Many people are persuaded of the existence of psychic phenomena by their own spontaneous experiences of apparent psi. However, without some measure of how often psi-suggestive experiences can be expected to occur purely by chance, it is difficult to determine the epistemic import of these cases. While methods have been developed to find statistical baselines for some spontaneous cases—specifically, ones in which cases of interest can be identified before any verification of their supposedly psychic content has been obtained—many spontaneous cases (...) of purported psi are not identified as such until after some degree of spontaneous verification occurs: for instance, when a person notices a striking correspondence between their mental state and another event to which that state appears to have no physical causal connection. This paper develops a method applicable to these cases—the time-slice method for calculating baseline correspondence potential—and thus enables individuals to determine the epistemic import of their own spontaneous psi experiences. (shrink)

Dr. Ian Stevenson, the pioneer of the study of reincarnation phenomena, conjectures that the reason why a person is born in a particular family might be accounted for in terms of psychic connections: Shared experiences leave mental traces within us and produce psychic connections between the persons concerned and the longer an association between two persons lasts, and the greater its intensity, the stronger the connections between them become; such psychic connections act as an agent to attract a deceased person (...) to be reborn to a particular person. This conjecture suggests that the most natural pattern of cases of the reincarnation type (CORT) is the one occurring within the same family since family members tend to develop such psychic connections most easily (Stevenson, 2001: 236-244). As Yanagida, who is known as the father of Japanese native folkloristics, reported skipped-generation reincarnation (grandparent to be reborn as grandchildren) might have been considered “normal” in some areas in prewar Japan (Yanagita, 2013). In Ohkado (2016a) I reported one same-family CORT occurring in contemporary Japan, suggesting that the phenomena are by no means obsolete. In the present article I would like to report another five same-family cases. (shrink)

According to the survivalist interpretation of mediumship, the existence of discarnate persons provides the best explanation for the data associated with physical and mental mediumship. Others—advocates of what is often called the “super-psi hypothesis”—maintain that the data of mediumship may be at least equally explained in terms of living agent psi (ESP and psychokinesis). Many defenders of the survivalist interpretation of mediumship attempt to defl ate the alleged explanatory virtues of the super-psi hypothesis by arguing that the hypothesis is unfalsifi (...) able and lacks independent evidential support. My central contention in this paper is that these frequently encountered survivalist criticisms of the super-psi hypothesis are ultimately self-defeating to the case for survival from mediumship. To show this I first argue in some detail that the survivalist interpretation of mediumship is committed to a kind or degree of psi that is indistinguishable from what is required by the super-psi hypothesis. From this vantage point it can be shown that any attempt to impugn the explanatory virtues of the super-psi hypothesis on account of the kind or degree of psi it requires undercuts the argument for survival itself. (shrink)

Abstract An attempt is made to examine the main principles that underlay the ?Rhinean? school of parapsychology. Five such principles are discussed: (1) that psi can best be assessed using quantitative measures and forced?choice tests; (2) that psi is a function of the unconscious with the implication that objective performance alone is important, not the state of mind of the subject; (3) that psi ability is, to some degree, present in everyone; (4) that only those problems deserve attention for which (...) an unambiguous answer is attainable, with the implication that survival research should be shelved indefinitely and (5) that psi is non?physical. These five principles are then reviewed from our present vantage point and all are found to require qualification to a greater or lesser extent. Some critics, however, want to go further and allege that Rhine led psychical research into a blind alley and that the time has come to revert to the earlier investigative tradition. This, we contend, is defeatist, the more especially since the advent of computers has greatly extended the scope and power of the experimental approach. Despite its inherent difficulties, it remains the indispensable mainstay of our continuing efforts to make sense of the paranormal. (shrink)

The conservation of energy and momentum have been viewed as undermining Cartesian mental causation since the 1690s. Modern discussions of the topic tend to use mid-nineteenth century physics, neglecting both locality and Noether’s theorem and its converse. The relevance of General Relativity has rarely been considered. But a few authors have proposed that the non-localizability of gravitational energy and consequent lack of physically meaningful local conservation laws answers the conservation objection to mental causation: conservation already fails in GR, so there (...) is nothing for minds to violate. This paper is motivated by two ideas. First, one might take seriously the fact that GR formally has an infinity of rigid symmetries of the action and hence, by Noether’s first theorem, an infinity of conserved energies-momenta. Second, Sean Carroll has asked how one should modify the Dirac–Maxwell–Einstein equations to describe mental causation. This paper uses the generalized Bianchi identities to show that General Relativity tends to exclude, not facilitate, such Cartesian mental causation. In the simplest case, Cartesian mental influence must be spatio-temporally constant, and hence 0. The difficulty may diminish for more complicated models. Its persuasiveness is also affected by larger world-view considerations. The new general relativistic objection provides some support for realism about gravitational energy-momentum in GR. Such realism also might help to answer an objection to theories of causation involving conserved quantities, because energies-momenta would be conserved even in GR. (shrink)

Psychical researchers have long recognized the difficulties posed for interpretation of ostensible evidence of postmortem survival by paranormal interactions and other psychological processes involving only living persons. Myers (1903, Vol. 1:8–9), for example, says It became gradually plain to me that before we could safely mark off any group of manifestations as definitely implying an influence from beyond the grave, there was need of a more searching review of the capacities of man’s incarnate personality than psychologists... had thought it worth (...) their while to undertake. Myers himself of course became convinced that he had obtained compelling evidence of survival, but others in his own circle, familiar with most if not quite all of the same evidence, remained unpersuaded. That early episode pretty much set the pattern for the subsequent history of the subject: Despite the advent of more and better evidence of types Myers and his colleagues already knew about, and additional kinds of evidence not as well-known or even unknown to them such as drop-in mediumistic communicators and cases of the reincarnation type (CORT), serious and open-minded students of the survival literature have remained deeply divided right to the present day as to whether the available evidence justifies rational belief in the possibility of survival, and if so to what degree. (shrink)

In his review of my book on the mediumship of Franek Kluski (Weaver 2015) in this Journal (Morck 2015), Nemo Mörck raises a number of issues which I would like to clarify. When faced with incredible reports, the natural reaction is to assume that they must be false. I can understand this position, having shared it for a long while, but it is not always tenable. I would probably not have written about Kluski if I had not come across Filippo (...) Bottazzi’s account of his laboratory research on Eusapia Palladino (Bottazzi 1909/2011). This sent me in search of other accounts of laboratory research into physical mediumship, and they made me realise that my natural reaction was wrong. Phenomena such as those produced by Kluski sound incredible, but well-documented reports show that they are not unique, even though limited to a small number of mediums. This does not mean accepting such reports without question. I have looked for inconsistencies, for ways of producing the phenomena fraudulently (including hidden entrances at the location of the sittings), for confirmation of claims, and for information about the backgrounds of the sitters. Naturally, I have also learned as much as I could about fraudulent tricks. This led me to believe that comparing the Kluski sittings to those given by fraudulent mediums, as suggested by Mörck (Mörck:510), would be a pointless exercise. A great deal of what happens in a séance room can be faked in a variety of ways, but the two aspects which make the difference between what is explicable in principle, and what is just inexplicable, are the scale of the phenomena, and the conditions under which they arise. Hereward Carrington decided that the fraudulent methods which he described in great detail in his book (Carrington 1907) could not explain the phenomena of D.D. Home, and ended up with collective hallucinations or collaboration by accomplices as the only other explanations. He found neither of them viable in view of the nature of the phenomena and the variety of sitters and locations. I have found myself in exactly the same situation with regard to Kluski. (shrink)

In Persons, Souls and Death, David Lund (2009) presents a cumulative case argument for postmortem survival based on the ostensible explanatory power of survival in relation to data drawn from psychical research. In this paper I argue that the survival hypothesis does not satisfy at least two necessary explanatory criteria accepted and deployed by Lund. First, the data that the survival hypothesis ostensibly explains are not otherwise improbable, as much if not all of the data may be adequately accounted for (...) in terms of psychic functioning among living agents—the LAP hypothesis. Here I argue in considerable detail that Lund’s criticisms of the LAP hypothesis, like those leveled by many other survivalists, are significantly defective. Second, the survival hypothesis does not lead us to expect the data Lund outlines, so it fails with respect to predictive power. Since the “best explanation” is one that leads us to expect what is otherwise improbable, the survival hypothesis i. (shrink)

A review was conducted of Crookes' lever experiments on the psychic force proposed by Daniel D. Home. The levers were 36"-long boards with a fulcrum at 1.5" and 4.5" from the left end in the first and second experiments, respectively, and had a spring-balance suspension at the right end. In the first experiment, Crookes did not provide sufficient evidence to conclude that the experimental results could not be explained using Newtonian mechanics. In the second experiment, direct contact between Home's hand (...) and the lever was prevented by a water vessel that had been set exactly over the fulcrum. If the gravity center of the vessel is assumed to have been off-center by even 5 mm to the right of the fulcrum, a force greater than 114 lbf would have been required to be exerted on the lever when Home's fingertips were dipped in the water to produce the observed increase in spring force (0.71 lbf); this is physically impossible. The analyses show that neither changes in the buoyant force on the dipped fingers nor water sloshing or external tremors can explain the experimental results. Additionally, some well-known paranormal phenomena are listed for a possible future extension of this study. (shrink)

Since Leibniz's time, Cartesian mental causation has been criticized for violating the conservation of energy and momentum. Many dualist responses clearly fail. But conservation laws have important neglected features generally undermining the objection. Conservation is _local_, holding first not for the universe, but for everywhere separately. The energy in any volume changes only due to what flows through the boundaries. Constant total energy holds if the global summing-up of local conservation laws converges; it probably doesn't in reality. Energy conservation holds (...) if there is symmetry, the sameness of the laws over time. Thus, if there are time-places where symmetries fail due to nonphysical influence, conservation laws fail there and then, while holding elsewhere, such as refrigerators and stars. Noether's converse first theorem shows that conservation laws imply symmetries. Thus conservation trivially nearly entails the causal closure of the physical. But expecting conservation to hold in the brain simply assumes the falsehood of Cartesianism. Hence Leibniz's objection begs the question. Empirical neuroscience is another matter. So is Einstein's General Relativity: far from providing a loophole, General Relativity makes mental causation _harder_. (shrink)

Over the past hundred years, a number of scientific investigators claim to have adduced experimental evidence for phenomena information” seems to behave like a weak signal that has to compete for the information-processing resources of the organism, a reduction of ongoing sensorimotor activity may facilitate ESP detection. Such a meaningful convergence of results suggests that psi phenomena may represent a unitary, coherent process whose nature and compatibility with current physical theory have yet to be determined. The theoretical implications and potential (...) practical applications of psi could be significant, irrespective of the small magnitude of psi effects in laboratory settings. (shrink)

It is generally supposed by psychical researchers that evidence suggestive of consciousness surviving bodily death would always be compatible with the so-called 'super-psi hypothesis', according to which living-agent psi is wholly responsible for the evidence. In this paper, I argue that, granted how super-psi is supposed to work, a case can be made for certain near-death experience cases to be incompatible with the super-psi hypothesis. From such a base, the explanatory impasse between the super-psi hypothesis and the survival hypothesis can (...) be broken. Keywords: near-death experiences, NDEs, super-psi, mind-body dualism, survival, consciousness. (shrink)

Composer and musicologist Nicolas Slonimsky published a fascinating and delightful book entitled Lexicon of Musical Invective: Critical Assaults on Composers Since Beethoven’s Time (Slonimsky 1965). The book is a collection of what Slonimsky called “biased, unfair, ill-tempered, and singularly unprophetic judgments” (p. 3) about famous composers and their works. We find, for example, the Gazette Musicale de Paris on August 1, 1847, saying of Verdi, “there has not yet been an Italian composer more incapable of producing what is commonly called (...) a melody.” And this publication stuck to its guns. On May 22, 1853, it said of Rigoletto that it “lacks melody. This opera has hardly any chance to be kept in the repertoire.” The May 1804 issue of Zeitung für die Elegente Welt proclaimed Beethoven’s Second Symphony is a crass monster, a hideously writhing wounded dragon, that refuses to expire, and though bleeding in the Finale, furiously beats about with its tail erect................ (shrink)

This paper examines the ways in which familiar views about the world and our place in it must change in the face of the reality of psi phenomena. It is argued that most commentators are confused on this topic. Contrary to the received opinion, the existence of psi should make almost no difference to our currently accepted body of scientific theories. Nor, as some argue, can it be of much help to a defense of dualism. But the existence of psi (...) has profound implications regarding the pervasiveness of intentions in the world, even in connection with everyday sorts of events. The view is defended that we have no grounds for imposing antecedent restrictions on the range, magnitude, or refinement of psi. Finally, the paper discusses how the evidence for precognition forces serious consideration of a world?view generally associated only with so?called ?primitive? cultures. (shrink)

Several of my recent Editorials have dealt with terminological/conceptual errors and confusions that have been all too prevalent among psi researchers. In this Editorial, I want to consider a related issue often raised about parapsychological concepts and explanation. Probably we’ve all heard the complaint that parapsychology’s core concepts have only been defined negatively, with respect to our present level of ignorance—for example, taking “telepathy” to be “the causal influence of one mind on another independently of the known senses.” Perhaps some (...) of you have even expressed that complaint yourselves. Of course, the assumption underlying those complaints is that this definitional strategy is a problem. However, it seems like a perfectly reasonable procedure to me, and I can easily accept the possibility that we might eventually learn enough about phenomena so defined that we can later construct better, detailed, and more informative analytical definitions. But at least as far as psi research is concerned, I consider it presumptuous—at our present (and considerable) level of ignorance—to proceed any other way. We hardly have the barest hint, based on all the available data, as to what psi is doing in the world (i.e., both inside and outside the lab). In fact, formal, experimental evidence has been particularly unilluminating. It has barely succeeded, if it’s succeeded at all, in convincing parapsychological fence-sitters that there are any genuine paranormal phenomena to study (I’ve explored some reasons for this in Braude, 1997). And it certainly hasn’t shed light on how pervasive, extensive, and refined psi effects might be, or whether effects of radically different magnitudes would be the result of substantially different processes. At best, typical quantitative research examines only straitjacketed expressions of phenomena that non-laboratory evidence suggests occur more impressively (if not flamboyantly) “in the wild.” So it strikes me as appropriately modest and circumspect to define “PK” (for example) as “the effect of an organism on a region r of the physical world without any known sort of physical interaction between the organism's body and r.” (For additional specific parapsychological definitions, see Braude, 2002). (shrink)

Science and the Afterlife Experience is the concluding volume of a trilogy that began with Parapsychology and the Skeptics (Carter 2007; reissued as Science and Psychic Phenomena, Carter 2012) and continued with Science and the Near-Death Experience (Carter 2010). These books provide handy introductions to parapsychology, psychical research, and allied concerns (such as the near-death experience) for a new generation of readers. They may best be described as quasi-scholarly, aimed primarily at a general (non-academic) audience, although they include notes, reference (...) lists, and indexes. Carter, who holds an M.A. from the University of Oxford, England, identifies himself as a philosopher and here and there addresses philosophical concerns, such as the implications of “paranormal” phenomena for concepts of personal identity. One of the hallmarks of the series is the attention given to materialistic skeptical positions, extended in the volume under review to include super-ESP. (shrink)

It is widely held among philosophers that the conservation of energy is true and important, and widely held among philosophers of science that conservation laws and symmetries are tied together by Noether's first theorem. However, beneath the surface of such consensus lie two slights to Noether's first theorem. First, there is a 325+-year controversy about mind-body interaction in relation to the conservation of energy and momentum, with occasional reversals of opinion. The currently popular Leibnizian view, dominant since the late 19th (...) century, claims to find an objection to broadly Cartesian views in their implication of energy non-conservation. Here energy conservation is viewed as an oracle, an unchallengeable black box. But Noether's first theorem and its converse show that conservation and symmetry of the laws stand or fall together. Absent some basis for expecting conservation in brains that has a claim on the Cartesian, the objection is circular. An empirically based argument is possible, but is a different argument with little force except insofar as it is rooted in neuroscience. Second, General Relativity has a 100+-year-long controversy about whether gravitational energy exists and is objectively localized. The usual view is that gravitational energy exists but is not objectively localized, though some deny its existence. Without positive answers to both questions, generally applicable conservation laws do not exist: energy is not conserved. This conclusion is startling in itself and a problem for conserved quantity theories of causation. Yet Noether's first theorem applies to General Relativity, which has uncountably many symmetries of its laws and so has conservation laws, indeed uncountably many of them. Many authors downplay these laws due to their quirky properties; some authors even attempt to explain the laws' supposed nonexistence in terms of an absence of symmetries of the geometry, which is a distraction. Thus Noether's first theorem is widely ignored, left uninterpreted, or distorted in relation to General Relativity. Taking the theorem seriously seems possible, however, restoring the conservation of energy, or rather, energies. How do these controversies relate? One sometimes finds claims that General Relativity's supposed lack of conservation laws answers Leibniz on behalf of Descartes. Taking seriously the superabundance of formal conservation laws in General Relativity, however, suggests that General Relativity resists mind-to-body causation. This conclusion can be proven apart from interpretive controversies. The resistance is, however, finite and tends to be swamped by larger world-view considerations. (shrink)

This issue of the Journal is my first as Editor-in-Chief. I’m pleased, but more than a little surprised, to find myself in this position. Only a few months ago, well into the process of veering erratically toward retirement, I imagined I’d spend the next several years doing little more than what senior philosophers often do: writing memoirs, musing about big and abstract ideas, flaunting my lack of practical wisdom by publishing incompetent but more accessible reflections on everyday concerns, or just (...) becoming tragically curmudgeonly. (shrink)