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  1. Reasoning About Want.Hillary Harner & Sangeet Khemlani - 2022 - Cognitive Science 46 (9):e13170.
    No present theory explains the inferences people draw about the real world when reasoning about “bouletic” relations, that is, predicates that express desires, such aswantin “Lee wants to be in love”. Linguistic accounts ofwantdefine it in terms of a relation to a desirer's beliefs, and how its complement is deemed desirable. In contrast, we describe a new model‐based theory that posits that by default, desire predicates such aswantcontrast desires against facts. In particular,A wants Pimplies by default thatPis not the case, (...)
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  • Underspecifying Desires.Richard Jefferson Booth - 2023 - Linguistics and Philosophy (5):1-30.
    According to a simple theory of the relationship between 'want' ascriptions and the desires they ascribe, when I learn that ⌜A wants p⌝ is true, I learn that the truth of p is necessary and sufficient for satisfying one of A’s desires. I argue that this simple theory is false: ⌜A wants p⌝ can be true and underspecific: p may be necessary but not sufficient for the satisfaction of one of A’s desires. I show that existing semantics for 'want' cannot (...)
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  • On preferring.Kyle Blumberg - 2022 - Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (6):1315-1344.
    In this paper, I draw attention to comparative preference claims, i.e. sentences of the form \S prefers p to q\. I show that preference claims exhibit interesting patterns, and try to develop a semantics that captures them. Then I use my account of preference to provide an analysis of desire. The resulting entry for desire ascriptions is independently motivated, and finds support from a wide range of phenomena.
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  • Wanting is not expected utility.Tomasz Zyglewicz - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
    In this paper, I criticize Ethan Jerzak’s view that ‘want’ has only one sense, the mixed expected utility sense. First, I show that his appeals to ‘really’-locutions fail to explain away the counterintuitive predictions of his view. Second, I present a class of cases, which I call “principled indifference” cases, that pose difficulties for any expected utility lexical entry for ‘want’. I argue that in order to account for these cases, one needs to concede that ‘want’ has a sense, according (...)
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  • Desiderative Lockeanism.Milo Phillips-Brown - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    According to the Desiderative Lockean Thesis, there are necessary and sufficient conditions, stated in the terms of decision theory, for when one is truly said to want. I advance a new Desiderative Lockean view. My view is distinctive in being doubly context-sensitive. Want ascriptions exhibit a remarkable context-sensitivity: what a person is truly said to want varies by context in a variety of ways, a fact that has not been fully appreciated. Others Desiderative Lockeans attempt to capture the context-sensitivity in (...)
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