Franz C. Brentano, 'La psicología de Aristóteles, con especial atención a la doctrina del entendimiento agente. Seguida de un apéndice sobre la actividad del Dios aristotélico'. Traducción y presentación de David Torrijos Castrillejo. Madrid, Ediciones Universidad San Dámaso, 2015, ISBN: 978-84-15027-81-2, xix + 344 pp. Título original: 'Die Psychologie des Aristoteles insbesondere seine Lehre vom ΝΟΥΣ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ. Nebst einer Beilage über das Wirken des Aristotelischen Gottes'. Mainz: Franz Kirchheim, 1867.

This paper looks at the causal activity of the unmoved mover of Aristotle. The author affirms both the efficient causality of God and his teleological role. According to Aristotle, the main explanation, by describing God, is ‘thinking on thinking’. That means his most important factor to act cannot only ‘be aimed’ but must also ‘be thought’. The final causality is based on the higher energeia what owns the efficient cause, since the energeia itself is regarded by Aristotle as good. God (...) as unmoved mover not moves as a form such the idea of the Good, but as individual and active substance. The goal of the divine activity is God himself, while the other immaterial substances move the spheres as instruments for the change in the world. Insofar those substances are intelligent agents, they are ends for themselves and for their effects. Many new texts to defend such as an efficient causal interpretation are quoted. (shrink)

This paper looks at the causal activity of the unmoved mover of Aristotle. The author affirms both the efficient causality of God and his teleological role. He thinks that the principal character, by describing God, is ‘thinking on thinking’. That means his most important factor to act cannot only ‘be aimed’ but must also ‘be thought’. There are many new texts to defend such as an efficient causal interpretation and also various philosophical arguments to support final causality.

In the last few years, a new paradigm of the knowledge of the divinity in Aristotle has emerged, affording the possibility of understanding him as efficient cause. In that case, if God is efficient cause and gives rise to teleology, this must have some existential significance for man. We can ask ourselves therefore whether the knowledge of metaphysics can offer some orientation also for ethics. Yet if this were true, the need would arise to deepen the question of how much (...) the gods love men and what would the nature of their relationship be to natural justice. Given that man is born and lives thanks to the divinity, the conclusion is that two consequences follow: a response of religious thanksgiving is needed but also, that since the will of the divinity desires the good for man, the human search for happiness is the same as the fulfillment of the divine law. All this is explained, to a certain extent, in the context of the friendship between man and the divine. (shrink)

Este artículo se ocupa de mostrar la recepción y transformación de la teoría aristotélica del azar y la causalidad accidental en una de las obras fundamentales del aristotelismo antiguo: el De Fato de Alejandro de Afrodisia. Ross sugiere la continuidad entre Aristóteles y Alejandro en algunos de los planteamientos más importantes de su propuesta. Ross señala algunas de las diferencias más significativas entre los dos filósofos en el contexto de una discusión más general acerca de la relación entre el mundo (...) físico y las entidades metafísicas. De acuerdo con Ross, Alejandro introdujo algunas nociones a la filosofía aristotélica, tal como “destino” y “providencia”, que son completamente ajenas al planteamiento original de Aristóteles y se separan de la letra del Maestro en más de una ocasión, aunque le atribuya su propia doctrina. Por último, Ross procura mostrar que hay una tensión entre la lectura tradicional de Metafísca XII –inspirada precisamente en Alejandro— y algunas tesis del De Fato. La idea de que el Primer Motor se presenta como algo deseable e inteligible al primer cielo, el cual se mueve de manera circular para imitar la actividad de aquello que se le presenta como deseable y cuya única actividad es pensarse a sí mismo, se inspira, sugiere Ross, precisamente en Alejandro. (shrink)

Aristotle’s divine nous of Metaphysics Λ.9 is generally understood to exclusively characterise the Prime Mover-God. This paper challenges this view by (1) drawing out the strong congruity between our ‘best state’ and that of the Prime Mover in Λ.7 and (2) removing certain key obstacles to a more inclusive reading of Λ.9: our thought is not limited to the ‘human’ kind (ho anthrōpinos nous, 1075a7), nor is our self-knowledge always a ‘by-product’ (en parergōi, 1074b36). Noēsis noēseōs, I contend, equally applies (...) to some forms of our thought. Hence, divine thought is accessible—indeed, even commendable—to us, just as the ‘divine life’ of Nicomachean Ethics X.7 is. (shrink)

Este artículo se ocupa de mostrar la recepción y transformación de la teoría aristotélica del azar y la causalidad accidental en una de las obras fundamentales del aristotelismo antiguo: el De Fato de Alejandro de Afrodisia. Ross sugiere la continuidad entre Aristóteles y Alejandro en algunos de los planteamientos más importantes de su propuesta. Ross señala algunas de las diferencias más significativas entre los dos filósofos en el contexto de una discusión más general acerca de la relación entre el mundo (...) físico y las entidades metafísicas. De acuerdo con Ross, Alejandro introdujo algunas nociones a la filosofía aristotélica, tal como “destino” y “providencia”, que son completamente ajenas al planteamiento original de Aristóteles y se separan de la letra del Maestro en más de una ocasión, aunque le atribuya su propia doctrina. Por último, Ross procura mostrar que hay una tensión entre la lectura tradicional de Metafísca XII –inspirada precisamente en Alejandro— y algunas tesis del De Fato. La idea de que el Primer Motor se presenta como algo deseable e inteligible al primer cielo, el cual se mueve de manera circular para imitar la actividad de aquello que se le presenta como deseable y cuya única actividad es pensarse a sí mismo, se inspira, sugiere Ross, precisamente en Alejandro. (shrink)

Whether Aristotle wrote the treatises of Metaphysics with different conceptions of the science of Being in mind has long puzzled scholars. The particular question that causes them unease is whether Aristotle’s enterprise in establishing the science of Being through the several treatises of Metaphysics is marked by a general science of Being, studying all departments of Being whatsoever, or whether his investigation of this science reflects an attitude towards a special metaphysics seeking knowledge of a special department of Being, in (...) this case, God, and therefore should be regarded as a science that is eminently theological. In this thesis, I aim to show that Aristotle’s enterprise in Metaphysics does not necessarily hinder reconciliation between the universal and the theological dimensions of the science of Being and that although Aristotle's conception of the science of Being is eminently theological it does not conflict with its also being universal. Furthermore, I aim to show that had the conception of the science of Being in Aristotle’s mind not been theological, it would not be universal either. (shrink)

Ch.9 of Metaph. 12 gives no support to the common view (against which I have argued elsewhere) that in ch.7 Aristotle identifies his Prime Mover not only as a god but also as an intellect. Rather, ch.9 approaches the divinity of intellect as a common belief (ἔνδοξον) from the Greek philosophical and poetic tradition (as at ch.7, 1072b23) that now requires dialectical testing. Here Aristotle initially establishes that there is a most active intellect (proposed ch.7, 1072b18–19: demonstrated ch.9, 1074b17–21, b28–9), (...) and that it contemplates what is best (proposed loc. cit.: demonstrated ch.9, 1074b21–7). Thus ch.9 proceeds by deducing, as a new result, characteristics implying that this intellect is itself the Prime Mover, since its object, qua best, must be the god of ch.7, and divine intellect is essentially identical (1074b33–1074a5), and an indivisible unity (a5–10), with that object. (shrink)