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How to make sense of the com M on P ri or assumption under incomplete information

Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring

International Journal of Game Theory 28 (3):409-434 (1999)

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Agreement and Equilibrium with Minimal Introspection.Harvey Lederman - 2014 - Dissertation, Oxford Universitydetails Standard models in epistemic game theory make strong assumptions about agents’ knowledge of their own beliefs. Agents are typically assumed to be introspectively omniscient: if an agent believes an event with probability p, she is certain that she believes it with probability p. This paper investigates the extent to which this assumption can be relaxed while preserving some standard epistemic results. Geanakoplos (1989) claims to provide an Agreement Theorem using the “truth” axiom, together with the property of balancedness, a significant (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Superconditioning.Simon M. Huttegger - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (4):811-833.details When can a shift from a prior to a posterior be represented by conditionalization? A well-known result, known as “superconditioning” and going back to work by Diaconis and Zabell, gives a sharp answer. This paper extends the result and connects it to the reflection principle and common priors. I show that a shift from a prior to a set of posteriors can be represented within a conditioning model if and only if the prior and the posteriors are connected via a (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
People with Common Priors Can Agree to Disagree.Harvey Lederman - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):11-45.details Robert Aumann presents his Agreement Theorem as the key conditional: “if two people have the same priors and their posteriors for an event A are common knowledge, then these posteriors are equal” (Aumann, 1976, p. 1236). This paper focuses on four assumptions which are used in Aumann’s proof but are not explicit in the key conditional: (1) that agents commonly know, of some prior μ, that it is the common prior; (2) that agents commonly know that each of them updates (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 16 citations
Mindreading and endogenous beliefs in games.Lauren Larrouy & Guilhem Lecouteux - 2017 - Journal of Economic Methodology 24 (3):318-343.details We argue that a Bayesian explanation of strategic choices in games requires introducing a psychological theory of belief formation. We highlight that beliefs in epistemic game theory are derived from the actual choice of the players, and cannot therefore explain why Bayesian rational players should play the strategy they actually chose. We introduce the players’ capacity of mindreading in a game theoretical framework with the simulation theory, and characterise the beliefs that Bayes rational players could endogenously form in games. We (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
For Bayesian Wannabes, Are Disagreements Not About Information?Robin Hanson - 2003 - Theory and Decision 54 (2):105-123.details Consider two agents who want to be Bayesians with a common prior, but who cannot due to computational limitations. If these agents agree that their estimates are consistent with certain easy-to-compute consistency constraints, then they can agree to disagree about any random variable only if they also agree to disagree, to a similar degree and in a stronger sense, about an average error. Yet average error is a state-independent random variable, and one agent's estimate of it is also agreed to (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 6 citations

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