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  1. Grounding the Selectionist Explanation for the Success of Science in the External Physical World.Ragnar van der Merwe - forthcoming - Foundations of Science: DOI: 10.1007/s10699-023-09907-y.
    I identify two versions of the scientific anti-realist’s selectionist explanation for the success of science: Bas van Fraassen’s original and K. Brad Wray’s newer interpretation. In Wray’s version, psycho-social factors internal to the scientific community – viz. scientists’ interests, goals, and preferences – explain the theory-selection practices that explain theory-success. I argue that, if Wray’s version were correct, then science should resemble art. In art, the artwork-selection practices that explain artwork-success appear faddish. They are prone to radical change over time. (...)
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  • Methodological Naturalism and Scientific Success.Yunus Adi Prasetya - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (1):231-256.
    Several metaphysical naturalists argue that the success of science, together with the claim that scientists adhere to methodological naturalism, amounts to strong evidence for metaphysical naturalism. I call this the scientific-success argument. It is argued that the scientific-success argument is similar to the no-miracles argument for realism in philosophy of science. On the no-miracles argument, the success of science is taken as strong evidence that scientific theories are true. Based on this similarity, some considerations relevant to one argument may also (...)
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  • Tinbergen’s four questions and the debate between scientific realism and selectionism.Kok Yong Lee - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12643-12661.
    According to the no-miracle argument, scientific realism is the only view that does not render the predictive success of scientific theories miraculous. Against the no-miracle argument, selectionists argue that the predictive success of scientific theories is a product of them being subject to a selection process that weeds out predictively unsuccessful theories. Against selectionism, I argue that the selectionist explanation is not an alternative to the realist one. More precisely, I draw on a standard framework in behavioral biology, known as (...)
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  • Escaping the Fundamental Dichotomy of Scientific Realism.Shahin Kaveh - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (4):999-1025.
    The central motivation behind the scientific realism debate is explaining the impressive success of scientific theories. The debate has been dominated by two rival types of explanations: the first relies on some sort of static, referentially transparent relationship between the theory and the unobservable world, such as truthlikeness, representation, or structural similarity; the second relies on no robust relationship between the theory and unobservable reality at all, and instead draws on predictive similarity and the stringent methodology of science to explain (...)
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