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  1. Can we test inconsistent empirical theories?Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - manuscript
    This paper discusses the logical possibility of testing inconsistent empirical theories. The main challenge for answering this affirmatively is to avoid that the inconsistent consequences of a theory both corroborate it and falsify it. I answer affirmatively by showing that we can define a class of empirical sentences whose truth would force us to abandon such inconsistent theory: the class of its potential rejecters. Despite this, I show that the observational contradictions implied by a theory could only be verified (provided (...)
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  • Is Christ really contradictory? Some methodological concerns from the philosophy of science.María Del Rosario Martínez-Ordaz - 2021 - Manuscrito 44 (4):313-339.
    Two of the most important outcomes of The Contradictory Christ include: identifying Christ as an unproblematically contradictory being as well as laying the foundations of an investigation of the logical consequences of the existence of Christ, qua contradictory, within a particular 'theory'. In light of the enormous reluevance of Beall’s The contradictory Christ for the study of inconsistency, my main concern here is to explore the effect of some methodological choices behind Beall’s proposal -this in order to recognize in more (...)
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  • The ignorance behind inconsistency toleration.María del Rosario Martínez-Ordaz - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8665-8686.
    Inconsistency toleration is the phenomenon of working with inconsistent information without threatening one’s rationality. Here I address the role that ignorance plays for the tolerance of contradictions in the empirical sciences. In particular, I contend that there are two types of ignorance that, when present, can make epistemic agents to be rationally inclined to tolerate a contradiction. The first is factual ignorance, understood as temporary undecidability of the truth values of the conflicting propositions. The second is what I call “ignorance (...)
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