Advances in reproductive genetic engineering have the potential to transform human lives. Not only do they promise to allow us to select children free of diseases, they can also enable us to select children with desirable traits. In this paper, I consider two clusters of arguments for the moral permissibility of reproductive genetic engineering, what I call the Perfectionist View and the Libertarian View; and two clusters of arguments against reproductive genetic engineering, what I call the Human Nature View and (...) the Motivation View. I argue that an adequate theory of the ethics of reproductive genetic engineering should take into account insights gained from these views. (shrink)

If we assume that “enhancement” names all efforts to boost human mental and physical capacities beyond the normal upper range found in our species, then enhancement covers such a broad range of interventions that it becomes implausible to think that there is any generic ethical case to be made either for or against it. Michael Sandel has recently made such a generic case, which focuses on the importance of respecting the “giftedness” of human nature. Sandel succeeds in diagnosing an important (...) worry we may have about the use of some enhancements by some parents, but his arguments are better understood as opposing “procrustean parenting” rather than enhancement in general. (shrink)

Advocates of cognitive enhancement maintain that technological advances would augment autonomy indirectly by expanding the range of options available to individuals, while, in a recent article in this journal, Schaefer, Kahane, and Savulescu propose that cognitive enhancement would improve it more directly. Here, autonomy, construed in broad procedural terms, is at the fore. In contrast, when lauding the goodness of enhancement expressly, supporters’ line of argument is utilitarian, of an ideal variety. An inherent conflict results, for, within their utilitarian frame, (...) the content of rational, hence autonomous, choices is quite restricted. Further, advocates do not clearly indicate their relative emphasis between the often conflicting goals of maximizing benefit and avoiding harm. In practice, their construction of harms is highly expansive, for disabilities include any constraints that “rational” people would decline if it were technically possible to do so. For advocates, this means that where enhancement measures are available, those constraints become avoidable limitations, and not to remove them is to harm. The centrality of harm-avoidance and their ideal utilitarian frame entail sociopolitical requirements that enhancement defenders disallow when trumpeting autonomy in the vein of individual choice. Advocates have thus not done enough to support the claim that their views are wholly separate from earlier eugenics. (shrink)

To reassure those concerned about wholesale discontinuity between human existence and posthumanity, transhumanists assert shared ground with antiquity on vital challenges and aspirations. Because their claims reflect key misconceptions, there is no shared vision for transhumanists to invoke. Having exposed their misuses of Prometheus, Plato, and Aristotle, I show that not only do transhumanists and antiquity crucially diverge on our relation to ideals, contrast-dependent aspiration, and worthy endeavors but that illumining this divide exposes central weaknesses in transhumanist argumentation. What is (...) more, antiquity’s handling of these topics suggests a way through the impasse in current enhancement debates about human “nature” and helps to resolve a tension within transhumanists’ accounts of what our best moments signify about the ontological requirements for real flourishing. (shrink)

Medicalization of women’s bodies as exemplified by plastic surgeries: Medicalization of human condition including the medicalization of women’s bodies through the use of cosmetic surgery is advertised by the scientists as giving numerous benefits. At the same time, however, it undoubtedly raises many ethical and legal controversies regarding the validity of medicalization itself, possible directions of its future development and the means of social control over ongoing medicalization. In the case of medicalization of women’s bodies there are questions about its (...) purpose and meaning, about the criteria of beauty and about constructing one’s picture based on the ideal model of „socially desired” body. Given a broad range and complexity of medicalization of human condition the author will first give a short introduction to the problem of medicalization and then will focus on the medicalization of women’s bodies through the use of cosmetic surgery whilst simultaneously giving arguments against its use and propagation. (shrink)

An intellectual and cultural movement advocating a radical enhancement of human performance via technoscientific and biomedical advances, transhumanism has grown in notoriety in recent years. Grouping engineers, philosophers, sociologists, and entrepreneurs, the movement and its ideals of enhanced humans have a strong social resonance, be it doping in sport, the use of smart drugs, or the biomedical battle against aging. This article sheds theoretical and critical light on transhumanism through the lens of human perfectibility. It particularly aims to show how (...) the movement marks a significant reversal of the humanist conception of human perfectibility inherited from the Enlightenment. Far from working for the social and political emancipation of humans and the human condition, transhumanism is emblematic of a depoliticized conception of human perfectibility focused on the technoscientific adaptation of the human being. Transhumanism thus marks a major rupture with the modern democratic project of autonomy. (shrink)

Scientific discoveries and the emergence of cosmological theories such as the Big Bang Theory and evolution have challenged the Christian doctrine of creation and its reliability on many fronts, because the discoveries appear to contradict the Christian account as to how creation unfolded. Hefner sees the situation as an additional interpretative task to theologians. He, however, posits that scientific discoveries are an opportunity to communicate the Christian message through social and scientific experience to bring meaning to broader society. He expresses (...) the notion that religion will remain relevant only if it measures up to science, because we are in a science and technology era. Hefner, therefore, introduced the concept of created co-creator as a metaphor and analytical tool to explain the meaning and purpose of humans within the biosphere. The concept is characterized by the ability to communicate religion through science and to relate with available models of origin. This work expounds on the concept of created co-creator’s ability to explain human technological trajectory in theology. There is also an effort to establish a relationship between Hefner’s concept and Haraway’s cyborg with an emphasis on the concept’s ability to communicate the Christian doctrine of creation through scientific knowledge and why such an enterprise is useful. (shrink)

New medical technologies promise to allow us to transform our core characteristics. Some see these technologies as filled with promise. Others see them as filled with existential risk. David DeGrazia argues that personal identity concerns raised by opponents to enhancement technology fail to impugn attempts by autonomous agents to bring about enhancements with which they autonomously identify. In advancing this argument DeGrazia evaluates five supposedly inviolable core narrative characteristics, concluding that none of these characteristics are in fact inviolable so long (...) as the individual contemplating transformation autonomously identifies with the change they decide to make. Employing insights gleaned from LA Paul’s recent work on the subject of transformative experiences I will argue that at least for some transformations, the prospects for autonomous identification are slim at best. The upshot will be that many of the core narrative traits discussed by DeGrazia will be inviolable in practice, if not in principle. (shrink)

This article will examine how the notion of emotional authenticity is intertwined with the notions of naturalness and artificiality in the context of the recent debates about ‘neuro-enhancement’ and ‘neuro-psychopharmacology.’ In the philosophy of mind, the concept of authenticity plays a key role in the discussion of the emotions. There is a widely held intuition that an artificial means will always lead to an inauthentic result. This article, however, proposes that artificial substances do not necessarily result in inauthentic emotions. The (...) literature provided by the philosophy of mind on this subject usually resorts to thought experiments. On the other hand, the recent literature in applied ethics on ‘enhancement’ provides good reasons to include real world examples. Such case studies reveal that some psychotropic drugs such as antidepressants actually cause people to undergo experiences of authenticity, making them feel ‘like themselves’ for the first time in their lives. Beginning with these accounts, this article suggests three non-naturalist standards for emotions: the authenticity standard, the rationality standard, and the coherence standard. It argues that the authenticity standard is not always the only valid one, but that the other two ways of assessing emotions are also valid, and that they can even have repercussions on the felt authenticity of emotions. In conclusion, it sketches some of the normative implications if not ethical intricacies that accompany the enhancement of emotions. (shrink)

Intelligent neurotechnology is an emerging field that combines neurotechnologies like brain-computer interface (BCI) with artificial intelligence. This paper introduces a capability framework to assess the responsible use of intelligent BCI systems and provide practical ethical guidance. It proposes two tests, the threshold and flourishing tests, that BCI applications must meet, and illustrates them in a series of cases. After a brief introduction (Section 1), Section 2 sets forth the capability view and the two tests. It illustrates the threshold test using (...) examples from clinical medicine of BCI applications that enable patients with profound disabilities to function at a threshold level through computer mediation. Section 3 illustrates the flourishing test by exploring possible future applications of BCI involving neuroenhancements for healthy people, using examples adapted from research currently underway in the US military. Section 3 applies a capability lens to a complex case involving dual effects, both therapeutic and non-therapeutic, showing how the threshold and flourishing tests resolve the case. Section 4 replies to three objections: neurorights are the best tool for assessing BCI; the two tests are moving targets; and the analysis utilizes a capability view to do work it is not designed for. The paper concludes that a capability view offers unique advantages and gives practical guidance for evaluating the responsible use of present and future BCI applications. Extrapolating from our analysis may help guide other emerging technologies, such as germline gene editing, expected to impact central human capabilities. (shrink)

Transhumanism advances an ideology promising a positive human advance through the application of new and as yet unrealized technologies. Underlying the whole is a libertarian ethos married to a very Christian eschatology promising a miraculous transformation that will answer human needs and redress human failings. In this paper, the supposedly scientific basis on which transhumanist promises are built is critiqued as futurist imaginings with little likelihood of actualization. Transhumanists themselves are likened to the affable con man Professor Harold Hill who, (...) in The Music Man, describes as dire social problems whose solution is a youth band he seeks to sell but has no intention of building. Even were some of the transhumanist imaginings to be realized, I argue, the result would be a dystopia in which the few received benefits denied to the many. In advancing imaginary technologies as a solution to human needs, transhumanists and their bioethical fellow travelers handily avoid discussion of or advocacy for the kind of pedestrian social actions that demonstrably could achieve many of their purported goals. So their enthusiasms, I conclude, are not merely fanciful but damaging to the humanist goals they pretend to advance. (shrink)

This paper critiques current arguments advancing the potential for transhumanism and a range of biological and pharmacological enhancements to better human flourishing. It does so from a historical perspective weighing the individualistic and competitive evolutionary theories of Darwin with the cooperative and communal theories of Prince Peter Kropotkin a generation later. In doing so it proposes the transhumanist and enhancement enthusiasts operate within a paradigm similar to Darwin’s, one that is atomist and individualistic. The critique, which considers the status of (...) those with cognitive, sensory and physical limits, advances a vision of society as a cooperative and communal rather than individualistic and competitive. Within this framework the argument is not one of either/or but on the lexicographical superiority of the communal and social over the individualistic and competitive ethos underlying both Darwin and most contemporary transhumanist literature. This reordering of priorities, it is argued, reflects advances in contemporary biology and evolutionary thinking. (shrink)

In this paper we will argue: (1) that scholars, regardless of their normative stand against or for genetic enhancement indeed have a moral/professional obligation to hold on to a realistic and up-to-date conception of genetic enhancement; (2) that there is an unwarranted hype surrounding the issue of genetic enhancement in general, and gene doping in particular; and (3) that this hype is, at least partly, created due to a simplistic and reductionist conception of genetics often adopted by bioethicists.

There are increasing pressures for bioethics to emphasise ‘translation’. Against this backdrop, we defend ‘speculative bioethics’. We explore speculation as an important tool and line of bioethical inquiry. Further, we examine the relationship between speculation and translational bioethics and posit that speculation can support translational work. First, speculative research might be conducted as ethical analysis of contemporary issues through a new lens, in which case it supports translational work. Second, speculation might be a first step prior to translational work on (...) a topic. Finally, speculative bioethics might constitute different content altogether, without translational objectives. For each conception of speculative bioethics, important methodological aspects determine whether it constitutes good bioethics research. We conclude that whether speculative bioethics is compatible with translational bioethics—and to what extent—depends on whether it is being employed as tool or content. Applying standards of impact uniformly across bioethics may inappropriately limit speculative bioethics. (shrink)

Individualist ethical analyses in the enhancement debate have often prioritised or only considered the interests and concerns of parents and the future child. The collectivist critique of the human enhancement debate argues that rather than pure individualism, a focus on collectivist, or group-level ethical considerations is needed for balanced ethical analysis of specific enhancement interventions. Here, I defend this argument for the insufficiency of pure individualism. However, existing collectivist analyses tend to take a negative approach that hinders them from adequately (...) contributing to balanced ethical analysis, and often leads to a prohibitive stance. I argue this is due to two common problems with collectivist analyses: inappropriate acceptance of individualist assumptions, and failure to appropriately weigh individual vs collective ethical considerations. To further develop the collectivist critique in the enhancement debate, I suggest we may look to collectivism in public health ethics, which avoids these problems. (shrink)

The current ban on certain performance enhancing substances in sport such as erythropoietin faces a line-drawing problem: what is the moral difference between taking an EPO injection to incre...

Para el transhumanismo, la humanidad es una etapa que, guiada por la evolución biológica, estuvo precedida por otras anteriores y a la que seguirán otras nuevas. Según el transhumanismo hemos de romper la inercia de causas ciegas que gobierna la evolución y, a través de la biotecnología, alcanzar lo que denominan una “vida mejor”. Los autores afines a esta corriente desarrollan sus propuestas negando la existencia de una naturaleza humana, pero sin abandonar la convicción de que resulta posible definir en (...) qué consiste una “vida mejor”. En este artículo analizamos la claridad y el rigor con la que presentan el fin último de su propuesta, la relación entre el fin y los medios planteados para alcanzarlo, y, finalmente, pondremos de manifiesto algunas inconsistencias derivadas de su rechazo de que la naturaleza humana pueda tener valor normativo. (shrink)

Tanto el transhumanismo como el posthumanismo filosófico han prestado una atención especial a la corporalidad humana en relación al avance tecnológico. En el presente artículo, se comienza señalando cómo ambos movimientos difieren significativamente respecto a la herencia del humanismo. Posteriormente, se aborda la noción transhumanista de la ‘libertad morfológica’ de la mano de More, Sandberg y Bostrom. A continuación, se presentan casos paradigmáticos de modificaciones corporales mediante implantes cibernéticos. En último lugar, se problematizan las cuestiones de la identidad, la corporalidad (...) y el desencuentro entre ambas corrientes respecto al ‘volcado de la mente’. -/- Transhumanism and philosophical posthumanism have paid special attention to human corporeality in relation to technological breakthroughs. This article begins by pointing out how the two movements differ significantly about the inheritance of humanism. Subsequently, the transhumanist notion of ‘morphological freedom’ is addressed from the proposals of More, Sandberg, and Bostrom. Then, paradigmatic cases of body modifications through cybernetic implants are considered. Finally, the issues of identity, corporeality, and the disagreement between the two currents regarding ‘mind uploading’ are problematized. (shrink)

Debate concerning human enhancement often revolves around the question of whether there is a common “nature” that all human beings share and which is unwarrantedly violated by enhancing one’s capabilities beyond the “species-typical” norm. I explicate Thomas Aquinas’s influential theory of human nature, noting certain key traits commonly shared among human beings that define each as a “person” who possesses inviolable moral status. Understanding the specific qualities that define the nature of human persons, which includes self-conscious awareness, capacity for intellective (...) thought, and volitional autonomy, informs the ethical assessment of various forms of enhancement. Some forms of cognitive and physical enhancement may be desirable from the perspective of what constitutes the “flourishing” of human persons in our fundamental nature; while other forms of enhancement, such as emotive or so-called “moral” enhancement, run the risk of detracting from human flourishing when evaluated from the virtue-theoretic perspective Aquinas promotes. (shrink)

The enhancement debate in neuroscience and biomedical ethics tends to focus on the augmentation of certain capacities or functions: memory, learning, attention, and the like. Typically, the point of contention is whether these augmentative enhancements should be considered permissible for individuals with no particular “medical” disadvantage along any of the dimensions of interest. Less frequently addressed in the literature, however, is the fact that sometimes the _diminishment_ of a capacity or function, under the right set of circumstances, could plausibly contribute (...) to an individual's overall well-being: more is not always better, and sometimes less is more. Such cases may be especially likely, we suggest, when trade-offs in our modern environment have shifted since the environment of evolutionary adaptation. In this article, we introduce the notion of “diminishment as enhancement” and go on to defend a _welfarist_ conception of enhancement. We show how this conception resolves a number of definitional ambiguities in the enhancement literature, and we suggest that it can provide a useful framework for thinking about the use of emerging neurotechnologies to promote human flourishing. (shrink)

Because of accelerating technological progress, humankind may be rapidly approaching a critical phase in its career. In addition to well-known threats such as nuclear holocaust, the propects of radically transforming technologies like nanotech systems and machine intelligence present us with unprecedented opportunities and risks. Our future, and whether we will have a future at all, may well be determined by how we deal with these challenges. In the case of radically transforming technologies, a better understanding of the transition dynamics from (...) a human to a "posthuman" society is needed. Of particular importance is to know where the pitfalls are: the ways in which things could go terminally wrong. While we have had long exposure to various personal, local, and endurable global hazards, this paper analyzes a recently emerging category: that of existential risks. These are threats that could case our extinction or destroy the potential of Earth - originating intelligent life. Some of these threats are relatively well known while others, including some of the gravest, have gone almost unrecognized. Existential risks have a cluster of features that make ordinary risk management ineffective. A final section of this paper discusses several ethical and policy implications. A clearer understanding of the threat picture will enable us to formulate better strategies. (shrink)

This paper examines transhuman technologies that seek to eradicate disability - primarily prostheses and implants. While most would agree that disability denies individuals the same quality of life as those deemed “abled,” this eradication ultimately relies upon secular humanist notions of the perfect human. Transhuman technologies hold obvious implications for the human body, however they also hold implications for what it means to be an acceptable body; ultimately these technologies aim to create the perfect human by eradicating the disabled Other. (...) This paper uses these notions to question concepts of “hierarchies of life,” at which disabled individuals are most commonly moved towards the bottom, or at the very least considered nonhuman. This article seeks to provide alternative theory to the eradication of disability, which states that these individuals may not have the same mode of existence, but that their mode/s are just as valid as those lived by “abled” individuals through an examination of Braille. (shrink)

Transhumanism at once embodies our most modern thinking and our biggest longstanding problems. Transhumanism aims to enhance human core capacities: health-span, lifespan, and cognition. The thesis answers the following ethical challenges arising from transhumanist aims. First, whether transhumanism can be an ethical endeavour if it relies on authoritarian intervention by governments and governing bodies to change, generate and enforce behaviour, or to influence and enforce the uptake of medical procedures. Second, the thesis answers the challenge that it is unethical deliberately (...) to encourage the uptake of and pursuit of medical transhumanism given the extent of accessibility and distributive issues that remain unresolved in existing medicine. Finally, the thesis addresses a particular mental health crisis that is often predicted for transhuman beings, namely loss of meaning from loss of death and vulnerability, resulting in widespread loss of social cohesion. The thesis argues that the right solution to the first two problems is a libertarian paternalist approach, viz. nudging, and that this approach will also neutralise the risk of widespread and inevitable boredom or alienation that might otherwise result from the widespread introduction of human enhancement if people are nudged to engage more and more reflectively in their enhancement choices. Additionally, lifestyle issues like obesity, heart disease, cancers, and inaccessibility of vaccines and birth control pose unresolved problems for existing general medicine, killing millions every year worldwide. As a result, another serious challenge for enhancement medicine, which I propose would be addressed by the nudge approach, is to justify its place in the professional domain of medicine. (shrink)

Many states recognize a legal right to bodily integrity, understood as a right against significant, nonconsensual interference with one’s body. Recently, some have called for the recognition of an analogous legal right to mental integrity: a right against significant, nonconsensual interference with one’s mind. In this chapter, we describe and distinguish three different rationales for recognizing such a right. The first appeals to case-based intuitions to establish a distinctive duty not to interfere with others’ minds; the second holds that, if (...) we accept a legal right to bodily integrity, then we must, on pain of philosophical inconsistency, accept a case for an analogous right over the mind; and the third holds that recent technological developments create a need for a legal right to mental integrity. (shrink)

The human desire to acquire new capacities is as ancient as our species itself. We have always sought to expand the boundaries of our existence, be it socially, geographically, or mentally. There is a tendency in at least some individuals always to search for a way around every obstacle and limitation to human life and happiness.

In this article we aim to distinguish between the transhuman and posthuman condition, according to their anthropological, ontological, and ethical natures. We will show that the current historical moment can be considered the beginning of a transhuman civilisation, given that the characteristics of the transhuman are already present in today’s human being. We will show that a series of decisive limitations for belonging to the human condition are in the process of being transcended due to acquisition of attributes of divinity (...) that human beings do not currently possess: omnipotence, omnipresence , ex nihilo creation – starting from the divine creative ideation – and immortality. Humans are increasingly taking on the attributes of divinity in the process of human enhancements. We will discuss the ways in which technology allows the human to overcome these limitations, elevating humans past their current condition, in a process in which they gain technological transcendence. Excepting immortality, all other limitations, once exceeded, generate a transhuman condition. Immortality generates a posthuman condition, since it can only be obtained by modifying the human ontological status from that of a biological being to that of a resident being in informatics networks. In order to clarify this process, we will discuss the concepts of everlastingness and artificial life prolongation. (shrink)

The paper discusses the role of anthropological arguments in contemporary ethics as exemplified in the current debate about biotechnological human enhancement interventions. Anthropological arguments refer to a normative conception of what it means to be a human being and are highly contested in contemporary moral philosophy. Most often they are promoted to constrain the ethically acceptable use of enhancement technologies. I argue that anthropological arguments can play a fundamental and important role in assessing the moral qualities of enhancement interventions, but (...) only if their normative justification and their specific content are properly determined. I offer an account how to do so, based on the contractualist and pragmatist ideal that all those who are affected by a decision of normative relevance should be included in what I call a “quasi-democratic deliberative process”. However, given that they stand in need of wide agreement, anthropological arguments resulting from such a process will be be rather minimal in content. In the exemplary debate about human enhancements they hence turn out to be widely – though not fully – permissive and unable to justify a restrictive stance towards enhancement interventions. (shrink)

In this work I offer a panorama of the diverse areas where the philosophical reflection has been developed during these last years: the conceptual, ethical and aesthetic questions. The conceptual problems of the sport have turned around: 1) game and sport; 2) the paper of the rules and the values in the sportive normative system; 3) the competitive character and playful of the sport. The more debated ethical questions have been: 1) sport and gender; 2) sport and nationalism; 3) sport (...) and violence. (shrink)

One of the most consequential advances in sciences and technology is the increasing generation of bodily enhancement products that enable a culture of, demand for, and acceptance of improving and modifying the human body (structure, function, abilities) beyond its species-typical boundaries. A lively discourse exists around the rights and wrongs of human genetic and other forms of enhancement. Many treat the species-typical human body as an obsolescent technology in need of serious improvements. This raises various questions. This paper addresses the (...) following questions: a) can one refuse the upgrade, b) who has access to the upgrade, c) is there a way to revert to the obsolescent state after the upgrade, and d) what is the impact of perceiving oneself as obsolescent. (shrink)

The modern idea of progress assumes that time will bring a steady improvement in all things human. This idea was always a contested one. However, since the mid-20th century at the latest philosophical thought about progress has been almost exclusively critical. The present paper introduces the standard arguments of progress’s detractors, particularly the notion that progress should be understood dialectically as the transformation of good intentions into their opposite. It attempts to sketch a more timely conception of progress in opposition (...) to this line of thought. (shrink)

As scientific progress approaches the point where significant human enhancements could become reality, debates arise whether such technologies should be made available. This paper evaluates the widespread concern that human enhancements will inevitably accentuate existing inequality and analyzes whether prohibition is the optimal public policy to avoid this outcome. Beyond these empirical questions, this paper considers whether the inequality objection is a sound argument against the set of enhancements most threatening to equality, i.e., cognitive enhancements. In doing so, I shall (...) argue that cognitive enhancements can be embraced wholeheartedly, for three separate reasons. However, though the inequality objection does not sufficiently support the conclusion that cognitive enhancements should be prohibited, it raises several concerns for optimal policy design that shall be addressed here. (shrink)

There are two types of artificial general intelligence (AGI) safety solutions: global and local. Most previously suggested solutions are local: they explain how to align or “box” a specific AI (Artificial Intelligence), but do not explain how to prevent the creation of dangerous AI in other places. Global solutions are those that ensure any AI on Earth is not dangerous. The number of suggested global solutions is much smaller than the number of proposed local solutions. Global solutions can be divided (...) into four groups: 1. No AI: AGI technology is banned or its use is otherwise prevented; 2. One AI: the first superintelligent AI is used to prevent the creation of any others; 3. Net of AIs as AI police: a balance is created between many AIs, so they evolve as a net and can prevent any rogue AI from taking over the world; 4. Humans inside AI: humans are augmented or part of AI. We explore many ideas, both old and new, regarding global solutions for AI safety. They include changing the number of AI teams, different forms of “AI Nanny” (non-self-improving global control AI system able to prevent creation of dangerous AIs), selling AI safety solutions, and sending messages to future AI. Not every local solution scales to a global solution or does it ethically and safely. The choice of the best local solution should include understanding of the ways in which it will be scaled up. Human-AI teams or a superintelligent AI Service as suggested by Drexler may be examples of such ethically scalable local solutions, but the final choice depends on some unknown variables such as the speed of AI progress. (shrink)

Durante los últimos decenios la utilidad se ha convertido en uno de los elementos más importantes de nuestra sociedad, hasta el punto de medir no sólo las cosas, sino a los seres humanos por su utilidad. No se trata de demostrar la utilidad de la cosas “inútiles”, sino de reivindicar que hay cosas que son valiosas por sí mismas. Esta es la perspectiva que me gustaría tratar en este artículo. Para ello, en primer lugar me detendré en explicar brevemente el (...) auge y expansión de la utilidad desde la modernidad hasta nuestros días, centrándome en una de sus vertientes contemporáneas: el transhumanismo. En segundo lugar, frente a esta corriente presentaré una defensa de lo inútil como aquello que nos caracteriza como humanos. Por último, me centraré en exponer cómo el arte nos enseña, por excelencia, a valorar lo inútil y, en este sentido, nos ayuda a comprender mejor al ser humano. (shrink)

Ce dossier traite de l‘influence et de l‘impact de l‘amélioration humaine sur notre société ainsi que sur notre conception de ce que c‘est que d‘être humain. Quels enjeux les technosciences engendrent-elles ? D‘où vient ce besoin de vouloir s‘améliorer ? Quelles libertés a-t-on face à ces nouvelles technologies? Et quelle place tient l‘humain dans ce débat ?

Human enhancement has emerged in recent years as a blossoming topic in applied ethics. With continuing advances in science and technology, people are beginning to realize that some of the basic parameters of the human condition might be changed in the future. One important way in which the human condition could be changed is through the enhancement of basic human capacities. If this becomes feasible within the lifespan of many people alive today, then it is important now to consider the (...) normative questions raised by such prospects. The answers to these questions might not only help us be better prepared when technology catches up with imagination, but they may be relevant to many decisions we make today, such as decisions about how much funding to give to various kinds of research. Enhancement is typically contraposed to therapy. In broad terms, therapy aims to fix something that has gone wrong, by curing specific diseases or injuries, while enhancement interventions aim to improve the state of an organism beyond its normal healthy state. However, the distinction between therapy and enhancement is problematic, for several reasons. First, we may note that the therapy-enhancement dichotomy does not map onto any corresponding dichotomy between standard-contemporary-medicine and medicineas-it-could-be-practised-in-the-future. Standard contemporary medicine includes many practices that do not aim to cure diseases or injuries. It includes, for example, preventive medicine, palliative care, obstetrics, sports medicine, plastic surgery, contraceptive devices, fertility treatments, cosmetic dental procedures, and much else. At the same time, many enhancement interventions occur outside of the medical framework. Office workers enhance their performance by drinking coffee. Make-up and grooming are used to enhance appearance. Exercise, meditation, fish oil, and St John’s Wort are used to enhance mood. Second, it is unclear how to classify interventions that reduce the probability of disease and death.. (shrink)

A través de un análisis de las novelas Un mundo feliz de Aldous Huxley y Oryx y Crake de Margaret Atwood, este trabajo indaga sobre los efectos de los avances tecnológicos y científicos en la naturaleza humana y la posible evolución hacia la posthumanidad. Específicamente, se analizan la postura de filósofos transhumanistas como Nick Bostrom y la de filósofos bioconservadores como Francis Fukuyama para examinar en qué aspectos los personajes de las ficciones se asemejan a un ser posthumano y para (...) reflexionar sobre los posibles alcances del mejoramiento humano y de un futuro posthumano. (shrink)