The notion of 'freedom' has gained an emblematic character in contemporary political discourse. It is, commonly, viewed as the central value and political goal of modern societies. Similarly, human rights documents conceive of freedom as their founding principle with universal validity. In contradistinction to this prevalent approach to freedom, this paper aims to demonstrate that freedom is, primarily, a political signifier with social-historical variability. One cannot, therefore, simply and uncritically assume that freedom has (or should have) universal validity or transhistorical (...) significance. In the first section of this paper, the structure of the contemporary liberal discourse on freedom is discussed and called into question. In light of Arendt's interpretation of freedom and through her analysis of the public domain, I reflect on the social-historical variability of the meaning of freedom and its inextricable nexus with a particular form of society. In the second section and drawing on Castoriadis, the notion of 'freedom' is approached in view of human signifying practices and imaginary dimension of society. This examination reveals in what way freedom––in the sense of a central social imaginary signification––contributes to the institution of an autonomous mode of society and determines the affective disposition and intentional vector of its inhabitants. (shrink)

As with terms such as “human rights”, “democracy”, and “equality”, the notion of “freedom” has an emblematic character with highly normative overtones. After the declaration of universal human rights, one might argue that freedom is – at least formally – a universal entitlement belonging to every human being. However, this universalist structure is built upon a conflictual foundation, as the juridico-political meaning of freedom is determined by the boundaries of national citizenship, statehood, and territorial sovereignty. This chapter examines refugeehood as (...) a normal by-product of the post-colonial world order, embodying the counter-history of nation-states whose internal borders, walls, and external fortifications are growingly being militarised and reinforced. Refugeehood represents an anomalous juridico-political condition that cannot be elucidated by colonial-racial binaries such as inclusion versus exclusion or rightlessness versus national citizenship. The central idea of this chapter is that, for refugees, the meaning of freedom and unfreedom are intertwined and should be approached as a dynamic relationship characterising the state of (non)-subjectivity. As political (non)-subjects, refugees call structural determinations of unfreedom into question. Refugees’ freedom is expressed in the act of flight and border crossing, irregular migratory movement, language games of resistance, and other emancipatory signifying practices by which they claim a place of refuge in the world. (shrink)

In this paper, we have tried to prove the lack of discretion by providing a logical and philosophical connection between the fundamental concept of a function in mathematics and one of Einstein's most exceptional relativity results, namely, the relativity of simultaneity. Then, by providing real examples of social experiences and philosophical interpretations of them, we propose another proof for lack of discretion.

It is widely accepted among political philosophers that distributive justice should be promoted by the state. This essay challenges this presumption by making two key claims. First, the state is not the only possible mechanism for attaining distributive justice. We could rely alternatively on the voluntary efforts and interactions of individuals and associations in civil society. The question of what mechanism we should rely on is a comparative and empirical one. What matters is which mechanism better promotes distributive justice. We (...) cannot settle the question a priori in favor of the state. Second, several considerations suggest a presumption in favor of relying on civil society. (shrink)

The nature of state governance in consolidated liberal democracies has important implications for the ideal theory debate. The states of these societies are polycentric. Decision-making power within them is disaggregated across multiple sites. This rules out one major justification for ideal theory. On this influential view, the ideal furnishes a blueprint of the morally perfect society that we should strive to realise. This justification is not viable in consolidated liberal democracies because their states lack an Archimedean point from which the (...) institutional structure as a whole can be designed to accord with the true ideal – whichever it might be. However, knowledge of the ideal can still aid agents in those societies to determine the worth of more modest political objectives other than the ideal itself. (shrink)

In the debate about Heidegger’s commitment to National Socialism is often referred to his membership in the „Committee for the Philosophy of Right“ of the „Academy for German Law“ that was founded by then „Reichsminister“ Hans Frank in 1934. Since the protocols of the Committee were destroyed and there is no relevant information in other writings, nothing can be said about the frequency and content of the meetings. It is only documented that the committee was dissolved in 1938. However, in (...) the past year the philosopher Sidonie Kellerer and the semiotician François Rastier referred to a document that, they say, proves that Heidegger was in the committee until 1941/42 and that the latter participated „in practice“ (Rastier) in the Holocaust. The said document was depicted for the first time in the above mentioned FAZ publication and will be analysed in the present essay. It is exluded in it that the document proves the continuity of the „Committee for the Philosophy of Right“ until 1941/42 or even the participation mentioned. It is rather possible to conclude in the frame of high probability that in the document were listed only the names and addresses of possible experts for the conversion of the Civil Code into a „Volksgesetzbuch“. The allegation of the committee’s participation in the Holocaust is rejected as being untenable. The publication of the article in the FAZ triggered the „Debate about Heidegger and Fake News“. In der Debatte um das Engagement des Philosophen Martin Heidegger für den Nationalsozialismus wird oft auf seine Mitgliedschaft in dem vom damaligen Reichsminister Hans Frank gegründeten „Ausschuss für Rechtsphilosophie“ innerhalb der „Akademie für Deutsches Recht“ verwiesen, der 1934 gegründet wurde. Da die Protokolle des Ausschusses zerstört wurden und auch in anderen Schriften keine diesbezüglichen Angaben zu finden sind, lässt sich nichts über die Häufigkeit und den Inhalt der Tagungen sagen. Es ist nur belegt, dass der Ausschuss 1938 offiziell aufgelöst wurde. Im vergangenen Jahr, im September 2017, referierten die Philosophin Sidonie Kellerer und der Linguist François Rastier jedoch auf ein Schriftstück, das belege, dass Heidegger bis 1941/42 in dem Ausschuss war und dieser auch „in der Praxis“ (Rastier) am Holocaust teilgenommen habe. Das Schriftstück wurde in der obigen Publikation der FAZ erstmals abgebildet und wird hier im Detail analysiert. Dabei kann begründetermaßen ausgeschlossen werden, dass das besagte Dokument den Fortbestand des „Ausschusses für Rechtsphilosophie“ oder die genannte Teilhabe belege. Nach hinreichender Analyse muss vielmehr in dem Rahmen hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit geschlossen werden, dass dort nur Namen und Adressen von potentiellen Gutachtern für die Umwandlung des BGB in ein „Volksgesetzbuch“ aufgelistet wurden. Der Vorhalt einer Teilhabe des Ausschusses am Holocaust wird als ganz unhaltbar zurückgewiesen. Die Publikation des Artikels in der FAZ löste die „Debatte über Heidegger und Fake News“ aus. (shrink)

A review of Failure by Arjun Appadurai and Neta Alexander.

The lectures on Heidegger‘s Being and Time held at a congress in Siegen (by Charles Bambach, Dieter Thomä, Johannes Fritsche, Rainer Marten et al.) and published in a book in the spring of 2019, are subject to a revision here. In particular, the works of the group around Emmanuel Faye are considered sect-like sessions of the intention to interpret Being and Time by the later Nazi identity of its author. Due to the dominance of these interpretations, the conference is criticized (...) under this aspect as „Congress of Braunfärber“ (i.e. those who dye it brown). Die auf einem Kongress in Siegen gehaltenen Vorträge zu Heideggers Sein und Zeit (von Charles Bambach, Dieter Thomä, Johannes Fritsche, Rainer Marten u.a.), im Frühling 2019 in Buchform publiziert, werden hier einer Revision unterzogen. Insbesondere die Arbeiten der Gruppe um Emmanuel Faye werden dabei als sektenhafte Sessionen des Unternehmen bewertet, „Sein und Zeit von der späteren nazistischen Mission seines Verfassers her zu lesen“. Aufgrund der Dominanz dieser Deutung wird die Tagung in Siegen wird unter diesem Gesichtspunkt als “Kongress der Braunfärber“ kritisiert. (shrink)

In mainstream political discourse, refugeehood is increasingly being associated with victimhood, powerlessness, abnormality, and political crises. On the one hand, refugees are, often, viewed as voiceless victims who should be offered protection and assistance on humanitarian grounds under exceptional circumstances. On the other hand, they are, increasingly, being portrayed as enemy-like strangers who pose a threat to the borders, stability of receiving states, and the well-being of their citizens. This prevailing framework fundamentally disregards refugees’ political subjectivity and ignores emancipatory phenomena (...) and practices of freedom, which are embedded and expressed in refugees’ migratory movements. This philosophical investigation aims to contribute to our understanding of the dynamic relationship of freedom and unfreedom from the perspective of refugees. To examine this dynamic relationship, this study situates itself in the autonomy of migration approach and draws on narratives and lived experiences of refugees, which were collected during in-depth interviews with refugees (Greece). These experiential accounts have been analysed and theoretically discussed in accordance with the guidelines of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). Through an interpretative process, this study critically contextualizes refugees’ perceptions and understandings of freedom in ongoing theoretical discussions concerning refugeehood and freedom. Based on these critical discussions, this study develops a theoretical examination of the dynamics of freedom and unfreedom in different spatio-temporal phases of refugeehood. In doing so, it explores the multifaceted act of flight, lived experiences of (un)freedom, socio-political structures of abandonment, and autonomous relations and arrangements by which refugees enact freedom in receiving states. Moreover, it challenges the prevalent conceptual distinctions between citizens versus non-citizens, hosts (nationals) versus guests (migrants), genuine refugees versus economic migrants, and the included (right-holders) versus the excluded (the rightless). (shrink)