Transhumanism is a scientific and philosophical movement that proposes to overcome, through new technologies, the restrictions imposed on us by our biological condition. Some transhumanists assume that the struggle against natural limits could lead to a radical change in our body or even to its replacement. Other authors, such as Nicholas Agar, propose a moderate enhancement that does not exceed the framework of what we understand to be human. In this article, I will offer a plausible interpretation of the project (...) of human enhancement from a Thomistic perspective. To carry out my analysis, I will focus on three fundamental metaphysical and anthropological questions: How do advocates of radical enhancement understand the relationship between limits, imperfections and evils in human nature? How is this relationship understood from moderate positions? And Is any of these proposals compatible with Aquinas’ anthropology? I will conclude that the identification of limits with imperfections and evils assumed by radical positions is incompatible with Aquinas’ anthropology. Nevertheless, this does not entail that any bio-modification is unacceptable. Aquinas’ peculiar metaphysics, together with its anthropology in which the natural, the supernatural and the preternatural realms intertwine, can offer an interesting framework to assess the human enhancement project. (shrink)

This article gives two arguments for believing that our society is unknowingly guilty of serious, large-scale wrongdoing. First is an inductive argument: most other societies, in history and in the world today, have been unknowingly guilty of serious wrongdoing, so ours probably is too. Second is a disjunctive argument: there are a large number of distinct ways in which our practices could turn out to be horribly wrong, so even if no particular hypothesized moral mistake strikes us as very likely, (...) the disjunction of all such mistakes should receive significant credence. The article then discusses what our society should do in light of the likelihood that we are doing something seriously wrong: we should regard intellectual progress, of the sort that will allow us to find and correct our moral mistakes as soon as possible, as an urgent moral priority rather than as a mere luxury; and we should also consider it important to save resources and cultivate flexibility, so that when the time comes to change our policies we will be able to do so quickly and smoothly. (shrink)

Michael Sandel's opposition to the project of human enhancement is based on an argument that centres on the notion of giftedness. Sandel claims that by trying to ?make better people? we fall prey to, and encourage, an attitude of mastery and thus lose, or diminish, our appreciation of the giftedness of life. Sandel's position and the underlying argument have been much criticised. In this paper I will try to make sense of Sandel's reasoning and give an account of giftedness that (...) defends its relevance for the ethical assessment of the human enhancement project. In order to do so, I will also look at virtue-related notions, such as gratitude and humility, and distinguish the gifted from the merely given. The failure to acknowledge this distinction gives rise to one of the most common objections to Sandel's argument. Other objections will be shown to rest on similar misunderstandings. (shrink)

Extreme human enhancement could result in “posthuman” modes of being. After offering some definitions and conceptual clarification, I argue for two theses. First, some posthuman modes of being would be very worthwhile. Second, it could be very good for human beings to become posthuman.

Blackballing the reaper is an old ambition, and considerable progress has been made. For the past 150 years, best-performance life-expectancy (i.e. life-expectancy in the country where it is highest) has increased at a very steady rate of 3 months per year.1 Lifeexpectancy for the ancient Romans was circa 23 years; today the average life-expectancy in the world is 64 years.2 Will this trend continue? What are the consequences if it does? And what ethical and political challenges does the prospect of (...) life-extension create for us today? This article comments on some views on the ethics, science, and politics of lifeextension from a recent edited volume, The Fountain of Youth. (shrink)

Chemical brain preservation allows the brain to be preserved for millennia. In the coming decades; the information in a chemically preserved brain may be able to be decoded and emulated in a computer. I first examine the history of brain preservation and recent advances that indicate this may soon be a real possibility. I then argue that chemical brain preservation should be viewed as a life-saving medical procedure. Any technology that significantly extends the human life span faces many potential criticisms. (...) However; standard medical ethics entails that individuals should have the autonomy to choose chemical brain preservation. Only if the harm to society caused by brain preservation and future emulation greatly outweighed any potential benefit would it be ethically acceptable to refuse individuals this medical intervention. Since no such harm exists; it is ethical for individuals to choose chemical brain preservation. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to look into the question of whether considerable life extension should be seen as a form of human enhancement. Human enhancement, generally, refers to enhancing physical, psychological, and moral human capacities beyond the average or “normal” level. Much of the recent literature focusing on considerable life extension has been related to the human enhancement debate. I will examine whether considerable life extension and human enhancement are connected. I argue that they are not connected to (...) each other in the way that is presented by many philosophers such as John Harris, Nick Bostrom, and Nils Holtug, as well as Savulescu, Kahane, and Sandberg. Sometimes considerable life extension should be seen rather as a part of preventive care. Considerable life extension can result simply from preventive care. If we define considerable life extension as enhancement, it is interesting because it is related to many ethical questions. A quite common view, for example, is one that states that treatment should be supported financially by society, whereas enhancement should not. However, claiming that there is no strong conceptual link between considerable life extension and enhancement does not mean that the former should automatically be covered by public healthcare or insurance policies. The aim of this paper is not to present a strong view for or against the ethical desirability of considerable life extension. I argue that the importance of the human enhancement framework has been overstated in the case of considerable life extension. My point is simply that it is unclear why the possibility of radical extension in human life should be primarily discussed in the sphere of human enhancement. (shrink)

Technological dystopias incarnate transhumanist dreams of a this-worldly blissful immortality. Underlying these and others is a globalized technocratic paradigm, the loss of an overarching cosmic world view, rise in consumerism, a gnostic repudiation of the body, and a neo-pelagian aspiration to individualistic self-sufficiency. One response to these transhumanist dreams is to remind ourselves of how nature actually works, its origins, constrains, and future. Our relationship with nature spills over to how we feel standing face-to-face with pain and suffering. In this (...) article I reframe cancer as a journey of maintaining harmony with nature instead of a war against death that we are destined to lose. I argue that understanding the limits and constraints of the natural world help us come to peace with the reality of cancer, and perhaps find meaning in suffering. Instead of avoiding the inevitable at all costs, vulnerability and suffering have their own lessons. In contrast to trans humanist dreams, being human presents an opportunity to welcome the reality of imperfection, to be liberated from our addiction to control and excessive technological manipulation of nature, to draw together as a community, and to live the lessons of each stage of our finite life to its fullest. I hope this reflection, grounded in scientific literature and engaging with richly embodied medical humanities readings, can help us all change how we relate to cancer, from books to bench to biotech to bedside. (shrink)

Debates about the ethical and social implications of research that aims to extend human longevity by intervening in the ageing process have paid little attention to the attitudes of members of the general public. In the absence of empirical evidence, conflicting assumptions have been made about likely public attitudes towards life-extension. In light of recent calls for greater public involvement in such discussions, this target article presents findings from focus groups and individual interviews which investigated whether members of the general (...) public identify ethical issues surrounding life-extension, and if so, what these ethical issues are? In this study, while some participants were concerned primarily with the likely personal consequences of life-extension, for others the question of whether or not to pursue interventions to extend longevity, and how they should be implemented, clearly raised important ethical issues, many of which have been prominent in debates among bioethicists. (shrink)

In her short story “Stable Strategies for Middle Management,” Eileen Gunn imagines a future in which Margaret, an office worker, seeks radical genetic enhancements intended to help her secure the middle-management job she wants. One source of the story’s tension and dark humor is dramatic irony: readers can see that the enhancements Margaret buys stand little chance of making her life go better for her; enhancing is, for Margaret, probably a prudential mistake. This paper argues that our positions in the (...) real world are sufficiently similar to Margaret’s position in Gunn’s fictional world that we should take this story seriously as grounding an argument from analogy for the conclusion that radical genetic enhancements are, for us, probably a prudential mistake. The paper then defends this method. When the question at hand is one of speculative ethics, there is no method better fit to the purpose than argument from analogy to speculative fiction. (shrink)

Recent biotechnological advances pose topical challenges to Christian ethics. One such development is the attempt to try and enhance human beings and what it means to be human, also through radical life extension. In this contribution I am especially interested in limited human lifespan and attempts to radically prolong it. Although there are a number of ethical issues raised by critics, one of the most profound ethical and theological issues raised by these efforts is the question of equity and justice. (...) This artice looks at questions such as whether this biotechnology could exacerbate existing social divisions. Who will be experimented on in the development of this technology, as well as who will have access to it and be able to afford it, should it become commercially available? Being created in God’s image is a relational concept, referring not only to humanity’s relationship with God, but also with each other. Disrupting these relationships through the possible enlarging socioeconomic divisions between people through the utilisation of enhancement technology is a serious bioethical and theological question. (shrink)

I argue that Heidegger’s account of technology as “enframing” is a helpful lens through which to understand the possible effects and dangers of transhumanism. Without resorting to nebulous concepts such as “dignity;” Heidegger’s analysis can help us understand how new technologies employed to modify the body; brain; and consciousness will enframe our own bodies and identities as something akin to “standing reserve.” Under transhumanism; the body is enframed as an external; technologically modifiable product. I indicate some of the problems that (...) might arise when our own bodies no longer appear as central to our identity as embodied beings. Further; I argue that; by treating aspects of our own consciousness as technologically modifiable; we will be driven into a commodified and inauthentic relation to our identities. By examining the work of prominent transhumanists – including Brad Allenby; Daniel Sarewitz; and Andy Clark – I show how the threat that technology poses can be hidden when the essence of technology is not uncovered in a primordial way. I argue that by threatening to obscure death as a foundational possibility for Dasein; transhumanism poses the danger of hiding the need to develop a free and authentic relation to technology; Truth; and ultimately to Dasein itself. (shrink)

Black Panther, even with the deep problems in how it represents Black American men, grapples with messy histories directly, in plain sight of white audiences. The motivations and struggles of the characters Shuri and Erik "Killmonger" Stevens, in particular, show us how Black Panther's blend of Africanfuturism and Afrofuturism is meant to teach us how our memories of the past must connect with our visions of the future. Black Panther presents a vision of a distinctly African future that not only (...) affirms that there are in fact Black people in the future, but also gives us a glimpse of how Black people make it to the future and what kind of home we make there. Ruha Benjamin describes how our technologies coalesce to support anti‐Blackness and white supremacy – sometimes inadvertently, oftentimes explicitly. African/Afrofuturist works like Black Panther help us calibrate our walking canes, in a way. (shrink)