
|
|
|
|
Why informal logic? Informal logic is a group of proposals meant to contrast with, replace, and reject formal logic, at least for the analysis and evaluation of everyday arguments. Why reject formal logic? Formal logic is criticized and claimed to be inadequate because of its commitment to the soundness doctrine. In this paper I will examine and try to respond to some of these criticisms. It is not my aim to examine every argument ever given against formal logic; I am (...) |
|
|
This paper presents a way in which formal logic can be understood and reformulated in terms of argumentation that can help us unify formal and informal reasoning. Classical deductive reasoning will be expressed entirely in terms of notions and concepts from argumentation so that formal logical entailment is equivalently captured via the arguments that win between those supporting concluding formulae and arguments supporting contradictory formulae. This allows us to go beyond Classical Logic and smoothly connect it with human reasoning, thus (...) |
|
|
This paper examines whether philosophers of argument, in spite of their disavowing ‘timeless principles’, nevertheless embrace a set of principles, or axioms, to underlie argumentation theory. First, it reviews the thinking of some prominent philosophers of argument; second, it extracts some principles common to their philosophies; and third, it draws out possible consequences for argumentation theory and asks whether such theory has an underlying political posture. |
|
|
|
|
|
I characterize the deductivist ideal of justification and, following to a great extent Toulmin’s work The Uses of Argument, I try to explain why this ideal is erroneous. Then I offer an alternative model of justification capable of making our claims to knowledge about substantial matters sound and reasonable. This model of justification will be based on a conception of justification as the result of good argumentation, and on a model of argumentation which is a pragmatic linguistic reconstruction of Toulmin’s (...) |
|
|
This special issue of Informal Logic brings together two important areas of philosophy that have shown significant development in the last three decades: informal logic and feminist philosophy. A significant innovation they both share is new thinking about practices of argumentation and related practices of reasoning. Feminist theorizing supporting social and political change foregrounds “reasoning for change” in a way that draws attention to the contextual and rhetorical dimensions of argument and thus connects with significant developments in informal logic. |
|
|
This discussion reviews the thinking of some prominent philosophers of argument to extract principles common to their thinking. It shows that a growing concern with dialogical pragmatics is better appreciated as a part of applied ethics than of applied epistemology. The discussion concludes by indicating a possible consequence for philosophy of argument and invites further discussion by asking whether argumentation philosophy has an implicit, underlying moral, or even political, posture. |
|
|
|
|
|
In a posthumous paper, Perelman discusses his decision to bring his theory of argumentation together with rhetoric rather than calling it an informal logic. This is due in part because of the centrality he gives to audience, and in part because of the negative attitude that informal logicians have to rhetoric. In this paper, I explore both of these concerns by way of considering what benefits Perelman’s work can have for informal logic, and what insights the work of informal logicians (...) |
|
|
This paper will describe what happened to the community of informal logicians between 1983 and 1987, when they started to interact with communication scholars, rhetoricians and Pragma-Dialecticians. Special attention will be paid to key events, such as the Second International Symposiums on Informal Logic, the founding of AILACT in 1983, the start of journal Informal logic in 1984, and the international conference on argumentation held at Amsterdam in 1986. |
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-6f97f49787-zlfb6 uwo