I offer four ways of distinguishing paleobiology from neontology, and from this develop a sketch of the philosophy of paleobiology. I then situate and describe the papers in the special issue Paleobiology and Philosophy, and reflect on the value and prospects of paleontology-focused philosophy.

Philosophers have usually highlighted how the weakness and paucity of historical evidence underdetermine the choice between rival historical explanations. Focusing underdetermination on the link between theory and evidence comes, I argue, with three assumptions: competing hypotheses are easy to generate, investigators agree on the constitution and interpretation of the evidence and a plurality of hypotheses is a useful evil to reach consensus. The last assumption implies that the sustained coexistence of incompatible hypotheses is considered as a scientific failure. I argue (...) that this negative vision of sustained disagreement has monistic undertones. By drawing from a case study in evolutionary biology, this paper defends a form of scientific pluralism. Firstly, I show that underdetermination is not only found at the inferential level but also at the level of the constitution and interpretation of the evidence, on the choice of investigative scaffolds and when interpreting background theories. Because of that, competing hypotheses exhibit a degree of methodological incommensurability. While catastrophic from a monistic standpoint, I defend that scientific pluralism gives a different, and I think richer, account of such situations. On the plus side, competing approaches benefit from their sustained coexistence and interaction. I argue that this generates direct and indirect epistemic goods independently of whether the controversy is solved. Scientific pluralism also shifts our attention from achieving consensus to managing disagreement. The challenge becomes to maintain the conditions for fruitful interactions in a community with incommensurable approaches and heterogeneous expertise. (shrink)