This paper compares two theories and their two corresponding computational models of human moral judgment. In order to better address psychological realism and generality of theories of moral judgment, more detailed and more psychologically nuanced models are needed. In particular, a motivationally based theory of moral judgment is developed in this paper that provides a more accurate account of human moral judgment than an existing emotion-reason conflict theory. Simulations based on the theory capture and explain a range of relevant human (...) data. They account not only for the original data that were used to support the emotion–reason conflict theory, but also for a wider range of data and phenomena. (shrink)

In economic unethical decision-making experiments, one important methodological investigation is what types of contexts should be used to frame the instructions. Within the experimental economics community, using neutral-context instructions instead of loaded-context instructions is the mainstream practice. Because the loaded contexts may impact behavior in an unpredictable manner and therefore, put experimental control at risk. Nevertheless, using the loaded-context instructions could be advantageous in several ways. A properly framed context can help to facilitate learning and gain ecological validity. The challenge (...) is whether we can identify when and why the loaded context may alter behavior. In this paper, we aim to test if being familiar with a loaded context can systematically influence unethical decisions in a bribery game. We conduct a laboratory bribery game experiment with three different treatments: the neutral-context treatment, the familiar-context treatment, and the unfamiliar-context treatment. Using the neutral-context treatment as a benchmark, we find that participants in the familiar-context treatment express stronger negative attitudes toward corruption. Attitudes toward unethical behavior are the same in the neutral-context treatment and the unfamiliar-context treatment. Behaviorally, the participants in the familiar-context treatment are much less likely to engage in corrupt activities. The neutral-context treatment and the unfamiliar-context treatment produce the same behavioral outcome. (shrink)

In argumentation, metaphors are often considered as ambiguous or deceptive uses of language leading to fallacies of reasoning. However, they can also provide useful insights into creative argumentation, leading to genuinely new knowledge. Metaphors entail a framing effect that implicitly provides a specific perspective to interpret the world, guiding reasoning and evaluation of arguments. In the same vein, emotions could be in sharp contrast with proper reasoning, but they can also be cognitive processes of affective framing, influencing our reasoning and (...) behavior in different meaningful ways. Thus, a double (metaphorical and affective) framing effect might influence argumentation in the case of emotive metaphors, such as “Poverty is a disease” or “Your boss is a dictator,” where specific “emotive words” (disease, dictator) are used as vehicles. We present and discuss the results of two experimental studies designed to explore the role of emotive metaphors in argumentation. The studies investigated whether and to what extent the detection of a fallacious argument is influenced by the presence of a conventional vs. novel emotive metaphor. Participants evaluated a series of verbal arguments containing either “non-emotive” or “emotive” (positive or negative) metaphors as middle terms that “bridge” the premises of the argument. The results show that the affective coherence of the metaphor's vehicle and topic plays a crucial role in participants' reasoning style, leading to global heuristic vs. local analytical interpretive processes in the interplay of the metaphorical and the affective framing effects. (shrink)