This paper is the first of a series of three articles that present the syntactic proof of the PA-completeness of the modal system G, by introducing suitable proof-theoretic objects, which also have an independent interest. We start from the syntactic PA-completeness of modal system GL-LIN, previously obtained in [7], [8], and so we assume to be working on modal sequents S which are GL-LIN-theorems. If S is not a G-theorem we define here a notion of syntactic metric d(S, G): we (...) calculate a canonical characteristic fomula H of S (char(S)) so that ⊢G ∼ H → (∼S) and ⊢GL-LIN ∼ H, and the complexity σ of ∼ H gives the distance d(S, G) of S from G. Then, in order to produce the whole completeness proof as an induction on this d(S, G), we introduce the tree-interpretation of a modal sequent Q into PA, that sends the letters of Q into PA-formulas describing the properties of a GL-LIN-proof P of Q: It is also a d(*, G)-metric linked interpretation, since it will be applied to a proof-tree T of ∼ H with H = char(S) and σ(∼ H) = d(S, G). (shrink)

This paper is the final part of the syntactic demonstration of the Arithmetical Completeness of the modal system G; in the preceding parts [9] and [10] the tools for the proof were defined, in particular the notion of syntactic countermodel. Our strategy is: PA-completeness of G as a search for interpretations which force the distance between G and a GL-LIN-theorem to zero. If the GL-LIN-theorem S is not a G-theorem, we construct a formula H expressing the non G-provability of S, (...) so that ⊢GL-LIN ∼ H and so that a canonical proof T of ∼ H in GL-LIN is a syntactic countermodel for S with respect to G, which has the height θ(T) equal to the distance d(S, G) of S from G. Then we define the interpretation ξ of S which represents the proof-tree T in PA. By induction on θ(T), we prove that ⊢PA Sξ and d(S, G) > 0 imply the inconsistency of PA. (shrink)

In this paper are studied the properties of the proofs in PRA of provability logic sentences, i.e. of formulas which are Boolean combinations of formulas of the form PIPRA, where h is the Gödel-number of a sentence in PRA. The main result is a Normal Form Theorem on the proof-trees of provability logic sequents, which states that it is possible to split the proof into an arithmetical part, which contains only atomic formulas and has an essentially intuitionistic character, and into (...) a logical part, which is merely instrumental. Moreover, the induction rules which occur in the arithmetical part are implicit. Some applications of the Normal Form Theorem are shown in order to obtain some syntactical results on the PRA-completeness of modal logic. In particular a completeness theorem for Boolean combinations of modalities is given. (shrink)

Modal Platonism utilizes "weak" logical possibility, such that it is logically possible there are abstract entities, and logically possible there are none. Modal Platonism also utilizes a non-indexical actuality operator. Modal Platonism is the EASY WAY, neither reductionist nor eliminativist, but embracing the Platonistic language of abstract entities while eliminating ontological commitment to them. Statement of Modal Platonism. Any consistent statement B ontologically committed to abstract entities may be replaced by an empirically equivalent modalization, MOD(B), not so ontologically committed. This (...) equivalence is provable using Modal/Actuality Logic S5@. Let MAX be a strong set theory with individuals. Then the following Schematic Bombshell Result (SBR) can be shown: MAX logically yields [T is true if and only if MOD(T) is true], for scientific theories T. The proof utilizes Stephen Neale's clever model-theoretic interpretation of Quantified Lewis S5, which I extend to S5@. (shrink)

We study a modal system ¯T, that extends the classical (prepositional) modal system T and whose language is provided with modal operators M inn (nN) to be interpreted, in the usual kripkean semantics, as there are more than n accessible worlds such that.... We find reasonable axioms for ¯T and we prove for it completeness, compactness and decidability theorems.

A nonempty sequence T1,...,Tn of theories is tolerant, if there are consistent theories T 1 + ,..., T n + such that for each 1 i n, T i + is an extension of Ti in the same language and, if i n, T i + interprets T i+1 + . We consider a propositional language with the modality , the arity of which is not fixed, and axiomatically define in this language the decidable logics TOL and TOL. It is (...) shown that TOL (resp. TOL) yields exactly the schemata of PA-provable (resp. true) arithmetical sentences, if (A1,..., An) is understood as (a formalization of) PA+A1, ..., PA+An is tolerant. (shrink)

This paper, a sequel to Models for normal intuitionistic modal logics by M. Boi and the author, which dealt with intuitionistic analogues of the modal system K, deals similarly with intuitionistic analogues of systems stronger than K, and, in particular, analogues of S4 and S5. For these prepositional logics Kripke-style models with two accessibility relations, one intuitionistic and the other modal, are given, and soundness and completeness are proved with respect to these models. It is shown how the holding of (...) formulae characteristic for particular logics is equivalent to conditions for the relations of the models. Modalities in these logics are also investigated. (shrink)

-/- Provability logic is a modal logic that is used to investigate what arithmetical theories can express in a restricted language about their provability predicates. The logic has been inspired by developments in meta-mathematics such as Gödel’s incompleteness theorems of 1931 and Löb’s theorem of 1953. As a modal logic, provability logic has been studied since the early seventies, and has had important applications in the foundations of mathematics. -/- From a philosophical point of view, provability logic is interesting because (...) the concept of provability in a fixed theory of arithmetic has a unique and non-problematic meaning, other than concepts like necessity and knowledge studied in modal and epistemic logic. Furthermore, provability logic provides tools to study the notion of self-reference. (shrink)

Kniha, jako je tato, nemůže být tak docela dílem jediného člověka. Dovést ji do podoby koherentního celku bych nedokázal bez pomoci svých kolegů, kteří po mně text četli a upozornili mě na spoustu chyb a nedůsledností, které se v něm vyskytovaly. Můj dík v tomto směru patří zejména Vojtěchu Kolmanovi, Liboru Běhounkovi a Martě Bílkové. Za připomínky k různým částem rukopisu jsem vděčen i Pavlu Maternovi, Milanu Matouškovi, Prokopu Sousedíkovi, Vladimíru Svobodovi, Petru Hájkovi a Grahamu Priestovi. Kniha vznikla v rámci (...) projektu podpořeného grantem AV ČR číslo A0009001/00. (shrink)