Negotiation Support Systems have traditionally modelled the process of negotiation. They often rely on mathematical optimisation techniques and ignore heuristics and other methods derived from practice. Our goal is to develop systems capable of decision support to help resolve a given dispute. A system we have constructed, Family_Winner, uses empirical evidence to dynamically modify initial preferences throughout the negotiation process. It sequentially allocates issues using trade-offs and compensation opportunities inherent in the dispute.

We modify the payment rule of the standard divide the dollar (DD) game by introducing a second stage and thereby resolve the multiplicity problem and implement equal division of the dollar in equilibrium. In the standard DD game, if the sum of players’ demands is less than or equal to a dollar, each player receives what he demanded; if the sum of demands is greater than a dollar, all players receive zero. We modify this second part, which involves a harsh (...) punishment. In the modified game $(D\!D^{\prime })$ , if the demands are incompatible, then players have one more chance. In particular, they play an ultimatum game to avoid the excess. In the two-player version of this game, there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which players demand (and receive) an equal share of the dollar. We also provide an $n$ -player extension of our mechanism. Finally, the mechanism we propose eliminates not only all pure strategy equilibria involving unequal divisions of the dollar, but also all equilibria where players mix over different demands in the first stage. (shrink)

We report the results of a questionnaire study on the fair distribution of indivisible goods. We collected data from three different subject pools, first- and second- year students majoring in economics, law students, and advanced economics students with some background knowledge of fairness theories. The purpose of this study is to assess the empirical relevance of various fairness criteria such as inequality aversion, the utilitarian principle of maximizing the sum of individual payoffs, the Rawlsian “maximin” principle of maximizing the payoff (...) of the worst-off individual, and the criterion of envy-freeness (in the sense of Foley 1967). (shrink)

This article is a plea for a realist view of deliberative bodies against a nominalist view. They cannot be reduced to the changing collection of the individuals who compose it. The deliberative bodies are real collective entities insofar as we are able to precise their criteria of identity. These are the differentiation between an interior and an exterior linked by functions or ends; thus these collective entities are adaptive systems. There are three kinds of such adaptive systems: technical systems, organisms (...) and human organizations. The specificity of human organizations is related to the nature of the relations between parties, which are normative, and to the way their ends are determined. Deliberative bodies are organizations of which the specific characteristics have been listed. The mode of being of these collective entities is adverbial. This means that the existence of a deliberative body is subordinated to the nature of the activity of its members and to the manner they are oriented toward its instituted ends. (shrink)