Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Subjective Moral Biases & Fallacies: Developing Scientifically & Practically Adequate Moral Analogues of Cognitive Heuristics & Biases.Mark H. Herman - 2019 - Dissertation, Bowling Green State University
    In this dissertation, I construct scientifically and practically adequate moral analogs of cognitive heuristics and biases. Cognitive heuristics are reasoning “shortcuts” that are efficient but flawed. Such flaws yield systematic judgment errors—i.e., cognitive biases. For example, the availability heuristic infers an event’s probability by seeing how easy it is to recall similar events. Since dramatic events, such as airplane crashes, are disproportionately easy to recall, this heuristic explains systematic overestimations of their probability (availability bias). The research program on cognitive heuristics (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception.Adrian M. S. Piper - 2013 - APRA Foundation Berlin.
    The Humean conception of the self consists in the belief-desire model of motivation and the utility-maximizing model of rationality. This conception has dominated Western thought in philosophy and the social sciences ever since Hobbes’ initial formulation in Leviathan and Hume’s elaboration in the Treatise of Human Nature. Bentham, Freud, Ramsey, Skinner, Allais, von Neumann and Morgenstern and others have added further refinements that have brought it to a high degree of formal sophistication. Late twentieth century moral philosophers such as Rawls, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Rationality of Grief.Carolyn Price - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):20-40.
    Donald Gustafson has argued that grief centres on a combination of belief and desire:The belief that the subject has suffered an irreparable loss.The desire that this should not be the case.And yet, as Gustafson points out, if the belief is true, the desire cannot be satisfied. Gustafson takes this to show that grief inevitably implies an irrational conflict between belief and desire.I offer a partial defence of grief against Gustafson's charge of irrationality. My defence rests on two elements. First, I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Deformed desires and informed desire tests.Anita Superson - 2000 - Hypatia 20 (4):109-126.
    : The formal theory of rational choice as grounded in desire-satisfaction cannot account for the problem of such deformed desires as women's slavish desires. Traditional "informed desire" tests impose conditions of rationality, such as full information and absence of psychoses, but do not exclude deformed desires. I offer a Kantian-inspired addendum to these tests, according to which the very features of deformed desires render them irrational to adopt for an agent who appreciates her equal worth.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • III the Importance of Being Identical.John Perry - 1976 - In Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 67-90.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • (1 other version)Identities of Persons.Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.) - 1976 - University of California Press.
    In this volume, thirteen philosophers contribute new essays analyzing the criteria for personal identity and their import on ethics and the theory of action: it presents contemporary treatments of the issues discussed in Personal Identity, edited by John Perry (University of California Press, 1975).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Do desires provide reasons? An argument against the cognitivist strategy.Avery Archer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2011-2027.
    According to the cognitivist strategy, the desire to bring about P provides reasons for intending to bring about P in a way analogous to how perceiving that P provides reasons for believing that P. However, while perceiving P provides reasons for believing P by representing P as true, desiring to bring about P provides reasons for intending to bring about P by representing P as good. This paper offers an argument against this view. My argument proceeds via an appeal to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Rational Significance of Desire.Avery Archer - 2013 - Dissertation, Columbia University
    My dissertation addresses the question "do desires provide reasons?" I present two independent lines of argument in support of the conclusion that they do not. The first line of argument emerges from the way I circumscribe the concept of a desire. Complications aside, I conceive of a desire as a member of a family of attitudes that have imperative content, understood as content that displays doability-conditions rather than truth-conditions. Moreover, I hold that an attitude may provide reasons only if it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Justificatory Reasons for Action.Georg Spielthenner - 2012 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (2):56-72.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Rawls, Brandt, and the Definition of Rational Desires.Robert K. Shope - 1978 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):329 - 340.
    Philosophers, psychiatrists, and social scientists would welcome clarification of the distinction between rational and irrational desires. It may be proper to say that rational desires are those which manifest rationality. But since this seems a rather unilluminating characterization, philosophers sometimes offer definitions of what constitute such manifestations of rationality. I shall consider definitions provided by John Rawls and Richard Brandt. Their definitions are unsatisfactory mainly because they include subjunctive conditionals. An alternative approach, which avoids conditionals, is attractive. But it encounters (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Principles of rationality.Kai Nielsen - 1974 - Philosophical Papers 3 (2):55-89.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Deformed Desires and Informed Desire Tests.Anita Superson - 2000 - Hypatia 20 (4):109-126.
    The formal theory of rational choice as grounded in desire-satisfaction cannot account for the problem of such deformed desires as women's slavish desires. Traditional “informed desire” tests impose conditions of rationality, such as full information and absence of psychoses, but do not exclude deformed desires. I offer a Kantian-inspired addendum to these tests, according to which the very features of deformed desires render them irrational to adopt for an agent who appreciates her equal worth.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • A condition of rationality.Kai Nielsen - 1976 - Philosophia 6 (1):21-27.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Wants and intentions in the explanation of action.Robert Audi - 1979 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 9 (3):227–249.
    This paper replies to criticisms of the author's accounts of intending ("journal of philosophy", 1973), wanting ("philosophical studies", 1973), and common-sense explanations of intentional actions; and it extends the nomological theory of intentional action developed in those and other articles. the paper argues, negatively, that theoretical construct accounts of intentional concepts do not entail implausible views of self-knowledge, nor assimilate reasons to mechanical causes; and, positively, that both the way in which reasons render intelligible the actions they explain and the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations