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Colour constancy: developing empirical tests of computational models

In Rainer Mausfeld & Dieter Heyer (eds.), Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World. Oxford University Press (2003)

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  1. Colour constancy as counterfactual.Jonathan Cohen - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):61 – 92.
    There is nothing in this World constant but Inconstancy. [Swift 1711: 258] In this paper I argue that two standard characterizations of colour constancy are inadequate to the phenomenon. This inadequacy matters, since, I contend, philosophical appeals to colour constancy as a way of motivating illumination-independent conceptions of colour turn crucially on the shortcomings of these characterizations. After critically reviewing the standard characterizations, I provide a novel counterfactualist understanding of colour constancy, argue that it avoids difficulties of its traditional rivals, (...)
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  • (1 other version)Perceptual Constancy.Jonathan Cohen - 2015 - In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 621-639.
    Students of perception have long known that perceptual constancy is an important aspect of our perceptual interaction with the world. Here is a simple example of the phenomenon concerning color perception: there is some ordinary sense in which an unpainted ceramic coffee cup made from a uniform material looks a uniform color when it is viewed under uneven illumination, even though the light reflected by the shaded regions to our eyes is quite different from the light reflected by the unshaded (...)
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  • Perceptual content is indexed to attention.Adrienne Prettyman - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):4039-4054.
    Attention seems to raise a problem for pure representationalism, the view that phenomenal content supervenes on representational content. The problem is that shifts of attention sometimes seem to bring about a change in phenomenal content without a change in representational content. I argue that the representationalist can meet this challenge, but that doing so requires a new view of the representational content of perception. On this new view, the representational content of perception is always relative to a way of attending. (...)
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  • On the nature of simultaneous colour contrast.Vebjørn Ekroll - 2005 - Dissertation, Christian-Albrechts-Universität Zu Kiel
    The subject of the present thesis is the phenomenon of simultaneous colour contrast: As is well known, the perceived colour of a given light stimulus depends almost as strongly on the stimulation of neighbouring regions of the visual field as on the local stimulus itself. Thus, the perceived colour of a target stimulus can be manipulated either by changing the colour co-ordinates of the target itself, or, alternatively, by changing the colour co-ordinates of the surround. Classical models of simultaneous contrast (...)
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  • Perception, Color, and Realism.Wayne Wright - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (1):19 - 40.
    One reason philosophers have addressed the metaphysics of color is its apparent relevance to the sciences concerned with color phenomena. In the light of such thinking, this paper examines a pairing of views that has received much attention: color physicalism and externalism about the content of perceptual experience. It is argued that the latter is a dubious conception of the workings of our perceptual systems. Together with flawed appeals to the empirical literature, it has led some philosophers to grant color (...)
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