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  1. Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.Guy Axtell - 2019 - Lanham, MD, USA & London, UK: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield.
    To speak of being religious lucky certainly sounds odd. But then, so does “My faith holds value in God’s plan, while yours does not.” This book argues that these two concerns — with the concept of religious luck and with asymmetric or sharply differential ascriptions of religious value — are inextricably connected. It argues that religious luck attributions can profitably be studied from a number of directions, not just theological, but also social scientific and philosophical. There is a strong tendency (...)
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  • Ownership, Agency, and Defeat.Daniel S. Breyer - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):253-256.
    In this article, I respond to Jennifer Duke-Yonge’s (2012) discussion of my article ‘Reflective Luck and Belief Ownership’ (Breyer, Acta Analytica, 25:133–154, 2010) and defend my Taking Responsibility account of belief ownership against her insightful criticisms.
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  • Ownership, Authorship and External Justification.Jennifer Duke-Yonge - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):237-252.
    Some of the most well-known arguments against epistemic externalism come in the form of thought experiments involving subjects who acquire beliefs through anomolous means such as clairvoyance. These thought experiments purport to provide counterexamples to the reliabilist conception of justification: their subjects are intuitively epistemically unjustified, yet meet reliabilist externalist criteria for justification. In this article, I address a recent defence of externalism due to Daniel Breyer, who argues that externalists need not consider such subjects justified, since they fail to (...)
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  • The Structure of Cognitive Agency.Daniel Breyer - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (3):285-296.
    Credit theories of knowledge have to explain the conditions under which beliefs are attributable to cognitive agents. The most promising way to explain these conditions is to offer an account of cognitive agency that is a plausible development of the uncontroversial notion that we are believing subjects. This article develops and defends a Structuralist model of cognitive agency.
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  • Knowledge, Credit, and Cognitive Agency.Daniel S. Breyer - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):503-528.
    According to credit theories of knowledge, S knows that p only if S deserves credit for truly believing that p. This article argues that any adequate credit theory has to explain the conditions under which beliefs are attributable to subjects. It then presents a general account of these conditions and defends two models of cognitive agency. Finally, the article explains how an agent-based approach rescues the credit theory from an apparent counterexample. The article's defense of the credit theory is qualified, (...)
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