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Plato’s Theaetetus

Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press (1988)

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  1. Knowledge and True Belief at Theaetetus 201a–c.Tamer Nawar - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (6):1052-1070.
    This paper examines a passage in the Theaetetus where Plato distinguishes knowledge from true belief by appealing to the example of a jury hearing a case. While the jurors may have true belief, Socrates puts forward two reasons why they cannot achieve knowledge. The reasons for this nescience have typically been taken to be in tension with each other . This paper proposes a solution to the putative difficulty by arguing that what links the two cases of nescience is that (...)
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  • The Ontology of the Secret Doctrine in Plato’s Theaetetus.Christopher Buckels - 2016 - Phronesis 61 (3):243-259.
    The paper offers an interpretation of a disputed portion of Plato’s Theaetetus that is often called the Secret Doctrine. It is presented as a process ontology that takes two types of processes, swift and slow motions, as fundamental building blocks for ordinary material objects. Slow motions are powers which, when realized, generate swift motions, which, in turn, are subjectively bundled to compose sensible objects and perceivers. Although the reading of the Secret Doctrine offered here—a new version of the “Causal Theory (...)
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  • Plato and the Norms of Thought.R. Woolf - 2013 - Mind 122 (485):171-216.
    This paper argues for the presence in Plato’s work of a conception of thinking central to which is what I call the Transparency View. According to this view, in order for a subject to think of a given object, the subject must represent that object just as it is, without inaccuracy or distortion. I examine the ways in which this conception influences Plato’s epistemology and metaphysics and explore some ramifications for contemporary views about mental content.
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  • Cross-modality and the self.Jonardon Ganeri - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):639-658.
    The thesis of this paper is that the capacity to think of one’s perceptions as cross-modally integrated is incompatible with a reductionist account of the self. In §2 I distinguish three versions of the argument from cross-modality. According to the ‘unification’ version of the argument, what needs to be explained is one’s capacity to identify an object touched as the same as an object simultaneously seen. According to the ‘recognition’ version, what needs to be explained is one’s capacity, having once (...)
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  • Plato's Appearance‐Assent Account of Belief.Jessica Moss - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (2pt2):213-238.
    Stoics and Sceptics distinguish belief (doxa) from a representationally and functionally similar but sub-doxastic state: passive yielding to appearance. Belief requires active assent to appearances, that is, affirmation of the appearances as true. I trace the roots of this view to Plato's accounts of doxa in the Republic and Theaetetus. In the Republic, eikasia and pistis (imaging and conviction) are distinguished by their objects, appearances versus ordinary objects; in the Theaetetus, perception and doxa are distinguished by their objects, proper perceptibles (...)
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  • Pathos in the Theaetetus.Evan Keeling - 2019 - In Evan Keeling & Luca Pitteloud (eds.), Psychology and Ontology in Plato. Cham: Springer Verlag.
    This paper is a test case for the claim, made famous by Myles Burnyeat, that the ancient Greeks did not recognize subjective truth or knowledge. After a brief discussion of the issue in Sextus Empiricus, I then turn to Plato's discussion of Protagorean views in the Theaetetus. In at least two passages, it seems that Plato attributes to Protagoras the view that our subjective experiences constitute truth and knowledge, without reference to any outside world of objects. I argue that these (...)
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  • Refutation and Relativism in Theaetetus 161-171.Alex Long - 2004 - Phronesis 49 (1):24 - 40.
    In this paper I discuss the dialogues between 'Protagoras', Theodorus and Socrates in "Theaetetus" 161-171 and emphasise the importance for this passage of a dilemma which refutation is shown to pose for relativism at 161e-162a. I argue that the two speeches delivered on Protagoras' behalf contain material that is deeply Socratic and suggest that this feature of the speeches should be interpreted as part of Plato's philosophical case against relativism, reflecting the relativist's own inability to defend his theory from attempts (...)
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  • Plato, the Eristics, and the Principle of Non-Contradiction.Ian J. Campbell - 2021 - Apeiron 54 (4):571-614.
    This paper considers the use that Plato makes of the Principle of Non-Contradiction in his engagements with eristic refutations. By examining Plato’s use of the principle in his most detailed engagements with eristic—in the Sophist, the discussion of “agonistic” argumentation in the Theaetetus, and especially the Euthydemus—I aim to show that the pressure exerted on Plato by eristic refutations played a crucial role in his development of the PNC, and that the principle provided him with a much more sophisticated means (...)
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  • On making mistakes in Plato: Thaeatetus 187c-200d.Catherine Rowett - 2012 - Topoi 31 (2):151-166.
    In this paper I explore a famous part of Plato’s Theaetetus where Socrates develops various models of the mind (picturing it first as a wax tablet and then as an aviary full of specimen birds). These are to solve some puzzles about how it is possible to make a mistake. On my interpretation, defended here, the discussion of mistakes is no digression, but is part of the refutation of Theaetetus’s thesis that knowledge is “true doxa”. It reveals that false doxa (...)
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  • Zalmoxis’ Medical Holism in the Charmides.Edoardo Benati - 2024 - Apeiron 57 (3):315-338.
    This paper studies an argument in the prologue of the Charmides which defends the view that it is impossible to cure the body independently of the soul. I argue that Socrates is committed to an account of the psychē as an embodied soul, causally responsible for the biological condition of the body. Furthermore, the prescription of kaloi logoi as a treatment for the soul’s biological failures suggests that Socrates appears to initially regard the ethical and biological dimensions of the soul (...)
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  • Die Welt im Fluß?Jörg Hardy - 2006 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 9 (1):31-78.
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  • (1 other version)The Case of Theaetetus.Gokhan Adalier - 2001 - Phronesis 46 (1):1-37.
    Any comprehensive interpretation of the "Theaetetus" has to provide answers to, among others, two very general questions concerning that dialogue: "What is Plato's relation to the problems faced in the "Theaetetus"?" and "What is the significance of the absence of the Forms from the discussion of the "Theaetetus", given their undoubted relevance to the topic of the dialogue, i.e. knowledge?" Predominantly, the answer given to the first question in the literature has been that the problems are those that Plato is (...)
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  • The Analysis of False Judgement According to Being and Not-Being in Plato’s Theaetetus (188c10–189b9).Paolo Crivelli - 2023 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 105 (4):509-566.
    The version of the paradox of false judgement examined at Tht. 188c10–189b9 relies on the assumption that to judge falsehoods is to judge the things which are not. The presentation of the argument displays several syntactic ambiguities: at several points it allows the reader to adopt different syntactic connections between the components of sentences. For instance, when Socrates says that in a false judgement the cognizer is “he who judges the things which are not about anything whatsoever” (188d3–4), how should (...)
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  • Protagoras refuted: How clever is Socrates' "Most clever" argument at Theaetetus 171a–c?Luca Castagnoli - 2004 - Topoi 23 (1):3-32.
    This article aims at reconstructing the logic and assessing the force of Socrates' argument against Protagoras' 'Measure Doctrine' at Theaetetus 171a–c. I examine and criticise some influential interpretations of the passage, according to which, e.g., Socrates is guilty of ignoratio elenchi by dropping the essential Protagorean qualifiers or successfully proves that md is self-refuting provided the missing qualifiers are restored by the attentive reader. Having clarified the meaning of MD, I analyse in detail the broader section 170a–171d and argue, against (...)
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  • The Method of Bifurcatory Division in Plato’s Sophist.Colin C. Smith - 2021 - Elenchos: Rivista di Studi Sul Pensiero Antico 42 (2):229-260.
    The strange and challenging stretch of dialectic with which Plato’s Sophist begins and ends has confused and frustrated readers for generations, and despite receiving a fair amount of attention, there is no consensus regarding even basic issues concerning this method. Here I offer a new account of bifurcatory division as neither joke nor naïve method, but instead a valuable, propaedeutic method that Plato offers to us readers as a means of embarking upon the kind of mental gymnastics that will stretch (...)
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  • The Puzzle of False Judgement in the Theaetetus.Nathanael Stein - 2016 - Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 61 (3):260–283.
    A puzzle about false judgement is raised in the Theaetetus (187d-200c), but not successfully answered there. On the proposed account, the confusion that explicitly vitiates Theaetetus’ final attempt to define knowledge is already at work implicitly in this puzzle. Theaetetus shares popular assumptions about knowledge (epistēmē), but also accepts that there are cognitive constraints on judgement (doxa): the puzzle arises because he fails to distinguish the one cognitive condition from the other.
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  • Perception and Knowledge in Plato's Theaetetus.Naly Thaler - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (3):160-167.
    In this paper, I examine several key issues relating to the definition of knowledge as perception in the first part of Plato's Theaetetus. I begin by explaining the workings of the ‘secret doctrine’ of perception, which is introduced in order to support the idea that perception is incorrigible, and then turn to examine the two refutations of the definition of knowledge as perception which appear at the end of the first part of the Theaetetus. I shall present and explain distinct (...)
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  • Colloquium 8.Ruby Blondell - 1998 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 14 (1):213-238.
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  • (1 other version)Colloquium 5.Klaus Brinkmann - 1992 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 8 (1):199-209.
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  • Commentary on Dixsaut.Klaus Brinkmann - 1997 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 13 (1):28-34.
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  • Commentary on Fine.Deborah De Chiara-Quenzer - 1994 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 10 (1):244-255.
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  • Plato’s methodological strategy in the first part of the Theaetetus.Graciela Marcos de Pinotti - 2016 - Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 16:31-49.
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  • Plato on the Traditional Definition of Knowledge.José Lourenço Pereira da Silva - 2018 - Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 23:167-204.
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  • Sobre o argumento “saber ou não-saber” em Teeteto 187d-200c.Anderson De Paula Borges - 2013 - Dois Pontos 10 (2).
    Há muita discussão sobre como interpretar o papel do argumento ‘Saber ou não Saber’ em Teeteto 188a-c. Alguns intérpretes supõem que esse papel é dialético e Platão não está comprometido com sua verdade. Outros pensam que o argumento revela a confusão de Platão sobre o tema da opinião falsa à época do Teeteto. Em minha análise, há uma terceira via que faz mais justiça ao que Platão está desenvolvendo em 188a-c. Penso que em 188a-c temos uma versão do princípio platônico (...)
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  • Il Teeteto e il suo rapporto con il Cratilo.Aldo Brancacci - 2020 - Elenchos: Rivista di Studi Sul Pensiero Antico 41 (1):27-48.
    With the use of a particular metaphor, which appears at the end of the Cratylus and is taken up with perfect symmetry at the beginning of the Theaetetus, Plato certainly wanted to indicate the succession of Cratylus–Theaetetus as an order for reading the two dialogues, which Trasillus faithfully reproduced in structuring the second tetralogy of Platonic dialogues. The claim of the theory of ideas, with which the Cratylus ends, must therefore be considered the background in which to place not only (...)
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  • (1 other version)Reading the περιτρoπη: Theaetetus 170c-171c. Chappell - 2006 - Phronesis 51 (2):109-139.
    Two readings of the much-discussed περιτροπή argument of "Theaetetus" 170c-171c have dominated the literature. One I call "the relativity reading". On this reading, the argument fails by ignoratio elenchi because it "carelessly" omits "the qualifications 'true for so-and-so' which [Protagoras'] theory insists on" (Bostock 1988: 90). The other reading I call "the many-worlds interpretation". On this view, Plato's argument succeeds in showing that "Protagoras' position becomes utterly self-contradictory" because "he claims that everyone lives in his own relativistic world, yet at (...)
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  • Esistenza e Persistenza.Damiano Costa - 2018 - Milan, IT: Mimesis.
    Nel nostro universo, qualunque cosa, dalla più piccola particella alla più smisurata galassia, esiste in un qualche tempo e in un qualche luogo. Ma cosa significa esistere in un qualche tempo? Il fenomeno dell’esistenza temporale gioca un ruolo fondamentale nella comprensione dell’universo e di noi stessi quali creature temporali. Eppure è un fenomeno profondamente misterioso. L’esistenza temporale è da intendersi come una relazione? Che legami ha con l’esistenza dell’ontologia? L’esistenza temporale e la localizzazione spaziale sono due fenomeni essenzialmente differenti o (...)
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  • Meta Logou in Plato’s Theaetetus.Boris Hennig - 2020 - Apeiron 54 (1):109-128.
    The account of knowledge in Plato’s Theaetetus, as true belief meta logou, seems to lead to a regress, which may be avoided by defining one kind of knowledge as true belief that rests on a different kind of knowledge. I explore a specific version of this move: to define knowledge as true belief that results from a successful and proper exercise of a rational capacity (a dunamis meta logou).
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  • (1 other version)Reading the περιτροπή: "Theaetetus" 170c-171c. Chappell - 2006 - Phronesis 51 (2):109 - 139.
    Two readings of the much-discussed περιτροπή argument of "Theaetetus" 170c-171c have dominated the literature. One I call "the relativity reading". On this reading, the argument fails by ignoratio elenchi because it "carelessly" omits "the qualifications 'true for so-and-so' which [Protagoras'] theory insists on" (Bostock 1988: 90). The other reading I call "the many-worlds interpretation". On this view, Plato's argument succeeds in showing that "Protagoras' position becomes utterly self-contradictory" because "he claims that everyone lives in his own relativistic world, yet at (...)
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  • Judgment, Logos, and Knowledge in Plato's Theaetetus.Naly Thaler - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (5):246-255.
    In this second installment on the Theaetetus, I discuss Theaetetus' second and third definitions of knowledge, namely, ‘true judgment’ and then ‘true judgment with the addition of an account’. I offer a brief description of Socrates' intricate examination of these suggestions, concentrating especially on the discussion of false judgment and that of the so-called ‘Dream Theory’. I then proceed to map different lines of interpretation for these passages that have been offered by scholars writing in the last 40 years.
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  • Phainomena e explicação na Ética Eudêmia de Aristóteles.Raphael Zillig - 2014 - In Zillig Raphael (ed.), Conocimiento, ética y estética en la Filosofía Antigua: Actas del II Simposio Nacional de Filosofía Antigua. Asociación Argentina de Filosofía Antigua. pp. 330-336.
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  • A Interpretação Aristotélica do Pensamento Protagoreano em Metafísica Γ 4-6.Anderson Borges - 2017 - Journal of Ancient Philosophy 11 (2):82-105.
    In Metaphysics Γ 4-6 Aristotle argues that Protagoras is committed not just to denying the PNC, but also to asserting its contrary. In this paper, I offer an analysis of this commitment. I try to show that Aristotle is working with a specific idea in mind: a Protagoreanism ontologically linked to the flux doctrine, as Plato suggested in Theaetetus 152-160.
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  • Conhecimento como Juízo Verdadeiro com logos no Teeteto de Platão.Gustavo R. B. A. Ferreira - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Campinas
    We examine the discussion about the definition of knowledge as true judgment accompanied by logos in Theaetetus 201c-210c, in order to ascertain which of the recent alternative interpretations is more consistent with the text. To accomplish this, we intend to analyze the text and explore in detail the secondary literature about it.
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  • The Eleatic Stranger in Sophist dialogue.Lucas Alvarez - 2022 - Plato Journal 23:7-21.
    Within the framework of the discussion about the existence of a spokesman in the Platonic dialogues, we look, in the first part, into the possible transfer of this spokesman’s function from Socrates to the Eleatic Stranger, identifying the contact and divergence points between both characters. In the second part, we try to show that this transfer has a dramatic staging at the beginning of the Sophist dialogue, where Socrates makes a demand that enables the Stranger to demonstrate his genuine philosophical (...)
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  • Crítica de la figura de Protágoras en el Libro Γ de la Metafísica de Aristóteles.Diego Tabakian - 2017 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 53:373-410.
    En su defensa del Principio de no-contradicción, Aristóteles discute con varios interlocutores, desde los presocráticos hasta el sofista Protágoras, este último ampliamente conocido en la Antigüedad por trastocar el concepto de verdad con su doctrina del “homo mensura”, declarando así la imposibilidad del discurso falso. Consideramos que una lectura atenta del Libro Γ que rescate la figura del abderita puede mostrar cómo la crítica del sofista es clave para la constitución del pensamiento aristotélico en torno al problema de la verdad. (...)
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