While human beings generally act prosocially towards one another — contra a Hobbesian “war of all against all” — this basic social courtesy tends not to be extended to our relations with the more-than-human world. Educational philosophy is largely grounded in a worldview that privileges human-centered conceptions of the self, valuing its own opinions with little regard for the ecological realities undergirding it. This hyper-separation from the ‘society of all beings’ is a foundational cause of our current ecological crises. In (...) this paper, we develop an ecosocial philosophy of education based on the idea of an ecological self. We aspire to consolidate voices from deep ecology and ecofeminism for conceptualizing education in terms of being responsible to and for, a complex web of interdependent relations among human and more-than-human beings. By analyzing the notion of opinions in light of Gilles Deleuze’s critique of the ‘dogmatic image of thought,’ we formulate three aspects of ESPE capable of supporting an ecological as opposed to an egoistic conception of the self: rather than dealing with fixed concepts, ESPE supports adaptable and flexible boundaries between the self and the world; rather than fixating on correct answers, ESPE focuses on real-life problems shifting our concern from the self to the world; and rather than supporting arrogance, EPSE cultivates an epistemic humility grounded in our ecological embeddedness in the world. These approaches seek to enable an education that cultivates a sense of self that is less caught up with arbitrary, egoistic opinions of the self and more attuned to the ecological realities constituting our collective life-worlds. (shrink)

In A World Not Made for Us, Keith R. Peterson provides a broad reassessment of the field of environmental philosophy, taking a fresh and critical look at three classical problems of environmentalism: the intrinsic value of nature, the need for an ecological worldview, and a new conception of the place of humankind in nature. Peterson makes the case that a genuinely critical environmental philosophy must adopt an ecological materialist conception of the human, a pluralistic value theory that emphasizes the need (...) for value prioritization, and a stratified categorical ontology that affirms the basic principle of human asymmetrical dependence on more-than-human nature. Integrating environmental ethics with the latest work in political ecology, Peterson argues it is important to understanding that the world is not made for us, and that coming to terms with this fact is a condition for survival in future human and more-than-human communities of liberation and solidarity. (shrink)

Based on a survey of some popularintroductory anthologies and texts, I arguefrom my experience as a philosopher oftechnology that environmental philosophy mightbe conceived by some researchers in the fieldin terms of an overly narrow theoreticalfoundation. Many of the key figures in thefield take as a basic assumption that theenvironmental crisis is fundamentally bestexplained in terms of some failing in themetaphysical outlooks of most people. However,philosophers of technology typically present atleast two additional types of generalexplanation of the crisis. Environmentalethicists might benefit (...) from consideration ofthese alternative ways of explaining the rootcauses of the ecological crisis. (shrink)

Vegetarianism is defined here as the view that the needless killing or eating of animals is wrong. A number of environmental ethicists oppose animal liberation in general and vegetarianism in particular. Many of their arguments are motivated by a concern that the principles of animal liberation imply negative evaluations of life processes intimately associated with the natural world, particularly pain, death, and predation. Environmentalists also charge that animal liberation entails a distancing of humanity from nature in a manner that is (...) untenable and, to the extent that it is attempted, spiritually if not physically unhealthy. ;Likewise, animal liberationists attack the philosophical foundations of environmentalism. They argue that non-sentient life can have neither intrinsic value nor moral rights. Animal liberationists fear that a realm of values which is too broad--including plants, rivers, ecosystems, and any natural event--would prevent the animal liberation agenda from gaining a moral foothold. Human activities such as hunting and eating animals can easily be swallowed up in natural categories, the environmentalists' gateway to positive evaluation. ;In the midst of the ongoing dispute between vegetarianism and environmentalism, this dissertation comes to the defense of each against the other. I argue that each side in the dispute makes the philosophical mistake of clinging to a monistic axiology. I argue also that vegetarianism and environmentalism are interwoven as programs for practical change. ;Neither mainstream animal liberationism nor mainstream environmentalism has done a very good job of addressing the impact of its agenda on issues of interhuman justice. I examine radical environmentalisms which have done exactly this. Two of these left-wing environmentalisms, deep and social ecology, have failed both the animals and themselves by not addressing animal welfare directly. A third, ecofeminism, will be shown to have done the best job of articulating a coherent position which addresses all three concerns: environmentalism, vegetarianism, and social justice. ;I conclude by discussing previous visions of a humane, just, and environmentally sound society. Most lack nothing in recommendations for ways in which humans and animals might live apart. I argue that a successful program will reject that separation. (shrink)