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Omega-consistency and the diamond

Studia Logica 39 (2-3):237 - 243 (1980)

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  1. The Single-minded Pursuit of Consistency and its Weakness.Walter Carnielli - 2011 - Studia Logica 97 (1):81 - 100.
    I argue that a compulsive seeking for just one sense of consistency is hazardous to rationality, and that observing the subtle distinctions of reasonableness between individual and groups may suggest wider, structuralistic notions of consistency, even relevant to re-assessing Gödei's Second Incompleteness Theorem and to science as a whole.
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  • In Memoriam: George Stephen Boolos 1940–1996.Warren Goldfarb - 1996 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 2 (4):444-447.
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  • Predicate provability logic with non-modalized quantifiers.Giorgie Dzhaparidze - 1991 - Studia Logica 50 (1):149 - 160.
    Predicate modal formulas with non-modalized quantifiers (call them Q-formulas) are considered as schemata of arithmetical formulas, where is interpreted as the provability predicate of some fixed correct extension T of arithmetic. A method of constructing 1) non-provable in T and 2) false arithmetical examples for Q-formulas by Kripke-like countermodels of certain type is given. Assuming the means of T to be strong enough to solve the (undecidable) problem of derivability in QGL, the Q-fragment of the predicate version of the logic (...)
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  • Provability logic-a short introduction.Per Lindström - 1996 - Theoria 62 (1-2):19-61.
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  • On strong provability predicates and the associated modal logics.Konstantin N. Ignatiev - 1993 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 58 (1):249-290.
    PA is Peano Arithmetic. Pr(x) is the usual Σ1-formula representing provability in PA. A strong provability predicate is a formula which has the same properties as Pr(·) but is not Σ1. An example: Q is ω-provable if PA + ¬ Q is ω-inconsistent (Boolos [4]). In [5] Dzhaparidze introduced a joint provability logic for iterated ω-provability and obtained its arithmetical completeness. In this paper we prove some further modal properties of Dzhaparidze's logic, e.g., the fixed point property and the Craig (...)
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