Switch to: References

Citations of:

Group understanding

Synthese 198 (7):6837-6858 (2019)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Truth About Better Understanding?Lewis Ross - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-24.
    The notion of understanding occupies an increasingly prominent place in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of science, and moral theory. A central and ongoing debate about the nature of understanding is how it relates to the truth. In a series of influential contributions, Catherine Elgin has used a variety of familiar motivations for antirealism in philosophy of science to defend a non- factive theory of understanding. Key to her position are: (i) the fact that false theories can contribute to the upwards trajectory (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Would we lie to you?: Jennifer Lackey: The epistemology of groups. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021, 224 pp, $70 HB. [REVIEW]Kenneth Boyd - 2021 - Metascience 30 (3):397-400.
    A review of Jennifer Lackey's "The Epistemology of Groups".
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Deliberation and Group Disagreement.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter - 2020 - In Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. London: Routledge. pp. 9-45.
    Suppose an inquiring group wants to let a certain view stand as the group's view. But there’s a problem: the individuals in that group do not initially all agree with one another about what the correct view is. What should the group do, given that it wants to settle on a single answer, in the face of this kind of intragroup disagreement? Should the group members deliberate and exchange evidence and then take a vote? Or, given the well-known ways that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Scientific Progress and Collective Attitudes.Keith Raymond Harris - forthcoming - Episteme:1-20.
    Psychological-epistemic accounts take scientific progress to consist in the development of some psychological-epistemic attitude. Disagreements over what the relevant attitude is – true belief, knowledge, or understanding – divide proponents of the semantic, epistemic, and noetic accounts of scientific progress, respectively. Proponents of all such accounts face a common challenge. On the face of it, only individuals have psychological attitudes. However, as I argue in what follows, increases in individual true belief, knowledge, and understanding are neither necessary nor sufficient for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation