Some have suggested that images can be arguments. Images can certainly bolster the acceptability of individual premises. We worry, though, that the static nature of images prevents them from ever playing a genuinely argumentative role. To show this, we call attention to a dilemma. The conclusion of a visual argument will either be explicit or implicit. If a visual argument includes its conclusion, then that conclusion must be demarcated from the premise or otherwise the argument will beg the question. If (...) a visual argument does not include its conclusion, then the premises on display must license that specific conclusion and not its opposite, in accordance with some demonstrable rationale. We show how major examples from the literature fail to escape this dilemma. Drawing inspiration from the graphical logic of C. S. Peirce, we suggest instead that images can be manipulated in a way that overcomes the dilemma. Diagrammatic reasoning can take one stepwise from an initial visual layout to a conclusion—thereby providing a principled rationale that bars opposite conclusions—and the visual inscription of this correct conclusion can come afterward in time—thereby distinguishing the conclusion from the premises. Even though this practical application of Peirce’s logical ideas to informal contexts requires that one make adjustments, we believe it points to a dynamic conception of visual argumentation that will prove more fertile in the long run. (shrink)

“Meta-argument allegations” consist of protestations that an interlocutor’s speech is wrongfully offensive or will trigger undesirable social consequences. Such protestations are meta-argument in the sense that they do not interrogate the soundness of an opponent’s argumentation, but instead focus on external features of that argument. They are allegations because they imply moral wrongdoing. There is a legitimate place for meta-argument allegations, and the moral and epistemic goods that can come from them will be front of mind for those levelling such (...) allegations. But I argue there is a dark side to such allegations, and their epistemic and moral costs must be seriously weighed. Meta-argument allegations have a concerning capacity to derail discussions about important topics, stymieing argumentational interactions and the goods they provide. Such allegations can license efforts to silence, punish and deter—even as they provoke the original speaker to retaliate in kind. Used liberally, such allegations can escalate conflicts, block open-mindedness, and discourage constructive dialogues. In response, I defend “argumentational tolerance”—a principled wariness in employing meta-argument allegations—as a virtue of ethical argument. (shrink)

What role, if any, does dialectic play in Aristotle’s epistemology in the Topics? In this paper I argue that it does play a role, but a role that is independent of endoxa. In the first section, I sketch the case for thinking that dialectic plays a distinctively epistemological role—not just a methodological role, or a merely instrumental role in getting episteme. In the second section, I consider three ways it could play that role, on two of which endoxa play at (...) least a co-starring role. But in the third section, I argue that endoxa don’t play that co-starring role, by arguing for a deflationary account of what endoxa are. For that reason, the third view emerges as the most plausible; but the third view is, I’ll suggest, Platonic. (shrink)

Przedstawiona propozycja badawcza dotyczy porównania sposobu komunikowania polityków polskich i polityków amerykańskich ze swoimi wyborcami. Materiałem badawczym są mowy końcowe wygłaszane przez liderów politycznych w czasie debat finałowych. Uwzględniono cykle amerykańskich debat finałowych z lat 1996–2016 i cykle debat polskich z lat 1995–2015. Mowy końcowe są tym elementem debaty, w którym następuje zmiana adresata interakcji argumentacyjnej i przekaz kierowany jest do wyborców jako głównego odbiorcy. Jest to element wieńczący starcie polityków i stanowi zarazem apel do wyborców o poparcie w głosowaniu. (...) Poddano analizie zawartość perswazyjną 24 mów amerykańskich polityków i 26 mów polskich polityków. Zastosowano metody ilościowe i jakościowe do wykazania specyfiki perswazyjnej w różnych kulturach politycznych. Ustalono zestaw powtarzających się taktyk perswazyjnych z podziałem na etos, logos, patos. Określono częstotliwość ich występowania w obydwu zestawach tekstów. (shrink)

Rhetorical analyses typically characterize structural, topical, and stylistic features of written or spoken argumentative text, and may also consider the context of interaction as well as the epistemic and social standing of participants as these relate to the goals of gaining, sustaining, and strengthening an audience’s adherence to a thesis or a course of action. Such considerations, broadly conceived, are taken to constitute rhetorical insights, insofar as they bear on effecting audience persuasion or, for that matter, fail to do so. (...) In the following, I am concerned with the question what a normative approach to argumentation may stand to gain from rhetorical insights. First, I follow Thomas Conley .. (shrink)

What can rhetoric tell us about good arguments? The answer depends on what we mean by “good argument” and on how we conceive rhetoric. In this article I examine and further develop Jürgen Habermas’s argumentation theory as an answer to the question—or as I explain, an expanded version of that question. Habermas places his theory in the family of normative approaches that recognize (at least) three evaluative perspectives on all argument making: logic, dialectic, and rhetoric, which proponents loosely align with (...) the three dimensions of product, procedure, and process, respectively (cf. Wenzel 1990; Tindale 1999). Habermas wants to integrate these perspectives in a conception of cogent argumentation that dispels .. (shrink)

In this paper, we closely examine the various ways in which a multi-party argumentative discussion—argumentative polylogue—can be analyzed in a dialectical framework. Our chief concern is that while multi-party and multi-position discussions are characteristic of a large class of argumentative activities, dialectical approaches would analyze and evaluate them in terms of dyadic exchanges between two parties: pro and con. Using as an example an academic committee arguing about the researcher of the year as well as other cases from argumentation literature, (...) we scrutinize the advantages and pitfalls of applying a dialectical framework to polylogue analysis and evaluation. We recognize two basic dialectical methods: interpreting polylogues as exchanges between two main camps and splitting polylogues into a multitude of dual encounters. On the basis of this critical inquiry, we lay out an argument expressing the need for an improved polylogical model and propose its basic elements. (shrink)

Most dialectical models view argumentation as a process of critically testing a standpoint. Further, they assume that what we critically test can be analytically reduced to individual and bi-polar standpoints. I argue that these two assumptions lead to the dominant view of dialectics as a bi-partisan argumentative discussion in which the yes-side argues against the doubter or the no-side. I scrutinise this binary orientation in understanding argumentation by drawing on the main tenets of normative pragmatic and pragma-dialectical theories of argumentation. (...) I develop my argument by showing how argumentative practice challenges these assumptions. I then lay out theoretical reasons for this challenge. This paves the way for an enhanced conceptualisation of dialectical models and their standards of rationality in terms of multi-party discussions, or argumentative polylogues. (shrink)

Most dialectical models view argumentation as a process of critically testing a standpoint. Further, they assume that what we critically test can be analytically reduced to individual and bi-polar standpoints. I argue that these two assumptions lead to the dominant view of dialectics as a bi-partisan argumentative discussion in which the yes-side argues against the doubter or the no-side. I scrutinise this binary orientation in understanding argumentation by drawing on the main tenets of normative pragmatic and pragma-dialectical theories of argumentation. (...) I develop my argument by showing how argumentative practice challenges these assumptions. I then lay out theoretical reasons for this challenge. This paves the way for an enhanced conceptualisation of dialectical models and their standards of rationality in terms of multi-party discussions, or argumentative polylogues. (shrink)

If there is a specifically rhetorical approach to argumentation, I believe it is one that studies argumentation that is specifically rhetorical. So if we want to ask, “What is the rhetorical approach to argumentation?” we should first ask, “What is rhetorical argumentation?” It is worthwhile focusing on this question because various misleading definitions of rhetorical argumentation have been in circulation for almost as long as rhetoric has existed. Some misleading definitions see the defining property of rhetorical argumentation in the arguer’s (...) aim. And that aim, which is often assumed to override all the arguer’s other considerations, is strategic: to persuade his hearer(s) by any available means and .. (shrink)

Taking Blair’s recent contribution to the debate about the triad as its starting point, the article discusses and challenges attempts to reduce the intricate relationship between rhetoric, dialectic and logic to a trichotomy with watertight compartments or to separate them with a single clear-cut criterion. I argue that efforts to pinpoint an essential difference, among the various typical differences partly grounded in disciplinary traditions, obscure the complexities within the fields. As a consequence, crosscutting properties of the fields as well as (...) the possibilities for theoretical bridging between them are neglected. (shrink)

Taking Blair’s recent contribution to the debate about the triad as its starting point, the paper discusses and challenges the effort to reduce the intricate relationship between rhetoric, dialectic, and logic to a single criterion or watertight trichotomy. I argue that such efforts obscure the complexities within the fields, their differences being partly due to disciplinary traditions. They neglect the intermingling properties of the fields as well as the possibilities for theoretical bridging between them.

El estudio actual de la argumentación se encuentra distanciado de la lógica. En este artículo sostengo que restaurar el vínculo del estudio de la argumentación con esta disciplina podría resultar benéfico para la metas descriptivas y normativas de este campo de investigación. Tras destacar algunos aspectos del surgimiento la teoría de la argumentación contemporánea, enfatizando la idea de "perspectivas", explico cómo el reconocimiento de sus objetivos y tareas volvió problemática la coexistencia de varios enfoques o aproximaciones para el estudio de (...) la realidad argumentativa. Sugiero algunas hipótesis explicativas sobre el abandono del enfoque lógico en favor de otras alternativas y, a continuación, ofrezco razones para encauzar el estudio sistemático de la argumentación desde este enfoque. Además de las consideraciones normativas y las herramientas descriptivas que pueden aducirse en su favor, sostengo que el enfoque lógico puede proporcionar una clase de integración a este campo investigación de maneras que no están disponibles para otras aproximaciones. (shrink)