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  1. Content, character, and color.Sydney Shoemaker - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):253-78.
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  • (1 other version)Why colours do look like dispositions.Harold Langsam - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):68-75.
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  • Metaphysical realism as a pre-condition of visual perception.Stephen J. Boulter - 2004 - Biology and Philosophy 19 (2):243-261.
    In this paper I present a transcendental argument based on the findings of cognitive psychology and neurophysiology which invites two conclusions: First and foremost, that a pre-condition of visual perception itself is precisely what the Aristotelian and other commonsense realists maintain, namely, the independent existence of a featured, or pre-packaged world; second, this finding, combined with other reflections, suggests that, contra McDowell and other neo-Kantians, human beings have access to things as they are in the world via non-projective perception. These (...)
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  • (1 other version)Our Knowledge of Colour.Mohan Matthen - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 27 (sup1):215-246.
    Scientists are often bemused by the efforts of philosophers essaying a theory of colour: colour science sports a huge array of facts and theories, and it is unclear to its practitioners what philosophy can or is trying to contribute. Equally, philosophers tend to be puzzled about how they can fit colour science into their investigations without compromising their own disciplinary identity: philosophy is supposed to be an a priori investigation; philosophers do not work in psychophysics labs – not in their (...)
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  • In Defense of Color Realism.Corey McGrath - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (1):101-127.
    In this article, I argue that popular explanatory frameworks in perceptual psychology suggest the truth of color realism. I focus on perceptual judgments and their evidential basis: namely perceptual representation. I first draw a distinction between two sorts of normativities with respect to which we can evaluate representational capacities and systems: biological and psychological normativities. The former is defined in terms of evolutionary fitness, and the latter in terms of representational accuracy. Generally, representational systems achieve psychological and biological success hand (...)
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  • The problem of reconciliation.Arda Denkel - 1995 - Philosophical Papers 24 (1):23-50.
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  • The indeterminacy of color vision.Richard Montgomery - 1996 - Synthese 106 (2):167-203.
    A critical survey of recent work on the ontological status of colors supports the conclusion that, while some accounts of color can plausibly be dismissed, no single account can yet be endorsed. Among the remaining options are certain forms of color realism according which familiar colors are instantiated by objects in our extra-cranial visual environment. Also still an option is color anti-realism, the view that familiar colors are, at best, biologically adaptive fictions, instantiated nowhere.I argue that there is simply no (...)
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  • What our colour experiences don't teach us: A reply to Boghossian and Velleman.Michael Watkins - 1997 - Dialogue 36 (4):783-786.
    RésuméPaul Boghossian et David Velleman ont soutenu que les théories physicalistes des couleurs — celles qui identifient les propriétés de couleur avec certaines propriétés physiques des objets ou de la lumière—ne peuvent accommoder l'intuition profonde selon laquelle nous ne pouvons pas être dans l'erreur au sujet des contenus représentationnels de nos expériences de couleur. Contre Boghossian et Velleman, je soutiens que cette intuition prétendue que les théories physicalistes ne réussisssent pas à accommoder, nest pas elle-même intuitivement plausible. En fait, c'est (...)
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  • Content, Character and Color.Sydney Shoemaker - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):253-278.
    The words “content” and “character” in my title refer to the representational content and phenomenal character of color experiences. So my topic concerns the nature of our experience of color. But I will, of course, be talking about colors as well as color experience. Let me set the stage by mentioning some things, some more controversial than others, that I will be taking for granted. I assume, to begin with, that objects in the world have colors, and have them independently (...)
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  • (1 other version)Our Knowledge of Colour.Mohan Matthen - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (Supplement):215-246.
    Scientists are often bemused by the efforts of philosophers essaying a theory of colour: colour science sports a huge array of facts and theories, and it is unclear to its practitioners what philosophy can or is trying to contribute. Equally, philosophers tend to be puzzled about how they can fit colour science into their investigations without compromising their own disciplinary identity: philosophy is supposed to be an _a priori_ investigation; philosophers do not work in psychophysics labs – not in their (...)
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  • (1 other version)Color primitivism.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2007 - In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Status of Secondary Qualities. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 73 - 105.
    The realist preference for reductive theories of color over the last few decades is particularly striking in light of the generally anti-reductionist mood of recent philosophy of mind. The parallels between the mind-body problem and the case of color are substantial enough that the difference in trajectory is surprising. While dualism and non-.
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  • A physicalist relationist theory of color.Eliezer Mintz - unknown
    The nature of color is an open philosophical and scientific question. In this work I develop a physicalist relationist theory of color. So far, attempts to identify color as a physical property of objects have not been convincing because no physical property used by scientists seems to be well correlated with color sensations. I define a new physical property which I call transformance and show that transformance is 100% correlated with color sensations. Intuitively, transformance is a very general abstract physical (...)
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