Results for 'Jake Wright'

155 found
Order:
See also
Jake Wright
University of Minnesota, Rochester
  1.  16
    Restricting Mobile Device Use in Introductory Philosophy Classrooms.Jake Wright - 2016 - Teaching Philosophy 39 (3):307-327.
    A restricted-use mobile device policy for introductory philosophy classrooms is presented and defended. The policy allows students to use devices only during open periods announced by the professor and is based on recent empirical findings on the effects of in-class mobile device use. These results suggest devices are generally detrimental to student learning, though they have targeted benefits for specific tasks. The policy is defended via a discussion of the ethical considerations surrounding device use, a discussion of the policy’s benefits, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Wright, Okasha and Chandler on Transmission Failure.Luca Moretti - 2012 - Synthese 184 (3):217-234.
    Crispin Wright has given an explanation of how a first time warrant can fall short of transmitting across a known entailment. Formal epistemologists have struggled to turn Wright’s informal explanation into cogent Bayesian reasoning. In this paper, I analyse two Bayesian models of Wright’s account respectively proposed by Samir Okasha and Jake Chandler. I argue that both formalizations are unsatisfactory for different reasons, and I lay down a third Bayesian model that appears to me to capture (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  3. Mechanistic Explanation Without the Ontic Conception.Cory Wright - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy of Science 2 (3):375-394.
    The ontic conception of scientific explanation has been constructed and motivated on the basis of a putative lexical ambiguity in the term explanation. I raise a puzzle for this ambiguity claim, and then give a deflationary solution under which all ontically-rendered talk of explanation is merely elliptical; what it is elliptical for is a view of scientific explanation that altogether avoids the ontic conception. This result has revisionary consequences for New Mechanists and other philosophers of science, many of whom have (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  4. Necessity, Caution and Scepticism.Bob Hale & Crispin Wright - 1989 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1):175 - 238.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  5. Explanatory Pluralism: An Unrewarding Prediction Error for Free Energy Theorists.Matteo Colombo & Cory Wright - 2017 - Brain and Cognition 112:3–12.
    Courtesy of its free energy formulation, the hierarchical predictive processing theory of the brain (PTB) is often claimed to be a grand unifying theory. To test this claim, we examine a central case: activity of mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic (DA) systems. After reviewing the three most prominent hypotheses of DA activity—the anhedonia, incentive salience, and reward prediction error hypotheses—we conclude that the evidence currently vindicates explanatory pluralism. This vindication implies that the grand unifying claims of advocates of PTB are unwarranted. More generally, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  6. What is Psychological Explanation?William Bechtel & Cory Wright - 2009 - In P. Calvo & J. Symons (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge. pp. 113--130.
    Due to the wide array of phenomena that are of interest to them, psychologists offer highly diverse and heterogeneous types of explanations. Initially, this suggests that the question "What is psychological explanation?" has no single answer. To provide appreciation of this diversity, we begin by noting some of the more common types of explanations that psychologists provide, with particular focus on classical examples of explanations advanced in three different areas of psychology: psychophysics, physiological psychology, and information-processing psychology. To analyze what (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  7. Mechanisms and Psychological Explanation.Cory Wright & William Bechtel - 2007 - In Paul Thagard (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.
    As much as assumptions about mechanisms and mechanistic explanation have deeply affected psychology, they have received disproportionately little analysis in philosophy. After a historical survey of the influences of mechanistic approaches to explanation of psychological phenomena, we specify the nature of mechanisms and mechanistic explanation. Contrary to some treatments of mechanistic explanation, we maintain that explanation is an epistemic activity that involves representing and reasoning about mechanisms. We discuss the manner in which mechanistic approaches serve to bridge levels rather than (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  8. The Paradox of Morality: An Interview with Emmanuel Levinas.Emmanuel Levinas, Tamra Wright, Peter Hughes & Alison Ainley - 1988 - In Robert Bernasconi & David Wood (eds.), The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other. Routledge.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   23 citations  
  9. Intractability and the Use of Heuristics in Psychological Explanations.Iris Rooij, Cory Wright & Todd Wareham - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):471-487.
    Many cognitive scientists, having discovered that some computational-level characterization f of a cognitive capacity φ is intractable, invoke heuristics as algorithmic-level explanations of how cognizers compute f. We argue that such explanations are actually dysfunctional, and rebut five possible objections. We then propose computational-level theory revision as a principled and workable alternative.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  10. Hume's Academic Scepticism: A Reappraisal of His Philosophy of Human Understanding.John P. Wright - 1986 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):407 - 435.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. On the Functionalization of Pluralist Approaches to Truth.Cory Wright - 2005 - Synthese 145 (1):1-28.
    Traditional inflationary approaches that specify the nature of truth are attractive in certain ways; yet, while many of these theories successfully explain why propositions in certain domains of discourse are true, they fail to adequately specify the nature of truth because they run up against counterexamples when attempting to generalize across all domains. One popular consequence is skepticism about the efficaciousness of inflationary approaches altogether. Yet, by recognizing that the failure to explain the truth of disparate propositions often stems from (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  12. Truth, Ramsification, and the Pluralist's Revenge.Cory Wright - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):265-283.
    Functionalists about truth employ Ramsification to produce an implicit definition of the theoretical term _true_, but doing so requires determining that the theory introducing that term is itself true. A variety of putative dissolutions to this problem of epistemic circularity are shown to be unsatisfactory. One solution is offered on functionalists' behalf, though it has the upshot that they must tread on their anti-pluralist commitments.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  13. Realism, Antirealism, Irrealism, Quasi-Realism. Gareth Evans Memorial Lecture, Delivered in Oxford on June 2, 1987.Crispin Wright - 1988 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):25-49.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  14.  76
    HIT and Brain Reward Function: A Case of Mistaken Identity (Theory).Cory Wright, Matteo Colombo & Alexander Beard - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 64:28–40.
    This paper employs a case study from the history of neuroscience—brain reward function—to scrutinize the inductive argument for the so-called ‘Heuristic Identity Theory’ (HIT). The case fails to support HIT, illustrating why other case studies previously thought to provide empirical support for HIT also fold under scrutiny. After distinguishing two different ways of understanding the types of identity claims presupposed by HIT and considering other conceptual problems, we conclude that HIT is not an alternative to the traditional identity theory so (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Metaphysics and Physiology: Mind, Body, and the Animal Economy in Eighteenth-Century Scotland.John P. Wright - 1990 - In M. A. Stewart (ed.), Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment. Clarendon Press. pp. 251-301.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16.  73
    Minimalism About Truth: Special Issue Introduction.Joseph Ulatowski & Cory Wright - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):927-933.
    The theme of this special issue is minimalism about truth, a conception which has attracted extensive support since the landmark publication of Paul Horwich's Truth (1990). Many well-esteemed philosophers have challenged Horwich's alethic minimalism, an especially austere version of deflationary truth theory. In part, this is at least because his brand of minimalism about truth also intersects with several different literatures: paradox, implicit definition, bivalence, normativity, propositional attitudes, properties, explanatory power, meaning and use, and so forth. Deflationist sympathizers have introduced (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Truth, Pluralism, Monism, Correspondence.Cory Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    When talking about truth, we ordinarily take ourselves to be talking about one-and-the-same thing. Alethic monists suggest that theorizing about truth ought to begin with this default or pre-reflective stance, and, subsequently, parlay it into a set of theoretical principles that are aptly summarized by the thesis that truth is one. Foremost among them is the invariance principle.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Truth, Explanation, Minimalism.Cory Wright - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):987-1009.
    Minimalists about truth contend that traditional inflationary theories systematically fail to explain certain facts about truth, and that this failure licenses a ‘reversal of explanatory direction’. Once reversed, they purport that their own minimal theory adequately explains all of the facts involving truth. But minimalists’ main objection to inflationism seems to misfire, and the subsequent reversal of explanatory direction, if it can be made sense of, leaves minimalism in no better explanatory position; and even if the objection were serviceable and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Ideas of Custom and Habit in Early Modern Philosophy.John P. Wright - 2011 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 42 (1):18.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. The Understanding.John P. Wright - 2013 - In James A. Harris (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century. Oxford University Press. pp. 148-70.
    The article discusses the varying conceptions of the faculty of ‘the understanding’ in 18th-century British philosophy and logic. Topics include the distinction between the understanding and the will, the traditional division of three acts of understanding and its critics, the naturalizing of human understanding, conceiving of the limits of human understanding, British innatism and the critique of empiricist conceptions of the understanding, and reconceiving the understanding and the elimination of scepticism. Authors discussed include Richard Price, James Harris, Zachary Mayne, Edward (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Truth as a Normative Modality of Cognitive Acts.Gila Sher & Cory Wright - 2007 - In Geo Siegwart & Dirk Griemann (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge. pp. 280-306.
    Attention to the conversational role of alethic terms seems to dominate, and even sometimes exhaust, many contemporary analyses of the nature of truth. Yet, because truth plays a role in judgment and assertion regardless of whether alethic terms are expressly used, such analyses cannot be comprehensive or fully adequate. A more general analysis of the nature of truth is therefore required – one which continues to explain the significance of truth independently of the role alethic terms play in discourse. We (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Embodied Cognition: Grounded Until Further Notice?Cory Wright - 2008 - British Journal of Psychology 99:157-164.
    Embodied Cognition is the kind of view that is all trees, no forest. Mounting experimental evidence gives it momentum in fleshing out the theoretical problems inherent in Cognitivists’ separation of mind and body. But the more its proponents compile such evidence, the more the fundamental concepts of Embodied Cognition remain in the dark. This conundrum is nicely exemplified by Pecher and Zwaan’s book, Grounding Cognition, which is a programmatic attempt to rally together an array of empirical results and linguistic data, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Wayne Waxman's Hume's Theory of Consciousness. [REVIEW]John P. Wright - 1995 - Hume Studies 21 (2):344-350.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Eliminativist Undercurrents in the New Wave Model of Psychoneural Reduction.Cory Wright - 2000 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 21 (4):413-436.
    "New wave" reductionism aims at advancing a kind of reduction that is stronger than unilateral dependency of the mental on the physical. It revolves around the idea that reduction between theoretical levels is a matter of degree, and can be laid out on a continuum between a "smooth" pole (theoretical identity) and a "bumpy" pole (extremely revisionary). It also entails that both higher and lower levels of the reductive relationship sustain some degree of explanatory autonomy. The new wave predicts that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Is Psychological Explanation Going Extinct?Cory Wright - 2007 - In Huib Looren de Jong & Maurice Schouten (eds.), The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. Oxford: Blackwell.
    Psychoneural reductionists sometimes claim that sufficient amounts of lower-level explanatory achievement preclude further contributions from higher-level psychological research. Ostensibly, with nothing left to do, the effect of such preclusion on psychological explanation is extinction. Reductionist arguments for preclusion have recently involved a reorientation within the philosophical foundations of neuroscience---namely, away from the philosophical foundations and toward the neuroscience. In this chapter, I review a successful reductive explanation of an aspect of reward function in terms of dopaminergic operations of the mesocorticolimbic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Review of Bortolotti's Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. [REVIEW]Emily Barrett & Cory Wright - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):600–603.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  72
    Ideas Of Habit And Custom In Early Modern Philosophy.John Wright - 2011 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 42 (1):18-32.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  56
    Hysteria and Mechanical Man.John P. Wright - 1980 - Journal of the History of Ideas 41 (2):233.
    In this article I contrast 17th and 18th explanations of hysteria including those of Sydenham and Willis with those given by Plato and pre-modern medicine. I show that beginning in the second decade of the 17th century the locus of the disorder was transferred to the nervous system and it was no longer connected with the womb as in Hippocrates and Galen; hysteria became identified with hypochondria, and was a disease contracted by men as well as women. I discuss the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  5
    Association, Madness, and the Measures of Probability in Locke and Hume.John Wright - 1987 - In Christopher Fox (ed.), Psychology and Literature in the Eighteenth Century. New York: AMS Press. pp. 103-28.
    This paper argues for the importance of Chapter 33 of Book 2 of Locke's _Essay Concerning Human Understanding_ ("Of the Association of Ideas) both for Locke's own philosophy and for its subsequent reception by Hume. It is argued that in the 4th edition of the Essay of 1700, in which the chapter was added, Locke acknowledged that many beliefs, particularly in religion, are not voluntary and cannot be eradicated through reason and evidence. The author discusses the origins of the chapter (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  5
    The Incoherence of Heuristically Explaining Coherence.Iris van Rooij & Cory Wright - 2006 - In Ron Sun (ed.), Proceedings of the 28th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Mahwah, NJ 07430, USA: pp. 2622.
    Advancement in cognitive science depends, in part, on doing some occasional ‘theoretical housekeeping’. We highlight some conceptual confusions lurking in an important attempt at explaining the human capacity for rational or coherent thought: Thagard & Verbeurgt’s computational-level model of humans’ capacity for making reasonable and truth-conducive abductive inferences (1998; Thagard, 2000). Thagard & Verbeurgt’s model assumes that humans make such inferences by computing a coherence function (f_coh), which takes as input representation networks and their pair-wise constraints and gives as output (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  16
    Recipes for Science: An Introduction to Scientific Methods and Reasoning.Angela Potochnik, Matteo Colombo & Cory Wright - forthcoming - New York: Routledge.
    There is widespread recognition at universities that a proper understanding of science is needed for all undergraduates. Good jobs are increasingly found in fields related to Science, Technology, Engineering, and Medicine, and science now enters almost all aspects of our daily lives. For these reasons, scientific literacy and an understanding of scientific methodology are a foundational part of any undergraduate education. Recipes for Science provides an accessible introduction to the main concepts and methods of scientific reasoning. With the help of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Against Boghossian, Wright and Broome on Inference.Ulf Hlobil - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):419-429.
    I argue that the accounts of inference recently presented (in this journal) by Paul Boghossian, John Broome, and Crispin Wright are unsatisfactory. I proceed in two steps: First, in Sects. 1 and 2, I argue that we should not accept what Boghossian calls the “Taking Condition on inference” as a condition of adequacy for accounts of inference. I present a different condition of adequacy and argue that it is superior to the one offered by Boghossian. More precisely, I point (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  33. Problems of Wright's Entitlement Theory.Luca Moretti - manuscript
    I am concerned with Crispin Wright (2004, 2008, 2012 and 2014)’s entitlement theory, according to which (1) we have non-evidential justification for accepting propositions of a general type, which Wright calls cornerstones, and (2) this non-evidential justification for cornerstones can secure evidential justification for believing many other propositions––those we take to be true on the grounds of ordinary evidence. I initially focus on Wright’s strategic entitlement, which is one of the types of entitlement that Wright has (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. The First Nine Months of Editing Wittgenstein - Letters From G.E.M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees to G.H. Von Wright.Christian Eric Erbacher & Sophia Victoria Krebs - 2015 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 4 (1):195-231.
    The National Library of Finland and the Von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Helsinki keep the collected correspondence of Georg Henrik von Wright, Wittgenstein’s friend and successor at Cambridge and one of the three literary executors of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. Among von Wright’s correspondence partners, Elizabeth Anscombe and Rush Rhees are of special interest to Wittgenstein scholars as the two other trustees of the Wittgenstein papers. Thus, von Wright’s collections held in Finland promise to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  91
    Teorías constitutivas de la autoridad de la primera persona: Wright y Heal.Martín Francisco Fricke - 2008 - Ludus Vitalis 16 (29):73-91.
    Someone who believes “I believe it will rain” can easily be mistaken about the rain. But it does not seem likely, and might even be impossible, that he is wrong about the fact that he believes that it is going to rain. How can we account for this authority about our own beliefs – the phenomenon known as first person authority? In this paper I examine a type of theory proposed, in distinct forms, by Crispin Wright and Jane Heal (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  30
    Wright y la autoridad de la primera persona: Problemas de teorías constitutivas de la autoridad.Martin Francisco Fricke - 2007 - In Jorge Martínez Contreras & Aura Ponce de León (eds.), El saber filosófico. Vol. 3: Tópicos. México, D.F.: Siglo XXI and Asociación Filosófica de México, A.C.. pp. 265-276.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Responding to N.T. Wright's Rejection of the Soul.Brandon L. Rickabaugh - 2018 - Heythrop Journal 59 (2):201-220.
    At a 2011 meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers, N. T. Wright offered four reasons for rejecting the existence of soul. This was surprising, as many Christian philosophers had previously taken Wright's defense of a disembodied intermediate state as a defense of a substance dualist view of the soul. In this paper, I offer responses to each of Wright's objections, demonstrating that Wright's arguments fail to undermine substance dualism. In so doing, I expose how popular (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  38. Parsimony and the Fisher–Wright Debate.Anya Plutynski - 2005 - Biology and Philosophy 20 (4):697-713.
    In the past five years, there have been a series of papers in the journal Evolution debating the relative significance of two theories of evolution, a neo-Fisherian and a neo-Wrightian theory, where the neo-Fisherians make explicit appeal to parsimony. My aim in this paper is to determine how we can make sense of such an appeal. One interpretation of parsimony takes it that a theory that contains fewer entities or processes, (however we demarcate these) is more parsimonious. On the account (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  39. Sewall Wright's Adaptive Landscapes: 1932 Vs. 1988.Massimo Pigliucci - 2008 - Biology and Philosophy 23 (5):591-603.
    Sewall Wright introduced the metaphor of evolution on “adaptive landscapes” in a pair of papers published in 1931 and 1932. The metaphor has been one of the most influential in modern evolutionary biology, although recent theoretical advancements show that it is deeply flawed and may have actually created research questions that are not, in fact, fecund. In this paper I examine in detail what Wright actually said in the 1932 paper, as well as what he thought of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  40. Chauncey Wright: Theoretical Reason in a Naturalist Account of Human Consciousness.Serge Grigoriev - 2012 - Journal of the History of Ideas 73 (4):559-582.
    Chauncey Wright was an early intellectual follower of Darwin, and a mentor to American pragmatists, C.S. Peirce and William James. Starting with the discussion of Wright’s interpretation of natural selection, the paper proceeds to outline the distinction he draws between theoretical (scientific) and practical consciousness and the way that this distinction plays out in his account of the development of human consciousness within the context of natural selection. Formulating the problem of reconfiguring the relationship between instrumental intelligence and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  88
    Wright on Theodicy: Reflections on Evil and the Justice of God.Michael C. Rea - 2008 - Philosophia Christi 10 (2):461-472.
    In "Evil and the Justice of God", N.T. Wright presses the point that attempting to solve the philosophical problem of evil is an immature response to the existence of evil--a response that belittles the real problem of evil, which is just the fact that evil is bad and needs to be dealt with. As you might expect, I am not inclined to endorse this sort of sweeping indictment of the entire field of research on the philosophical problem of evil. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Is Kant (W)Right? – On Kant’s Regulative Ideas and Wright’s Entitlements.Jochen Briesen - 2013 - Kant-Yearbook 5 (1):1-32.
    This paper discusses a structural analogy between Kant’s theory of regulative ideas, as he develops it in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, and Crispin Wright’s theory of epistemic entitlements. First, I argue that certain exegetical difficulties with respect to the Appendix rest on serious systematic problems, which – given other assumptions of the Critique of Pure Reason – Kant is unable to solve. Second, I argue that because of the identified structural analogy between Kant’s and Wright’s views (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Review of Crispin Wright, Truth and Objectivity. [REVIEW]Vincent C. Müller - 1996 - Erkenntnis 44 (1):119-123.
    This book is a new attempt to clarify what is at issue in the contemporary realism debates and to suggest which form the controversies ought to take. Wright has contributed to the-se debates for quite some time and essentially taken the anti-realist side (witness the papers collected in Realism, Meaning and Truth, 1987, 21993, and the forthcoming Realism, Rules and Objectivity, both Oxford: Basil Blackwell). In Truth and Objectivity however, he takes a step back and sketches a neutral ground (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. N.T. Wright and the Body-Soul Predicament: The Presumption of Duality in Ontological Holism.D'Oleo-Ochoa Isaias - 2016 - Stromata 58 (1):111-136.
    N.T. Wright has offered Christian philosophers a proposal where it is apparently possible to hold the belief in the intermediate state-resurrection of the body and an ontological holism in the same sense at the same time. I argue that this not only creates a basic contradiction in Wright’s ontological paradigm, but also it is not a coherent and tenable proposal despite the fact one might eventually find a potential solution to such a quandary.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. The Case for Qualia, E. Wright (Ed.), Oxford University Press, 2008. [REVIEW]Greg Janzen - forthcoming - Mind.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  37
    Realism and Truth: A Review of Crispin Wright, Truth and Objectivity. [REVIEW]Philip Pettit - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):883 - 890.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  47.  21
    Wright, John P. And Paul Potter,(Eds.), Psyche And Soma.J. Sutton - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):142-143.
    Review of Psyche And Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Wright on Borderline Cases and Bivalence.Hamidreza Mohammadi - manuscript
    The aim of this paper is, firstly to explain Crispin Wright’s quandary view of vagueness, his intuitionistic response to sorites and the relation of borderline cases and bivalence, and, secondly assess the objections to his ideas.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Wittgenstein, Modern Music, and the Myth of Progress.Eran Guter - 2017 - In Ilkka Niiniluoto & Thomas Wallgren (eds.), On the Human Condition – Essays in Honour of Georg Henrik von Wright’s Centennial Anniversary, Acta Philosophica Fennica vol. 93. Helsinki: Societas Philosophica Fennica. pp. 181-199.
    Georg Henrik von Wright was not only the first interpreter of Wittgenstein, who argued that Spengler’s work had reinforced and helped Wittgenstein to articulate his view of life, but also the first to consider seriously that Wittgenstein’s attitude to his times makes him unique among the great philosophers, that the philosophical problems which Wittgenstein was struggling, indeed his view of the nature of philosophy, were somehow connected with features of our culture or civilization. -/- In this paper I draw (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Vagueness and Intuitionistic Logic.Ian Rumfitt - forthcoming - In Alexander Miller (ed.), Language, Logic,and Mathematics: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press.
    In his essay ‘“Wang’s Paradox”’, Crispin Wright proposes a solution to the Sorites Paradox (in particular, the form of it he calls the ‘Paradox of Sharp Boundaries’) that involves adopting intuitionistic logic when reasoning with vague predicates. He does not give a semantic theory which accounts for the validity of intuitionistic logic (and the invalidity of stronger logics) in that area. The present essay tentatively makes good the deficiency. By applying a theorem of Tarski, it shows that intuitionistic logic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 155