In this paper I present an interpretation of J. G. Fichte's transcendental argument for the necessity of mutual recognition in Foundations of Natural Right. Fichte's argument purports to show that, as a condition of the possibility of self-consciousness, we must take ourselves to stand in relations of mutual recognition with other agents like ourselves. After reconstructing the steps of Fichte's argument, I present what I call the ‘modal dilemma’, which highlights a serious ambiguity in Fichte's deduction. According to the modal (...) dilemma, the conclusion to Fichte's transcendental argument—that as a condition of the possibility of our self-consciousness, we must recognize and be recognized by others—expresses either metaphysical or normative necessity. However, no normative conclusion follows from Fichte's premises, and the metaphysical claim that does follow from his argument appears to be implausibly strong. Thus the argument looks like a failure on either interpretation of the conclusion's modality. In the penultimate section of the paper, I propose a new interpretation of the argument that avoids the modal dilemma and provides a normative grounding of Fichte's concept of right. (shrink)

Hegel’s philosophy of history is fundamentally concerned with how shapes of life collapse and transition into new shapes of life. One of the distinguishing features of Hegel’s concern with how a shape of life falls apart and becomes inadequate is the role that habit plays in the transition. A shape of life is an embodied form of existence for Hegel. The animating concepts of a shape of life are affectively inscribed on subjects through complex cultural processes. This paper examines the (...) argument Hegel puts forward in his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History for why civilizations come to atrophy and examines the decisive role habit plays in this process. The paper concludes with a discussion of the way in which the central role of second nature in historical transitions and norm formation conflicts with Brandom’s account of norm formation in Hegel’s thought. (shrink)

This is a contribution to the controversy which of individual or collective intentionality is more fundamental. I call it the fundamentality-question. In a first step, I argue that it is really two questions. One is about sense and one about reference. The first is: Can one grasp or understand the concept individual intentionality and, correspondingly, individuality, on the one hand, without grasping or understanding the concept collective intentionality and, correspondingly, collectivity, on the other? The second is: Can the concept individual (...) intentionality and corresponding concept of individuality, on the one hand, refer to something without the concept of collective intentionality and corresponding concept of collectivity referring to something, on the other? Simplifying somewhat, this elaborated fundamentality-question admits of nine answers. In a second step, I pursue a tentative answer to the elaborated fundamentality-question. Given a disambiguation of individuality and, correspondingly, individual intentionality, the answer is the combination of claims that individuality and individual intentionality in one sense is fundamental in reference-dependence but that collectivity and collective intentionality is fundamental in reference-dependence in the other sense of individuality, while collectivity and collective intentionality is in both cases fundamental in sense-dependence. (shrink)

In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel claims that crime is a negation of right and punishment is the “negation of the negation.” Punishment, for Hegel, “annuls” the criminal act. Many take it that Hegel endorses a form of retributivism—the theory that criminal offenders should be subject to harsh treatment in response and in proportion to their wrongdoing. Here I argue that restorative criminal justice is consistent with Hegel's remarks on punishment and his overall philosophical system. This is true, in part, (...) because restorative justice integrates Hegel's instructive discussion of confession and forgiveness in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel claims that true moral relationships allow space for persons to confess their moral shortcomings and forgive the shortcomings of others. Restorative criminal justice brings the perpetrators and victims of crime together to offer confessions and forgiveness and to work to heal the various wounds caused by crime. I do not claim that Hegel must be read as advocating restorative justice. While Hegel tells us what punishment does, he does not commit himself to any form of punishment. What I offer here is a rational, progressive reconstruction and extension of Hegel's conception of crime and punishment. (shrink)

Hume’s concept of sympathy is often discussed in isolation from the concept of comparison, which plays an important role in his social and moral philosophy. If both concepts are discussed at all in...

There is a conspicuous tendency of humans to experience empathy and sympathy preferentially towards members of their own group, whereas empathetic feelings towards outgroup members or strangers are often reduced or even missing. This may culminate in a “dissociation of empathy”: a historical example are the cases of Nazi perpetrators who behaved as compassionate family men on the one hand, yet committed crimes of utter cruelty against Jews on the other. The paper aims at explaining such phenomena and at determining (...) the limits of empathy. To this purpose, it first distinguishes between two levels of empathy, namely primary or intercorporeal and extended or higher-level empathy. It then investigates the mutual interconnection of empathy and recognition, which may be regarded as a principle of extending empathy to others regardless of whether they belong to one’s own group or not. However, this principle is in conflict with ingroup conformism and outgroup biases that hamper the universal extension of empathy. Thus, a denial of recognition and exclusion of others from one’s ingroup usually results in a withdrawal or lack of extended empathy which then influences primary empathy as well. On this basis, and using the historical example of mass executions during the Holocaust, the paper investigates the mechanisms of exclusion which may lead to a withdrawal of recognition and finally to a dissociation of empathy. (shrink)

This article discusses the PISA framework’s concept of reading. The main argument is that PISA’s cognitive approach to literacy only to a small extent captures the normative dimension of reading. Consequently, the test fails to reflect key aspects of literacy, such as identity, identity formation and the ability to participate in society on a deeper level. The argument is based on a normative or moral conception of meaning and reading comprehension, based on Hegel’s concept of recognition.

This paper investigates Hegel’s account of the animal organism as it is presented in the Philosophy of Nature, with a special focus on its normative implications. I argue that the notion of “organisation” is fundamental to Hegel’s theory of animal normativity. The paper starts by showing how a Hegelian approach takes up the scientific image of organism and assigns a basic explanatory role to the notion of “organisation” in its understanding living beings. Moving from this premise, the paper turns to (...) the group of accounts in contemporary theoretical biology known as “organisational accounts”, which offer a widely debated strategy for naturalizing teleology and normativity in organisms. As recent scholarship recognizes, these accounts explicitly rely on insights from Kant and Post-Kantianism. I make the historical and conceptual argument that Hegel’s view of the organism shares several basic commitments with OAs, especially regarding the notion of “organisational closure”. I assess the account of normativity that such accounts advance and its implications for how we approach Hegel. Finally, I argue that the notion of “organisation” is more fundamental to Hegel’s theory of animal normativity than the Aristotelian notion of “Gattung” or “species”, which by contrast appears derivative – at least in the Philosophy of Nature and the Lectures – and does not play the central role in his account maintained by some scholars. (shrink)

RESUMEN Este trabajo se propone analizar los aportes de Judith Butler a las actuales lecturas norteamericanas sobre la introducción del deseo en la Fenomenología del espíritu de Hegel. Para ello, en primer lugar, situamos la aparición del deseo en la obra mencionada; en segundo lugar reconstruimos los principales lineamientos de las interpretaciones estadounidenses en boga; en tercer lugar nos ocupamos del análisis que Butler realiza sobre esta cuestión en Sujetos del deseo. Reflexiones hegelianas en la Francia del siglo XX. Por (...) último, en la conclusión, sistematizamos las contribuciones de Butler, destacando fundamentalmente tres: la significación particular que le otorga al deseo en su momento de emergencia; el modo de abordaje de esta problemática que se detiene en el estudio del tercer capítulo de la Fenomenología del espíritu; y la perspectiva retórica desde la que explica el deseo. ABSTRACT This paper aims to analyze Judith Butler's contributions to the recent interpretations of the introduction of desire in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, proposed by American scholars. In order to achieve this goal, we situate the appearance of desire in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Then, we reconstruct the main recent American readings. Finally, we examine Butler's interpretation. In the conclusion of this paper, we systematize the most important features of Butler's reading: the meaning of desire in the context of its moment of emergency; the way in which Butler studies this issue, which consist in a thorough reading of chapter III ofHegel's Phenomenology of Spirit; and Butler's rhetorical perspective of desire. (shrink)

This paper explores the implications of the recent revival of Hegel studies for the philosophy of economics. We argue that Hegel’s theory of Objective Spirit anticipates many elements of modern approaches in cognitive sciences and of the philosophy of mind, which adopt an externalist framework. In particular, Hegel pre-empts the theories of social and distributed cognition. The pivotal elements of Hegelian social ontology are the continuity thesis, the performativity thesis, and the recognition thesis, which, when taken together, imply that all (...) mental processes are essentially dependent on externalizations, with the underlying pattern of actions being performative. In turn, performative action is impossible without mutual recognition in an intersubjective domain. We demonstrate the implications for economic theory in sketching an externalist approach to institutions and preferences. (shrink)

Hegel’s Philosophy of Right can be analyzed whether independently from the Science of Logic or on the basis of the metaphysical premises developed in the latter work. In the present paper we enumerate different positions about this question, and we classify a number of attempts which were recently carried out in order to actualize the PhR. the differentiation of five levels of analysis of the articulation of the ethical and the logical in the PhR allows us to conclude that both (...) the thesis on the dependence and the thesis of the independence can be compatible, since they refer to different levels of analysis. (shrink)

The concept of recognition has played a role in two debates. In political philosophy, it is part of a communitarian response to liberal theories of distributive justice. It describes what it means to respect others’ right to self-determination. In ethics, Stephen Darwall argues that it comprises our judgment that we owe others moral consideration. I present a competing account of recognition on the grounds that most accounts answer the question of why others deserve recognition without answering the question of what (...) is involved in recognizing them. This paper answers the latter. I argue that, in general, recognition is something that we do to others rather than something that we think about others. In particular, recognition is an intentional action to treat another individual as a legitimate, self-determining agent. I then show that recognition's realizability requires that agents understand their intentions as dependent on others for their satisfaction. Thus, relations of recognition are instances of collective intentionality. (shrink)

To assert the primacy of objective spirit is to claim that certain distinctively human capacities, such as thinking and acting, are not capacities we have as individuals considered singly but are in some way dependent on shared public norms or social institutions. In this essay, I provide a brief history of arguments for the primacy of objective spirit from Hegel to the present, identifying three distinct strategies for defending this thesis: the teleological argument, the sociological argument and the quasi-transcendental argument. (...) Although it has now become quite common to read Hegel as advancing a quasi-transcendental argument, one similar to the argument found in Wittgenstein’s famous remarks about ‘rule-following’, I show that Hegel’s most interesting claims about the social dimensions of human mindedness are incompatible with this strategy and can only be vindicated if he is read as offering a teleological argument. (shrink)

El presente artículo compara las consideraciones de Hegel y Husserl sobre la intersubjetividad en relación a la normatividad. Para esto, en una primera parte se discute la descripción de la conciencia del yo y el otro en cada uno de los autores; en la segunda, sus conceptos de libertad; y en la tercera, sus conceptos de normatividad, teleología e historia.

El presente trabajo estudia la concepción erótica de la subjetividad en la Fenomenología del espíritu de Hegel. Las tesis que intentamos mostrar son dos. La primera es que la concepción erótica de la subjetividad tiene un sentido muy restringido: es la referencia negativa y puramente inmediata a la cosa viva, la aniquilación del objeto natural que no alcanza la completa negación del ser-otro porque la dimensión erótica de la subjetividad requiere e implica la autonomía del objeto en cuestión. La segunda (...) tesis es que, en cuanto posicionamiento práctico y negativo de la autoconciencia respecto de su objeto, la concepción erótica de la subjetividad no se limita al Capítulo IV, aunque es en este último, y específicamente en su parte introductoria, donde se establecen los caracteres propios de dicha concepción. (shrink)

Authority figures permeate our daily lives, particularly, our political lives. What makes authority legitimate? The current debates about the legitimacy of authority are characterised by two opposing strategies. The first establish the legitimacy of authority on the basis of the content of the authority’s command. That is, if the content of the commands meet some independent normative standard then they are legitimate. However, there have been many recent criticisms of this strategy which focus on a particular shortcoming – namely, its (...) seeming inability to account for who can legitimately command whom. This is the basis of the second strategy, which attempts to characterize the normative relationship that underlies and makes possible authoritative commands. The central point of Part I is that these two strategies are, in fact, not opposed and both raise questions which a theory of legitimacy must answer. If this is the case, then we need to ask: how ought we to determine the legitimacy both of the content of commands as well as who can command whom? Part II will answer this question. Starting with the question of standing, I argue that we ought not to look for normative principles outside of the institutions in which authority is embedded. Rather, one ought to start by elaborating the ontology of institutions in which a sui generis form of normativity arises. A joint commitment account of social ontology provides the tools necessary to see how the direction obligations emerge concurrently with the formation of institutions. Similarly, the question of content can be answered by paying close attention to the social ontology of institutions. We need not look beyond the internal constitutive standards of the institution itself. The constitutive standards provide an internal criterion by which the legitimacy of commands can be established. (shrink)

This thesis defends a novel interpretation of the normative foundations of Hegel’s mature social and political philosophy. It argues that autonomous agency is grounded in a drive to comprehend ourselves, which gives us an aim to which we are inescapably committed as agents. It argues that this aim ultimately makes it rational to cultivate and act out of a feeling of “ethical love”, which is a positive evaluative attitude towards the goods of other individuals that, in turn, implies a commitment (...) to the social and political institutions Hegel outlines in his theory of Sittlichkeit, or ethical life. Ethical love is the ultimate way in which individuals make themselves comprehensible to themselves; ethical life is the way in which they express that love. It is for this reason that acting autonomously ultimately requires participating in such institutions. I suggest that this interpretation avoids some of the shortcomings of alternative approaches to this matter. Chapter 1 introduces the notion of autonomous agency as underpinned by a drive towards self-comprehension. In chapter 2, I argue that this drive operates both with respect to our individual identities and developmentally, over time, in that agents characterised by this drive are led ultimately to conceive of themselves as “persons”, in Hegel’s technical sense: as agents who are rationally compelled to recognise others. In chapters 3 and 4, I show that there is a tension between these two aspects of our identities, and that Hegel’s theory of objective mind is effectively the working out of this tension. (shrink)