Switch to: References

Citations of:

What We Ought to Do: The Decisions and Duties of Non-agential Groups

Olle Blomberg

Journal of Social Ontology 6 (1):101-116 (2020)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.

The Easy Approach to Group Agency. A Simple Realist View on Group Agents.Andreea Popescu - 2021 - Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai Philosophia 66 (2):81-102.details We talk about groups as doing something, we talk as if groups have agency. Is our talk legitimate? Are there group agents? Is there something like group agency? In this paper, I discuss two ontological frameworks concerning existence questions: the Quinean framework and the Thomasson-Carnap framework. I apply them to the problem of group agency. I review the Quinean-oriented literature debating the existence of group agents and its methodological background. I argue, via Thomasson’s easy approach to ontology, that deflationism can (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
So What's My Part? Collective Duties, Individual Contributions, and Distributive Justice.Moritz A. Schulz - 2023 - Historical Social Research 48 (3: Collective Agency):320-349.details Problems in normative ethics paradigmatically concern what it is obligatory or permissible for an individual to do. Yet sometimes, each of us ought to do something individually in virtue of what we ought to do together. Unfortunately, traversing these two different levels at which a moral obligation can arise – individual and collective – is fraught with difficulties that easily lure us into conclusions muddying our understanding of collective obligations. This paper seeks to clearly lay out a systematic problem central (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
(1 other version)Abilities and Obligations: Lessons from Non-agentive Groups.Stephanie Collins - 2022 - Erkenntnis 88 (8):3375-3396.details Philosophers often talk as though each ability is held by exactly one agent. This paper begins by arguing that abilities can be held by groups of agents, where the group is not an agent. I provide a new argument for—and a new analysis of—non-agentive groups’ abilities. I then provide a new argument that, surprisingly, obligations are different: non-agentive groups cannot bear obligations, at least not if those groups are large-scale such as ‘humanity’ or ‘carbon emitters.’ This pair of conclusions is (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Team Reasoning and Collective Moral Obligation.Olle Blomberg & Björn Petersson - 2024 - Social Theory and Practice 50 (3):483-516.details We propose a new account of collective moral obligation. We argue that several agents have a moral obligation together only if they each have (i) a context-specific capacity to view their situation from the group’s perspective, and (ii) at least a general capacity to deliberate about what they ought to do together. Such an obligation is irreducibly collective, in that it does not imply that the individuals have any obligations to contribute to what is required of the group. We highlight (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
(1 other version)Abilities and Obligations: Lessons from Non-agentive Groups.Stephanie Collins - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (8):3375-3396.details Philosophers often talk as though each ability is held by exactly one agent. This paper begins by arguing that abilities can be held by groups of agents, where the group is not an agent. I provide a new argument for—and a new analysis of—non-agentive groups’ abilities. I then provide a new argument that, surprisingly, obligations are different: non-agentive groups cannot bear obligations, at least not if those groups are large-scale such as ‘humanity’ or ‘carbon emitters.’ This pair of conclusions is (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations

1